Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle
IX. évfolyam – 2010/2 • ISSN 1582-9952

TARTALOM/CUPRINS/SUMMARY

Mihály Vajda
European Identity and Nationalisms /3/

Miruna Troncotă
Western Balkans Revisited /11/

Emilia Świętochotowska
Cultural Identity vs. Transnational Solidarity /37/

Márton Attila Demeter
Națiunea europeană? /63/

Floare Chipea – Melinda Dincă
Identitatea din perspectiva interacționismului simbolic /93/

Gábor Flóra
Parallelism, Contradiction and Complementarity
in the Genesis of the National Identities
and Ideologies in Transylvania /115/

Alpár Losoncz
Identity as a Phenomenological Issue /157/

Vasile Muscă
Notes on the Margin of the Idea of Romanian Philosophy /169/

Gizella Horváth
Whose shoes? Identity in Works of Art /177/

Szerzők/Autorii/Authors /199/
Up to 1989 the critical intellectuals of the Eastern Middle Europe wanted to point out the European nature of their countries. Of course, from their viewpoint, Europe represented the Western Europe, the Western attitude. I do not want to deny that this was my own view either. The late Milan Siemečka from Bratislava reproached me for having asserted this. Why cannot Russia be European, just because its people are oppressed by a hard dictatorship? – wondered Siemečka.

Even now, I have to admit, I cannot give a straight answer to his question. And it is not so because of the Communist Dictatorship. The existing form of the political regime in a country is surely not the decisive factor if we want to take decisions regarding the attitude of a society. And, from my point of view, the idea of Europeanness expressed an attitude, nothing else. At that time I questioned neither Husserl’s deep convictions nor, curiously enough, Heidegger’s, that Europe suggests nothing else but the reign of the philosophical spirit. I did not question it, although I felt something was missing from this view: the other source of Europe, that is the Judeo-Christian tradition. I cannot provide any analysis of the two philosophers’ theses here. However I have to question where they have drawn the limit of this spiritual entity. I would say that Heidegger’s view is clearer. I quote two sentences from his work, *Introduction to Metaphysics*: „We are encircled, captured by pincers. Our people have mostly placed the pressure of the pincers in the essence of experiences, our people, which have the most neighbours, which is, accordingly, the most endangered one and, in accordance with all this, there are the metaphysical people par excellence.” „If the great decision concerning Europe won’t highlight the way of its annihilation, then, just then, it can happen only by developing the new historical spiritual forces deriving from the middle.” The revival of the German spirit, taken as the revival of Europe, i. e. the revival of the spiritual forces of Europe. The two branches of the pincers are Russia and America. The ground of the European spirit stretches between these...
two, a territory whose middle part is represented by Germany. I cannot speak about the political connotations of these statements here.

Husserl speaks differently. According to him, Europe has nothing to do with geography. He explains that besides the geographical Europe the European spirit belongs to the British Dominion, the United States etc., but the Eskimos or the Indian showmen at the markets, or the gypsies, who stroll throughout Europe permanently, do not belong to it. Derrida accuses Husserl on racism, without saying that one has to be a racist in that sense if he wants to speak about Europe as a spiritual identity. Yet it seems obvious to me. We name either everybody who lives within the geographical territory of Europe as European, or we can refer only to those whose whole attitude underlines some features that are related to the genuine European behaviour and thinking as European. That points out a special way of thinking. As I had already mentioned, the two philosophers regard this special way of thinking, the philosophical thinking as originating in the ancient Greece. Both of them emphasize that the European spirit is a philosophical spirit, and both of them see the origin of the European crisis in the crisis of the philosophical thinking.

If we want to accept this statement, that the European spirit is similar to the philosophical spirit, then we are again confronted with enormous difficulties. What does this philosophical thinking mean? Both philosophers state that philosophy originated in the ancient Greece, it has been the basis of our European thinking, but at this point we can see the possible deep difference between the two phenomenologists. On the one hand, both mean that philosophy has given birth to the form of cognitive activity we call science, that both philosophy and science are the products of Europe. However according to Husserl, science is the only true form of knowledge, even if its false objectivism, deriving from the approach of Descartes and Galileo, is the main root of our crisis; in his turn, Heidegger had gradually begun to compare knowledge (science) with thinking. In Husserl’s view, to overcome the crisis means to overcome the false objectivism of sciences and philosophy while also remaining devoted to the Greek beginnings; yet, according to Heidegger, without a new beginning (neuer Anfang), we will be unable to surpass the crisis. This new beginning cannot be the result of human thinking and activity. The genuine German philosophers (Meister Eckhart and Jacob Böhme, Leibniz and Kant, Schelling and Hölderlin, and finally Nietzsche) could
find only an abyss at the basis of the Being. The decision has to occur in the Being Sein.

Furthermore the behaviour and thinking of the Eskimos, Indians and gipsies are not determined by science. Many, probably the great majority of the inhabitants of the European and European type countries have not any idea about sciences, even if they think science is almighty. I wonder how these two great philosophers, speaking about Europe, wanted to see only the one source of the European thinking and behaviour forgetting that Europe could not be Europe without the other source, namely, as I have already mentioned, the Jewish-Christian religious tradition, whereas our thinking and, first of all, our behaviour, are based on the religious tradition, not on the scientific knowledge, even in the modern secular times. The only phenomenologist, who clearly saw that the West was determined by the alliance of religion with the scientific-technical knowledge, against the East, where the consciousness and behaviour were determined by the “metaphysics”, was the third great phenomenologist, Max Scheler. Considering this we can accept Europe as determined by a spirit without excluding anybody living within this territory.

Is then Russia European or not? This is a difficult question. It is not absurd to say that, from many perspectives, only the Western form of the Christian religion determines the attitudes we define as European. I am convinced that the most of the Europeans are inclined to think so, even if they do not want to declare their position in this case. In my view it is not so important to take a decisive standpoint in this respect. If I want to speak about the European identity and nationalism, the Russian nationalism has its place besides all the Western people’s nationalism.

The unification of Europe does not mean that there would be a strong European consciousness on the continent. The upper level of society is conscious of its European identity. But to suppose a kind of European consciousness among all the inhabitants of this territory? – I cannot believe in it. There is not such a phenomenon. I’ll try to explain what I mean. There is a United States of America on the North American continent. The inhabitants of the different States belonging to it feel American, and the fact that they live in Massachusetts or in the Washington State is something that mostly has only a practical importance for them. Of course, their place, city or context is very important for them; they can be, and are mostly very proud of the city they live in – I have heard
different people saying: ‘I am a New Yorker, and I do not even know any other parts of the States he or she meant, of course New York City not the New York State —, or the majority of the Californians are insisting on California, not on the Californian State, surely not on the Californian nation, which actually does not exist at all, on the surrounding, the beauty of nature and so on and so forth. So, in most of the cases they have a kind of local identity. Everything I’ve told is trivial, everybody knows it, it was perhaps even superfluous to mention. If there is something to mention besides the idea of being American, something important for some or even for the majority of the American people, that is their solidarity with their ethnic group. That they are Germans, Jews, Russians, Russian Jews, black not white, white not black, etc. I apologize for not having been politically correct.

Could anybody imagine a kind of the United States of Europe where the situation would be same? Europe, even those parts of it which belong to the EU, represent a community of the nation States, which consider their independence even inside the Union absolutely important. The ethnic and linguistic homogeneity is also an essential attribute in the case of their citizens.

The traditional conflicts among the major countries of Europe are vanishing at the moment. For instance, there is no conflict between the French and the German people, not to speak about the French and the German State. Even the conflicts between the Germans and the Czechs, the Germans and the Polish have appeared insignificant lately. But there are the national conflicts in Europe. They are very relevant in our region, even inside some Western States where different nations live under the same rule (Belgium), or in the contexts where smaller linguistic islands can be found inside of an otherwise uniform larger nation. I also have to mention the Irish issue in the United Kingdom, better to say in Ulster, the Basque problem in Spain etc. Commonplaces again, everybody knows these facts, and even if one would be happy to see that these problems are on their best way to be solved (which is surely not the case), nobody raises this question: Why is it so? In the last analysis everybody considered the following statement as “normal,” so to say: the condition of a peaceful life in a country is assured by the ethnic and lingual homogeneity of its inhabitants. With the sole exception of Switzerland. But the history of the last is totally different from that of the others.
By having explained all these, I’ve reached the point I originally wanted to speak about. The history of the European nation’s States begins with modernity, the development of democratic structures, the limited possibilities of practically all their inhabitants to take part in the formation of the united political will. Moreover, nationalism developed by means of the nation States. In the traditional societies, under the rule of the traditional forms of power, the belonging to an ethnical or lingual group played absolutely no role in the conflicts inside a State, or among the different States. In this respect, the only thing of importance was the social status of the decision makers, if we can use this modern expression. The members of the higher ranks of nobility and the higher clergy had fought against each other for different reasons, of course, mostly for power, but their ethnic belonging, or the language they spoke were not the reasons of their fights. Religion either – until the time of reformation there was only one religion in Europe. Later religion certainly played a role in developing nationalism. For a French aristocrat a German was surely not unfamiliar, their mode of thinking and behaviour was generally the same. They considered the members of the lower social levels, the peasants from the countryside or the craftsmen and merchants from the towns strangers in their own country. The last ones partially excepting the merchants, did not know anybody else as their co-habitants.

At the rise of modernity, during a period of time suggesting a social movement which had not been sensed since the epoch of the great migrations, when even common people had got in touch with others en masse, speaking another language, having alien habits, wearing quite different clothes, the fear from the others had begun to rise. Perceived as against the noblemen, the people belonging to the lower strata of society were different from country to country, partly because of their isolation. Thus people felt secure only among the people they knew, even if not necessarily personally; they wanted to live in a familiar surrounding. In their view the aliens were unreliable.

In the strata where the fear from the alien lies deeply in the soul of the people, even if unconsciously, there can be no feeling of European identity, even if consciously the majority knows that they are European.

Of course, there is no homogeneous European nationalism. The nationalism of each nation has its specificity. The citizens of the European nation States are nationalists, without any exception, but the forms of
these nationalisms are different indeed. In those States where nationalism has already lost its militant character there is only an unconscious form of it. A very prominent recent example: ‘Why are we obliged to support the Greeks who did not learn to make good use of their labour force?’ asks the average German citizen, even the one who approves the support of the Germans in need, who is highly socially sensitive.

But the nationalisms in our part of Europe, against the West, are mostly very combative. In the Carpathian basin these nationalisms have their very long history. Even if the early “freedom fights” of the Hungarians against the Habsburg rule had, in my view, nothing to do with any kind of nationalism: there were the fights of the feudal forces against a modern centralized monarchy. The first freedom fight against Austria pointing out a national, in fact nationalistic motivation, was the one in 1848–49, prepared by the so called “reform age” movement, a definitely middle-class intellectual one. They had gradually clearly declared that the Hungarian nation wanted to be independent from the German speaking monarchy. Nevertheless the Hungarian nation, even if its early nationalism had no excluding character at all –there were many foreigners, even Jews who had fought on the side of the “honvédek,” the freedom fighters – could not understand the nationalistic movement of the other nations living with them in the Carpathian basin, in the traditional Hungary of Szent István (St Steven). It was very sensitive to the oppression – whether it was oppressed. There was absolutely no sense to refer to it, if it was the oppressor. I shall certainly not tell the Hungarian story developing from the mid 19th century until now. Instead of making an attempt to solve the almost unsolvable issues, the Trianon treaty had practically impeded the solution for the next centuries; this has to be clear to everybody. I like the statement of István Bibós very much: The problem was not with Trianon, he said, the unity of Nagymagyarország (Nagymagyarország menyország, csonka Magyarország nem ország: The Great Hungary is the heaven, the mutilated Hungary is not a country at all) could not be saved. The problem was developed by the border-lines, created without any deep consideration; furthermore, I’d like to add, they were not acceptable for the Hungarians. Not even the disappearance of the borders, after so many decades, brought any détente.

The situation concerning the Balkans is even worse. I wanted to mention it only because the relationship of the Yugoslavian identity with
the nationalisms of the different nations of the former Yugoslavian State shows, in my view, how the real relationship between the European identity and the European nationalisms looks like. All my friends were Yugoslavian. None of them was a Serb, Croatian, or Bosnian. When I told them that, excepting the liberal intellectuals, there are no Yugoslavians in Yugoslavia, they laughed at me.

Of course, the increasing security and welfare makes nationalism less aggressive and combative. But in the poor regions of our continent I cannot hope that people of different nations would rather prefer to cooperate than fight against each other. If one does not feel secure he has to fight against those who endanger his security. And these are the aliens, even if they want to be assimilated as, for example, the majority of Jews.
The so-called ‘Western Balkans’ (WB) have always been a “hot subject” of research for the social scientists and this is due to their controversial theoretical status. Plenty of authors have tried to define this region by geographical, historical and cultural means, but it seems it was never clear enough and the debate is ongoing. The confusion comes from the fact that everyone knows where the Balkan region lies on the map, but no one can identify properly which are the exact Balkan countries. Some of the Balkan countries do not even recognize themselves as being Balkan… Starting from here, a lot of authors went even further, by doubting whether the concept could be used any longer in a context of disapproval regarding its significance. Maria Todorova was one of the first scholars to open a serious theoretical enquiry regarding the symbolical negative connotations of the concept of “Balkanism”, and its political usage both by Western Europeans and the countries from the region themselves (Todorova, 1994). In this context, the origin of the “naming” issue, and the creation of a political region by discourse poses a very intricate question: Who invented the WB and why?

As a response to the lack of precision accused of by other sciences, the social sciences developed a sort of ‘conceptual creativity’ by proposing new and more sharply defined words to encompass complex social realities. This phenomenon reached one of its peaks in the 90’s (after the fall of communism and the formal end of the Cold War), when all the concepts in the

* „Beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007–2013”
social and political sciences ought to be ‘re-defined’ or even ‘re-created’. In this theoretical context, an alternative for the inexact concept of “ex-Yugoslavia” was found in the term “Western Balkans”. It was introduced in the official political discourse in 1998 by the Austrian Presidency of the EU once Bulgaria and Romania (which were called the Eastern Balkans) were allowed to open membership talks with the EU. This new concept expressed the need of both the epistemic and the political community for a brand new geopolitical term to denominate the remaining countries left temporarily outside the EU paradigm. So, in the first phase the term ‘Western Balkans’ included all the countries that prepared at the time for the negotiations to gain EU membership (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia and Montenegro). Slovenia, even though it was an ex-Yugoslav country, was assimilated to the Central and East European Countries (CEEC), entering the EU in 2004. Croatia expected the same treatment from the EU, but it remained “outside” the CEE wave of Europeanization. The list of WB countries has suffered a few changes along the years, in the same rhythm with the political changes determined by the so-called ‘Europeanization’ process. After 2004, when the CEEC have been accepted as new member states of the EU, only seven South East European (SEE) countries remained outside the Union (but this number has fluctuated ever since, by adding or eliminating one or two countries from the list). It became clear that there was a stringent need for a new concept to tackle this ever-changing political reality (which was previously granted with the metaphor ‘powder keg’ at the beginning of the 20th century). The non-EU countries left outside the first Eastward Enlargement were divided in three categories: Romania and Bulgaria, which gained EU membership in 2007, Croatia and recently Montenegro and FYROM Macedonia which have candidate status; and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo (under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244/99) which are considered potential candidates. The latest widely accepted meaning of the WB by the academia and the political discourse refers to the ex-Yugoslav countries (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, FYROM, Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99), minus Slovenia, plus Albania (Grabbe, 2006) and this will be the meaning the article will refer to.

Leaving aside these “terminological” issues, which may also be an indicator of the difficulties raised by this region to social scientists, the purpose of this article is to map the way the WB defined their own ethnical, cultural and political identity in the last 15 years. This process took place as
a ‘symbolical dialogue’ (transfer of social perceptions) with their European counterpart - the vast region of Western Europe, symbolized by the EU, which was always seen as a point of reference both in their identity-building process and in the self-defining political discourse. It is a common fact that after the Bosnian War the international intervention was the only factor that could temporarily stabilize the post conflict societies of the Balkans. That is why the EU discourse of power was a pivotal factor for the political reconstruction of the region. Before going further with the analysis, there should also be acknowledged that the term ‘WB’ was officially employed by an EU governing institution (the Council) and this might be a partial answer to our previous question: Who invented the WB region and why? What the article wishes to suggest in this point is that when the creation of a region is investigated with the instruments of social sciences, it should be primarily taken in consideration the symbolic process of naming operated by certain actors towards others. This process is done in accordance with the personal political views of a certain dominant actor by employing a certain type of political discourse in relation to ‘the Other’, as a symbolic part of the epistemic ‘dialogue’ (in our case, between WB and EU).

After a short description of the general theoretical “East-West” dichotomy (which was inherited from the Cold War ideological discourse), the constructivist theoretical framework will be employed in order to “deconstruct” the way identity discourses shaped WB realities both locally and at the European level. Applying the constructivist conceptual framework, in the second part, the article shall stress upon the idea that politically, the evolution of the relationships between the Balkan countries and the West has led to the future prospects of enlargement of EU in the region, a process which sheds a new light on the evolution of cultural differences but also resemblances between the two geopolitical regions. This process implies a symbolical integration of the so-called ‘European values’ by the prospective candidate countries in the region. The trends of both inclusion and exclusion have marked the relations between these parts of Europe for centuries and the contemporary period makes no exception. In this context a section of the article will be dedicated to exploring the main features of so-called Europeanization and Balkanization, and mainly it shall configure the way they have been “constructed” and perceived by the actors. In this section the article will focus on investigating which are the main features of these two phenomena and what are the possible ways to overcome this contradiction.
based on the *identity* and *post identity* dichotomy. The article poses some doubts in the end regarding the accomplishment of national identity in the WB following EU’s post national standards.

**Can constructivism explain identity-building in the Western Balkans?**

The main hypothesis of the paper will involve terms such as *modernity* and *post modernity, national* and *post national* and *identity* and *post identity* as possible dichotomous pairs of concepts able to express the two ‘different languages’ used by the actors in their symbolic political interactions. In order to realize such a theoretical outcome, the article uses constructivism - a rather recent theory in both political science and international relations. The main reason for choosing this theory is that the study of national and regional identity usually focuses on the main markers developed inside constructivism: norms, beliefs, identities.

Constructivism emerged in the 1990s as international relations scholars first realized that the dominant approaches of neo realism and neo liberalism could not explain transformative events like the end of the Cold War. Constructivism is thus part of the post positivist “sociological turn” in the social sciences and one of its pioneering authors in international relations was Alexander Wendt. This theoretical framework asserts the existence of social structures - including norms, beliefs, and identities – constituting world politics (Wendt, 1999). All constructivists assert the importance of what John Searle calls “social facts”: facts that exist because all the relevant actors in a society agree they exist (Searle, 1995). Nations and nationalities are considered in this respect ‘social facts’ or ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983). Other ‘social facts’ like sovereignty, property, human rights, and collective security are for constructivists the basis of world politics, and social actors construct at the symbolical level those social facts through intense social interaction. This view on world politics has its theoretical origin also in the famous works of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann that has been brought back into the academic debate more recently by the already mentioned John Searle (Berger, Luckmann, 1966).

Further on, I shall try to comprise in a few sentences the main ideas which this theory relies on, in order to prove that it tackles exactly the prob-
lematical issues the paper intends to analyze about the WB. First, constructivists argue that material structures of incentives (such as institutions) have meaning for human agents only within the context of social rules. Second, social structures help constitute the interests and identities of purposive actors. Constructivism thus opposes in this regard individualist ontologies (such as rational choice theory) that explain social outcomes as the aggregate result of individual decisions (Frederking, 2003). Conversely, they explain that human agency is ‘enmeshed’ in a web of social rules that both constitute and regulate interactions between actors (Adler, 1997). Third, agents and structures construct each other. Rules make agents and agents make rules. The (social) world is made by people, who in turn are made by that (social) world. One of the pioneering authors on this subject, Jack Ruggie argues that constructivism offers an important middle ground between positivism and postmodernism (Ruggie, 1998). In this context, constructivism proves to be a very useful theoretical instrument in analyzing WB as a cultural and political product of the “symbolical war” between European modernity and post modernity, as the article shall demonstrate further on.

There must be underlined that one aim of constructivist arguments is studying the importance of beliefs in world politics and the way they are used in the discourse of power. In this respect, the article shall investigate the formation of what is typically known as “Balkanism”, a specific type of belief regarding Western European perception about former Yugoslav countries and the entire Peninsula. The second main constructivist argument focuses on the importance of identity in world politics. Identities tell agents who they are and who others are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves and others intelligible. Constructivists argue that interests stem from a particular, constructed representation of the relationship between self and other. So identity-building is a vital process for the functioning of a political community, especially in a post-conflict area like WB.

Many constructivist scholars focus not only separately on these issues, but also on the interconnections among ideas, norms, and identities, and the article tries to show that such a perspective may give a wider and more complex view on the region. Rules, like language, are not reducible to the meanings that individuals attach to them; they exist also in the shared meanings of their users and are reproduced through their practices (Wendt, 1999). Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of a term is connected to its use in speech, not whether it corresponds exactly to things in the real world.
This symbolical analysis tries to follow his statement and investigate not only the realities embodied in social structures, but also the way actors get in touch with these realities. I believe that without a symbolical explanation of the subtle interactions that took place between the Balkan populations and the strive for imposing their re-defined ‘post war identity’ on one side and the external international actors as ordering elements of international security arena on the other side, we can not understand the depth of this guided/supervised process of identity-building, first at the regional level and then at the European one. Political actions are nothing without the symbols attached to them.

WB became in the last 20 years a valuable subject of research because of their intricate power relations with other parts of Europe (marked by both inclusion and exclusion). Furthermore, this article tries to show that this region is also a very fertile ground for symbolical analysis. Here, identities are diffuse and always renegotiated, so identity-building challenges profoundly any attempt of institution building made after a West European ‘classical’ model. Moreover, in any type of research on the Balkans the most common view you will encounter is the one that states that among all the European sub-cultures we can definitely observe that the Balkan Peninsula is a sui-generis symbol of “the Other”, a cultural space distinct from all parts of Europe, a place of both Eastern and Western mixture. The main argument put forward in this section of the paper is that the concept of the “Other” opposed to “Us” is a culturally manufactured identity axiom (typical for colonial and postcolonial discourses of power) and can be only partially explained by historical and “objective” contexts (Frederking, 2003, p 368). That is why the main endeavor in studying the WB is to provide another type of answer to these questions: Why are the Balkans different than other parts of Europe? Are they just considered different so that they can be treated differently by other international actors or the distinction is a built-in reality? This basic question can not be answered without tackling the fundamental issue that creates controversy in any research on the region: identity-building.

Therefore, the article tries to prove in the first place that the constructivist theory has the conceptual instruments to explain that the interaction between WB and Western Europe influenced enormously the way the actors perceived themselves and each other, which determined certain political actions towards one another. The particular tension between the ways Balkan
The region has been perceived as a symbol of “otherness” for Europe will be one of the main challenges of the first part of the analysis, where the East versus West paradigms and their symbolical outcomes will be examined. The main hypothesis of this paper will refer to the way the two actors part of the European arena (the WB on one side and EU on the other side) construct their political discourses by using two different, incompatible ‘languages’ in relation to one another.

The East-West dogmatic dichotomy—
a legacy of the Cold War in the post Cold War period

In this part of the article the analysis will focus on the symbolical biases that oversimplified the WB in the Western rhetoric and determined Balkan states to counter-react aggressively. These particular tensions which stem for the ways WB have been perceived as a symbol of “otherness” for Europe will be one of the main challenges of the first part of the analysis. Here, the East vs. West paradigms of the Cold War logic of discourse will be examined and their symbolical outcomes in the Post Cold War Era.

In constructivist terms, there is a need to rigorously define the geopolitical context of the region and the interactions with its “symbolical” counterparts, in order to configure their power relations. Thus, the post Cold War Era is the main timeframe of the paper, when the geopolitical context was marked by the fall of communism and the transition to a viable democracy. Inside this time frame, Western democracies where confronted with a totally new situation: there was no ideological competitor and many transitions to democracy taking place in cultural spaces they knew almost nothing about (except the powerful stereotypes used as ideological “short cuts” during the Cold War). Such a moment brings with it the need for more refined political theories able to understand and explain the new realities. Western Europe became very engaged in taking the Balkans on its side, but this occurred a bit too late, after the shocks of ethnic based genocides during a 3-year-long violent war (1992–1995).

Formally, the dominant post-Cold War trend was movement away from Cold War rivalry rules and (slowly) toward collective security rules. In reality, Katherine Verdery’s thesis about this issue is that the Other, ideologically labeled as communism during the Cold War has replaced the old geo-
graphical and the symbolical notion of the Other - the Orient and after the fall of communism the Balkans regained its axiological label of inferiority and backwardness in Europe (Verdery, 1996). Taking into consideration also the famous statement of Martin Medhurst that “The Cold War was primarily a rhetorical war”, it is important to pay attention to symbols used in portraying “the Other” embodied by the WB also after the Cold War. Most theorists consider the Balkan region as a laboratory of history where plenty of political experiments took place. The post Cold War era is no exception to that. Some analysts even mention that “a new wave of utopianism” started after 1989, when the old partition between democratic West and communist East has become one between Europe and the Balkans (Kaufman, 2001). This period of time is worth to be more closely observed especially because it was marked by the fear of “borderlessness” and the collapse of clearly defined oppositions between the East and the West after 1989, which created a void of identity, a vacuum of power structures and a crisis of the established symbols. The politics of identity after the Cold War becomes a very controversial and fertile subject of research inside the Balkan Peninsula.

The article stresses therefore the idea that multiple strands of continuity exist between Cold War and post Cold War period and one of the most visible in the political discourse was the East-West dogmatic dichotomy. As Maria Todorova has argued following Edward Said’s writings, the symbolic implications of the term “Balkanism“ are elements of special focus in any theoretical enquiry of the region because this term incorporates the entire East-West rigid ideological debate. In this regard there were numerous pre-eminent academic contributions which followed Todorova’s works, and all of them are helpful in drawing a more accurate picture of the topic (Norris, 1999; Bjelić and Savić, 2002; Hammond, 2005). Although the term Balkan has gained negative connotations in Western Europe and North America mostly since the ethnic conflicts in the 1990s, the term and its derivatives will continue to be used both in the academia and in political discourses instead of the newly-accepted geographic and neutral South East Europe. In fact Eastern Europe as a broader geopolitical concept has always been an ideological avatar. The peak of this process was reached during the Cold War, based on rigid political dichotomies, but the trend started long ago back in the dark European history. As it is already well known, any concept of evil was embodied in the Eastern side of the European continent, a region of horrors, death, imprisonment, cruelness, dictatorship. Even though com-
The Western Balkans revisited – an Island of “Otherness” in Europe?

The communist Yugoslavia was a bit of an exception in this “ideological labeling” of the Cold War, because it had an “abnormal” communist system, (with its open borders, small capitalist private property and Iosip Broz Tito as an iconic powerful leader), the Balkans as a whole continued to be biased by these ideological rough considerations.

The Post Cold War period has been marked in the WB by permanent negotiations of identity (that took also the extreme form of ethnic cleansing), typical for a geopolitical zone of conflicting acts of identification. As the article shall explain further on, the Post Cold War Era is a Post identity Era which outlines a very challenging context for a political space being still in the process of ‘unfinished modernization’.

The unfulfilled modernization in the Western Balkans vs. the post modernization approach of the EU

The goal of these Post Cold War symbolically constructed relations between the two separated parts of Europe (separated both in ideological terms and in symbolical boundaries) was the convergence of strategies towards development. Analyzed from an evolutionist modernization theory, this convergence means only ‘a melting in’ of Non Western models into the Western model of society – as seen by the neo colonialist theoreticians (Roucek, 1998). The article wishes to draw attention that this process is even more complex than that and it needs more refined concepts in order to be explained and understood accurately. The process of building identity (as a feature of delayed modernization) in a Post Identity Era is the main theoretical asset proposed by the present article.

In elaborating the main hypothesis regarding the two different ‘languages’ the subjects of analysis use in relation with each other, the article shall first refer to the symbolical “war” between European Modernity and Post Modernity as two opposite processes which take place simultaneously in the WB. It shall be argued that by using ‘modern’ meanings of the same concepts in relation to ‘post modern’ realities (taking the identity-building process as unit of analysis), WB face not only structural but also symbolical difficulties in meeting Western European standards meant to integrate them in the EU paradigm of political development.
Modernity must be understood in this context not only as a temporal phase in human historical development, but also as a theoretical framework which influenced social processes and had as one of its main features the affirmation of national identity, which was the basis of state formation and of drawing boundaries between nationalities (Eisenstadt, 2001). Conversely, Post Modernity is also a temporal phase and a theoretical framework which came directly in contradiction with most of the prerogatives of Modernity, proclaiming the end of the state, the end of ideologies, relativity and the beginning of a post national era. According to these new guiding principles towards social and political developments, in a postmodern world identities are shaped by continuously shifting boundaries between cultures, religions and other places of belonging (new, transnational boundaries are been drawn). What was in the modern times stable, sacred and un-negotiable, in Post Modernity becomes “liquid”, uncertain, and open for debate and negotiation. The symbolical markers of what where once known as ‘national cultures’ are now transgressed by a multicultural puzzle in which every individual is involved. Postmodern identities can be changed and manipulated as often as the subject determines it is needed. Identities are layered upon differences that overlap each other as opposed to the search for similarities and homogeneity (as it was in the modern times) (Petrunic, 2005). Inside the postmodern paradigm, identity is to be seen as a dynamic and flexible construct in which multiple identities or acts of identification are allowed and expected.

Several scholars have explained the rise of nationalism as the consequence of “modernization” variously understood as some combination of secularization, industrialization, rising literacy, increasing technological sophistication, and similar factors (Gellner, 1983). National ideologies transformed political life, as they seized European imaginations, but also affected how people viewed each other in everyday circumstances. The experience of life in Eastern Europe, a region where the impact of nationalism proved particularly ‘explosive’ (as the metaphor tinderbox explicitly states), has included the experience of being stereotyped and classified in terms of ‘nationalist fantasy’. Nationalism has been inscribed in its numerous concrete historical hypostases within a single explanatory framework - that of modernity. It implies “a broader conception of the temporal-cultural dimensions of social relations-social relations through which ‘the nation’ is itself produced as a cultural- ideological effect of various forms of state power” (Todorova, 2005, p 141). This also means that outside the historical framework of mo-
In this theoretical context, the article suggests the simultaneous character of the process in which the ‘new’ national identities of former Yugoslav countries took shape in connection with the external intervention, mainly the EU enlargement policies (the so-called process of ‘Europeanization’, understood here as the symbolical transfer of values, realized through the discourse of power). This allows us to make observations about the contradictions between local perceptions of nationalism and local dimensions of identity-building in the WB (as constructing the Nation and fulfilling a long delayed modernization of the state) and the making of a new type of regional post identity through regional cooperation (following a transnational logic promoted by the EU, as a result of the post modern logic). This particular expectation defined by EU as ‘membership conditionality’ shall be defined in the article as post identity. Moreover, post identity is understood as the symbolic dimension of Europeanization, which encompasses in the case of the WB the transformations from an exclusive approach between self and the other (the ethnic definition of the state), towards an inclusive, multicultural, more flexible one (the civic definition of the state). This symbolical transfer in the identity-building process is for many analysts doomed to fail (taking into consideration the permanent delay and discontinuity of the EU Enlargement in the WB) but the article tries not to interrogate its finality, but to theoretically explain its malfunctioning. Further on, the article tries to define and examine those conflicting intersections of identity-building as contingent acts of social and cultural projections between WB and Western Europeans. Its aim is to identify the symbolical process of regional identity creation through political discourse and suggest possible misinterpretations of the actors for the same realities they are facing.

The article puts forward the idea that since 1995 (the year Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, which ended the Bosnian War) the WB are still in the modernizing process of identity-building (being de-phased from this process by multiple historical events in the last two centuries) and what Western Europe requires from them is a Postmodern bureaucratic reform in order to become EU members. So the two actors of the analysis - WB on one side and the EU on the other - have been facing in the last 15 years...
a contradictory process of un-realistic expectations from each other. EU conditionality, as the main instrument of political Europeanization is a multi purpose process of imposing standards and social values in shaping democratic reform. Not only does EU conditionality influence identity-building, but this ‘post modern’ instrument aims at bringing peace, stability and prosperity in the region. This multi-purpose strategy was often criticized by political scientists, who argued that tool was conceived by the Western powers as a peacemaking strategy after the Bosnian war 1992-1995 and the war in Kosovo in 1999, using EU as a ‘one for all’ instrument for solving nation-building problems. By making these countries focus on future EU membership, they intended in taking their attention from defending with their own life their ‘new-born’ identities (which were negatively and rigidly constructed according to ‘traditional’ standards of modernity, this type of process being already ‘outdated’ inside the post modern international arena, defined by large institutions of globalization). EU conditionality must be therefore understood as a tool for directing the WB towards a ‘post identity’ political construction, an ethnically neutral space where different citizens can communicate and cooperate peacefully with each other, respecting the rule of law and not imposing the ‘rule of blood’. So the big question arises: can EU cope with such a difficult mission of dismantling ‘the powder keg’ of ethnic hatred in the WB, something that the communist federation of Yugoslavia failed to accomplish in 50 years time? And after the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, when EU engaged actively in making the WB part of the EU in the near future, we might say that the answer to the previous question is yes, but then the question that needs to be addressed is the following ‘By what means and how big are the costs of this achievement?’.

In this context it is important to investigate the way modernity (as a Western paradigm) is defined as an identity-building process followed by specific institution building. It is already a very well known fact that during the 18th century new institutions appeared, led by an efficiency oriented bureaucracy, as Max Weber described, which formed the state apparatus. The way identities took shape during this period becomes a vital process for analyzing democratic national institutions. Inside the Balkans this aspect is highly problematic because the modernization was a permanently delayed phase in their history. In the Post Cold War Era the two actors of the European continent (WB and EU) found themselves in two distinct historical phases of development. This argument aims at explaining the misunderstandings
and tensioned relations between the two actors, which might also explain the present ‘failed Europeanization’ in the region. 15 years after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, WB are still ‘trapped’ inside the modern paradigm of defining their national identity in order to strengthen their statehood, whereas the EU offers them incentives for reform using a post modern paradigm of discourse. This discourse includes EU conditionality and Europeanization as its main components promoting a post national citizenship based on human rights principles and prescribes the formation of what the article labels as *post identity*, a typical outcome of European post modernity. *Post identity* is not directly built on the basis of rigidly defined nationality and ethnicity, but on rational purposes of welfare, cooperation and human rights. *Post identity* is flexible and rational, based on interests and mutually defined gains. Political structures that have a built-in dimension of *post identity* are focused on cooperation and assimilation, not on division and differentiation using a rigid criterion (as the ethnicity, religion or the race). From this constructivist perspective on identity-building, the Europeanization process in the WB has as its core goal the process of *post identity building* that should be the basis for efficient and non-violent institution building, built on civic rights and responsibilities not on ethnic division.

The post national reality of the EU, the main external actor that determines the international interactions of the Balkans, does not match the fact that ex Yugoslavia’s successor states are still *aspiring nations* or *nations under construction*. The recent evolutions in the region (the independence of Montenegro and Kosovo) bring even more fragmentation and deepen the unresolved problem of shifting from rigid late modernity towards open and fluid post modernity. For this type of states, “nationhood” is more than just symbolic, (i.e. “discursive”, as it is perceived in the EU member states), cultural rather than political, with a preeminent ethical role rather than a neutral civic engagement. The classical conception that asserts “states make nations, not the other way around” (Gellner, 1983) is applied completely opposite inside the Balkans. This should be a warning for EU in order to provide institutional and symbolical incentives to determine the WB to go beyond their long-disputed and almost never-ending identity-building process and base their states on other scopes, such as anticorruption policies, welfare, human rights, minority protection. These interest-based, universal values and norms are typical features of the globalization process and the post modern relativistic discourse. They can not be identified inside the Balkans and the mental
shift from one historical and symbolical phase to the other (from modernity to post modernity) seems to be a long and difficult process.

The WB symbolical framework, defined by ethnicities violently competing for a sort of ‘nationhood supremacy’, does not fit post modern realities. This overlapping process might explain the tensions and the ‘different languages’ the two actors use in this complex political process of post conflict democratization. How then can WB develop post identity strategies towards becoming EU members if they do not shift fundamentally out of the modernist nation-centered perspective?

**Balkanization and Europeanization as parts of cultural hybridity**

This section of the article shall focus on the main trends that marked the established relations between WB and EU during the last 15 years. The idea that needs to be demonstrated here is that the symbolical relations between WB and the EU are marked by two trends based on the misunderstandings and different attachments actors have towards the concepts of nationhood and identity. These complex processes bare the names Balkanization and Europeanization. Even if EU wants to construct a strong form of belonging inside the concept of European identity (as a symbolical outcome of the EU membership) the meaning of it is totally distinct to the one conceived by the WB as an emotional, exclusivist, profoundly ethnical type of attachment. Balkan people proved they are willing to give their lives in order to defend their new-born nationhood, whereas European identity is a broader, fluid, always negotiable, weaker type of attachment. So the question is: *can Europeanization be successfully achieved in the WB when it takes place at the same time with Balkanization?*

Europeanization is primarily a process of both defining and applying rules (Featherstone, Radaelli, 2000). Furthermore, as it is understood by constructivists, Europeanization means integrating various social perceptions (Schimmelfennig, 2006). The term ‘Balkanization’ in its historical usage had been destined to essentially denote a process of fragmentation of larger political complexes into smaller and often mutually antagonistic entities (Jano, 2008). In the contemporary colloquialism, the use of the term ‘Balkanization’ stands contrary to what may be ‘western’ values and norms,
democratization and Europeanization in the Balkans. The article wants to prove that the two trends of Balkanization and Europeanization are symbolical and institutional processes which run in parallel in the WB and that there is no clear-cut of when a process ends and when the other starts. This confusion has a direct impact upon the contradictory policies of the EU in the region (often defined by analysts as double standard, both inclusive and exclusive) but also on the contradictory feelings of the Balkan citizens towards EU (both enthusiast and very skeptic). As I already suggested, the ‘Balkanization’ process is directly connected with that of nation- and state-building and with the delayed transition (the unfinished symbolical outcome of Modernity, as it was showed). The Balkanization phase is hereby characterized by dissolution and disorder, lacking functional institutions, efficiency, capacity building. Most of the major incentives in these vital areas of political reconstruction are given under external influence and decision-making. The stage of Balkanization of public policies in the region are also marked, as Juno explains, by the conflict between homogeneity and accepted differences between the multiple nationalities that strived by blood to have the right to govern their country (Juno, 2008, p 342). This is also one of the main causes identified by renowned specialists in the Balkan studies, who explain that “differences become a synonym for the un-governability, whereas homogeneity had become a prerequisite for future security and well-being” in the region (Marko, 2005). As long as the WB states failed to create ‘citizenship’ homogeneity when ‘ethnic’ or ‘political’ heterogeneity was the case, and as long as a degree of acceptance of difference is missing, the ‘Balkanization’ paradigm will be employed in the region in order to oppose to the trend of Europeanization.

The complexity of this situation comes from the fact that Balkanization is simultaneously taking place with Europeanization, which creates ‘a symbolic blockade’ – puts the WB in a stagnant phase of in-betweeness (as Vesna Goldsworthy named it), neither identity obsessed, nationalistic and fully Balkanized, nor fully Europeanized, focused on building a neutral melting-pot of Post identity. Since the end of the Bosnian War, the aim of the entire post conflict reconstruction of the WB was (even though there was no temporal commitment for that goal to be achieved from neither sides) a full-fledged Europeanization, inside a strong EU. This on-going delayed process of (re-)integration of the continent failed to meet its ends because the actors perceived social realities in different manners and followed their
symbolic commitments in opposite directions of evolution. This way, the article tries to show that multiple and usually overlapping stages of complex interaction between the WB and the EU can be conceptualized in a constructivist perspective.

In order to validate the main hypothesis, a new encompassing concept must be introduced in the discussion – cultural hybridity - formulated by several authors of cultural studies as an alternative framework to understand postmodern identity. According to them, hybridization can be found most frequently in cultural trends, by which we understand attitudes, mentalities and values, and their expression, embodiment or symbolization in artifacts, practices and representations (Burke, 2009). In this regard, nations, social classes, tribes and casts have all been ‘deconstructed’ in the sense of being described as false (imagined) entities. Therefore the concept of cultural hybridity is a multicultural outcome and thus may offer a space for both resistance and protest, tolerance and pluralism and from my point of view it can integrate the two phenomena that occur simultaneously in the WB – Europeanization (EU’s post identity strategy to transfer EU values in candidate countries) and Balkanization (the counter-reaction of the WB to the EU). Cultural hybridity must be understood here as a consequence of cultural and political globalization (Burke, 2009). In the WB it may serve to explain the lack of progress in reforms and the stagnant ethnic division, a major challenge for implementing EU conditionality. What the article shall argue further on is that features of Modernity and Post Modernity co-exist in the WB, making the fulfillment of Western European expectations even more difficult.

Cultural hybridity has also been a term to describe societies that emerge from cultural contacts of European “explorers” and those “explored” (exactly the Post Cold War situation of the WB, a region “created” by EU political discourse, as it was showed in the beginning of the article). Instead of explaining these contacts as mere ‘impostures’ of a major culture onto a minor culture, hybridity emphasizes their mutual intermingling. In this context, identity-building in the WB is a mutually constructed product of Europeanization and Balkanization intermingled. The only problem is that hybridity can not function as a stimulus for development and creativity in the context and cultural interaction if the parties involved are not aware of the process. In the case of WB, none of the actors being in the “symbolical dialogue” are not aware of the intermingled phases of identity-building, thus both strive to impose their views in opposite directions (Balkanization pro-
Hybridity can be therefore understood in this context not only as “an effect of the cyclical oppression of groups of people in the Balkans, but also a cause for the present identity crisis” (Petrunic, 2005, p 138). Feelings of belonging and acts of identification could have successfully shape Balkan identity, but inside the post modern framework defined by Europeanization these features become almost impossible if there is no awareness of the actors of the situation. The mix of Balkanization with Europeanization forms an indefinite political hybrid, neither modern nor post modern, neither national, nor post national, an unfinished identity driven process aimed at integrating the WB in the EU post identity structure. The result is a classical ‘civilization clash’.

The negotiation of differences and the reconciliation of the past with the present are complexities that are encountered when analyzing the processes of identity formation especially inside geopolitical post-conflict spaces such as the WB. Although the negotiation of differences creates *a cultural hybridity* in which a community is evolving, a post modern perspective of hybridity (or as the article defined by the term *post identity*) is seen as a fluid experience that cannot be fixed in its identity formation (as it happens in Balkanization). Vesna Goldsworthy offers a possible explanation for this situation. She suggests that the Balkan identity and the culture of the peoples of the former republics of Yugoslavia are formed in *the space of in-betweenness* or *in a third liminal space* (Golsworthy, 2002, p 235). As a proof of this argument stands the fact that many other Balkan scholars metaphorically described the geopolitical areas of Croatia, Bosnia, or Serbia in particular as *living between two* (Antić), a *transitory character* (Kiossev), and *being neither here nor there* (Bjelić) and this expresses exactly what Goldsworthy called ‘the space of in-betweenness’. Thus what Marwan Kraidy defines as ‘cultural hybridity’ has the same meaning of what I propose in my theoretical framework of a symbolical mixture of *identity* overlapping *post identity*, a mixture of political influences (Kraidy, 2005). As Ana Petrunic considers, cultural hybridity provides “a narrative space, a post national allegory for institutional performance, in which the local and global forces of domination are intermingled” (Petrunic, 2005). In the same line of argument, Marko Antic considers that “Were postmodern identities to call upon the notions of plurality, difference, and heterogeneity, a web of interconnectedness between the Balkan peoples would be expected, whereby peace and harmony would reign instead of war and disunity” (Antic, 2003, p 15). Due to the lack
of progress in developing a politically-stable multicultural society and due to a history of imperial oppression in the Balkans, Antić suggests that the ambiguity of determining a Balkan identity is in fact the essence of a hybrid identity (Antic, 2003, p 12). In this context, the term ‘cultural hybridity’ matches the concept of ‘in-betweenness’ where the WB are being blocked for the moment (neither full modernization, nor assumed post modernization).

Moreover, Petrunic showed that whether living constrained by physical boundaries or living in imagined communities of borderless peoples, the Balkan peoples are continually negotiating spaces and developing identities within those symbolical built spaces (Petrunic, 2005, p 143). These features create a paradoxical outcome in the WB area: one can identify the main characteristics of cultural hybridity (and post identity) inside a space which refuses post modern terms of evolution (which implies building a state on civic grounds and going beyond ethnicities in identity-building). In this sense, Balkanization takes places at the same time with Europeanization, neutralizing its effects towards fulfilling EU conditionality. As it was already stated, WB are trapped inside a simultaneous and treacherous evolution process through both modernity and post modernity. This makes uncertainty wider, more dangerous and creates an un-manageable and un-predictable political structure.

Another explanation for the difficult symbolical status of the WB, which can not cope with going through modernity and post modernity at the same time, is given by Michael Ignatieff. He has also observed that acts of identification in the former republics of Yugoslavia are contingent on what one is not in relation to the other, so the negative standards in defining identity can be hardly changed into flexible, interwoven post modern terms of reference between Self and the Other. In an effort to comprehend the processes by which neighbors become deadly enemies, Michael Ignatieff negates the claim that the nationalist wars of the 1990s in Yugoslavia stem from tribal hatreds and past hostilities as the Orientalist stereotypical theories say. Instead, he purports that the various ethnic groups (i.e., Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian) are engaged in a “minor narcissism of difference” as Freud called it, meaning that characteristics that once seemed less important to discern identities become the minor differences or divisive factors of warring ethnic factions (Ignatieff, 1993). He also states that “ethnicity is described as if it were skin, a fate that cannot be changed” and that in reality, outside the Balkan understanding of the term, “what is essential about eth-
nicity is its plasticity” (Ignatieff, 1993, p 56). The contemporary Post Identity Era accepts only a fluid or ‘plastic ethnicity’ as part of an identity-building process in which the gaze of the other is ever-shifting (inside Europeanization). Conversely, actors are “blocked” in a negative gaze of the other inside the Balkanization paradigm. This two-way process is what the article defines as a major identity building dilemma in which the WB are symbolically ‘imprisoned’ - building identity in a post identity era. These concepts are destined to essentialize the “symbolical incompatibility” between the WB and the EU.

So the main conclusion that can be drawn here is that the WB cannot fully reach post identity in the absence of a successful identity-building process. Post identity can be reached only when the national identity-building is over. Seems logical, but the two actors seem not to be aware of this, which creates a ‘rapture’ in their discourses and the way they perceive one another. The argument is that incentive-based instruments (such as EU conditionality towards fulfilling future membership criteria) only trigger democratic change and successful Europeanization if certain domestic preconditions are met (finished modernization and identity-building). In this respective, applying the constructivist framework of analysis, one may find that if national identity-building runs counter to democratic requirements, through conditionality (in reaching towards Post-identity-led strategies, which include mostly institutional acceptance of ethnical diversity and heterogeneity, as the markers of Europeanization), this will ‘block’ compliance by framing it as inappropriate action of stagnant Balkanization. It must be acknowledged that this article is a primary theoretical construction, which shall be followed by a more accurate investigation with in-depth case study analysis of each notion mentioned in Table 1.
Table 1 Edited by the author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WESTERN BALKANS (WB)</th>
<th>EUROPEAN UNION (EU)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Type of “imagined political community”</td>
<td>The Nation</td>
<td>Post nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ethnic composition</td>
<td>Homogenity</td>
<td>Heterogeneity/Pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Form of Organization</td>
<td>Ethno-state</td>
<td>Transnational structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Historical paradigm</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Post Modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Specific Political Phenomenon</td>
<td>Fragmentation, Segregation</td>
<td>Globalization, Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Symbolical relation between Self and the Other</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Markers of the symbolical construction</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Post identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Overall political process</td>
<td>Balkanization</td>
<td>Europeanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic outcome of Identity building</td>
<td>Cultural Hybridity (space of in-betweeness) a symbolic, blockade’ of evolution</td>
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Conclusions. The Western Balkans - an island of ‘Otherness’ in Europe?

Defining WB in a cultural and political way means opening a Pandora’s box of identities, nationalities, ethnicities and many others aspects that create more divisions than connections. The already cliché metaphor that names the Balkans the Powder keg of Europe, dating since the beginning of the 20th century, is an indicator of such a symbolical definition which always has political intentions. WB is a region created by the political discourse of the EU after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. From this point of view, observing WB means observing the intricate way in which national identities take shape and influence political actions in unexpected ways. The evolution
of both perceptions and self-perceptions of the WB are the aspects the article briefly investigated within a constructivist approach. This endeavor was strictly theoretical and it aimed at proposing a new perspective in analyzing the future EU integration of the WB (Europeanization -mainly understood as a geopolitical discourse of power). The main argument offered by the article was that the delay of the Enlargement of the WB and its low level of predictability comes from a paradoxical situation of the WB being both in the process of deepening “Europeanization” and maintaining “Balkanization” as a counter reaction of modernity towards the post modern framework of identity-building. The hypothesis which was here tested is that the WB are still making efforts to build a national identity (a process which defines what is considered a mark of political modernity which ended in Western countries with the Second World War) and what the Western Europe is asking from these countries is a post identity institutional outcome, mainly through the instruments of European integration). So the tensions and misunderstandings between the actors come from two distinct political processes taking place simultaneously at the level of identity building - Balkanization and Europeanization, which is directly responsible the chaotic institutional result. This is also identified as a possible cause for the subsequent delay of EU Enlargement in the WB.

The analysis of the post communist transitions allowed social scientists to observe that political change cannot be only externally driven because political change involves a cultural exchange between the actors. Transition involves more than transfer of norms and focus on individual interests – culture, values and identities. Two decades after the 1989 milestone, the nation formation in South-Eastern Europe is still an unfinished process: some successor states of ex-Yugoslavia that take nationhood for granted (e.g. Serbia, Croatia) are in precarious stages of transition; some are even farther from being full-fledged national states (Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro). Still, EU offered all of them incentives for collaboration and future prospects of integration. Even though institutionalist theories can determine models for policy making regarding the transformative power of the EU in the WB, the article tried to prove that constructivist theory has also the theoretical ability to explain features which can not be tackled by other conceptual frameworks. There is a need for further investigations of this model in order to determine more concrete indicators which are able to explain de discrepancy between EU and WB discourse of power
during Europeanization. In this context the involvement of local actors remains the essential factor to foster a real democratic change. The massive and multilateral involvement of the international community in the Balkan political systems reminds us that the positive political changes are not due to EU’s efforts only, nor are they self sustainable, long standing and really embedded within the Balkan societies. Peaceful feelings of belonging and acts of identification could have successfully shaped the new Balkan identity as a regional label inside the EU, bringing reconciliation and democracy. But inside the post modern framework, the continuous re-definition of borders and the construction of national identities through a devastating war made stability un-reachable and ‘labeled’ the WB as an island of “Otherness” in Europe. This symbolical ‘trap’ does not allow the WB for fulfilling Modernization, nor the commencement of Post Modernity in reaching *Post identity* building, leaving the region blocked in a symbolical ‘space of in-betweeness’.
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EMILIA ŚWIĘTOCHOWSKA

Cultural Diversity vs. Transnational Solidarity. Perspectives on European Citizenship as Political Identity

Introduction

For nearly forty years scholar and politicians have been discussing the issues of European identity hoping to provide at least a partial response for the challenges impeding the enhancement of European democratic legitimacy. However, given that there is no shared understanding of common European heritage or one unique way of life pursued by Europeans it became dubious whether attempts to ground European identity in cultural values could accommodate pluralism within and between societies, and to ensure allegiance of their members. Continuous disputes on what it actually means to be European has been met with charges of hindering integration and obstructing decision-making process. It is also true that particular cultural identities tend to act on political stage as mere tactical devices to underpin the articulation of nation-state interests in the system of intergovernmental bargaining (Kraus, 2003, p. 52). But at the same time uncertainties and ambiguities regarding the future political and juridical outcomes of further cooperation have still been inspiring thinking about common concerns and sense of commitments that continue to sustain the European project and encourage countries to engage in collective endeavors. In recent years, in the light of Eastern accession, concerns about civic relationship and public’s allegiance to European community have focused on redefining European identity as a political category. Many believe that the potential for fostering a new kind of political identity that would normatively and empirically fit in with the dynamics of European process underlies the concept of European citizenship. For if legitimacy and accountability of European institutions depend on active citizens who are motivated to engage in collective deliberations regarding their common matters, the concept of European citizenship would seem to encapsulate ideals about political membership, community and democratic process. Thus, building and strengthening European identity
corresponds with the attempts to develop a meaningful and more substantial European citizenship that is supposed to deliver underpinning for future projects, political consensus and agreement on mutual commitments.

Introduction of the European citizenship in 1992 by the Treaty on European Union was a part of the efforts towards fostering a sense of common belonging across European nations. In major degree it codifies the economic rights associated with freedom of movement within the EU and added certain new ones, most notably the right for citizens residing in another member state of which they are not a national. For these reasons a number of scholars treated this legal and political development as a purely decorative and symbolic institution which added little to rights already institutionalized within the framework of Community laws (Lehning, 1997). Others on the other hand focused on defending the primacy of national citizenship by highlighting the derivative nature and weak content of its European counterpart. Having in mind the variety of national sensitivities, the Treaty stipulated that EU citizenship is to complete and not replace national citizenship, hence EU citizenship entails both vision of a heterogeneous community which values diversity and of a new form of belonging which transcends the embeddedness of nationality.

The concept of European citizenship is normatively linked with the question of whether supranational democracy is possible or desirable if we assume that democratic nation-state requires identifying demos constituted as a self-defining entity. Thus, claims for European political identity appear both justified and particularly sound if we take European democracy as a serious project, not simply as a functional system of political coalitions and bundle of voting procedures, but also as a framework for public deliberations, condition for political accountability and as a matter of empowering individuals with new options of public engagement. Indeed, the European Union has increasingly became an arena where individuals exercise their autonomy, whilst the public regulation of this private sphere is removed from the framework of the nation-state. Given that various economic, political, demographic and cultural trends linked to the phenomena falling under the term “globalization” have exposed both practical and conceptual weakness of contemporary nation-states, need for overcoming Union’s democratic deficit appears increasingly urgent and desirable.

However, considerations of European political identity need to accommodate specific conditions for formulating an innovative and plausible
response. First of all, profound disagreements over the nature of European identity reflect deep socio-cultural diversity across EU member states some of which need to be preserved and promoted whereas the others, such as socio-economic inequalities, need to be leveled down. Moreover, contemporary nation-states themselves are internally very pluralistic, with differentiated citizenship, institutional complexity, and many different levels of organization. Hence, diversity should not be reduced to the particular identities of supposedly homogenous nation-states. Second of all, cultural divisions are channeled through complex and differentiated European institutional design and public spheres. It is well-known the European Union as a multilevel community has a mixed structure that comprises both intergovernmental and supranational forms of cooperation and levels of governance as well as many communicative modalities (Kraus, 2003, Chapter 3, p. 52).

In any case it is important to stress that collective political identity itself is a very contested concept since sociological and philosophical traditions led to confusion of its several analytic dimensions and overestimation its role as a precondition of democracy (Kantner, 2006). This also applies to the dominant strands of contemporary debates in political philosophy. Communitarians as well as most liberals share a belief that a sense of a collective identity grown out of cooperation and mutual trust between members of society is indispensable for proper functioning of free and just institutions in a democratic community of distant strangers. However, for the latter issue of civic identification has been particularly troublesome since it presupposes an underlying attachments to a certain political community whose rules, history and traditions are particularistic and therefore exclusive. For the most part liberal theories have focused on prescribing political principles for just and egalitarian society while neglecting the sources of citizens’ solidarity due to their particularistic and private character. This problem has not been completely avoided by influential theory of John Rawls as well as many followers of his followers. Indeed, none of them offered a strong account of the significance of culture in constituting the general conditions for pursing individual life projects but rather treated this as a purely contingent motivational problem (Beitz, . Typically they assume that nations are necessary pre-political foundations of political societies and peoples ensure the legitimacy of democratic government.

These kinds of considerations are reflected in the debates on the principles and ideals involved in the development of European commu-
They also take account of academic discovery referred to as “normative turn in European studies” that integration process is not only about functions and multiple interests but also about ideals and norms (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2000). Growing academic literature on the normative aspects of a number of European process such as democratic legitimacy, political identity and constitutionalism express this theoretical turn.

This paper aims at contributing to the debate about European political identity and possibilities for transnational solidarity of Europe by reviewing recent scholarship on the subject and exploring dynamics of basic concepts and developments from normative view of political philosophy complemented with some sociological points. In what follows, at first I will sketch the modern concept of citizenship and clarify its relationship with political identity and solidarity. I will draw attention to how new social facts influence both descriptive and normative changes of the concept of citizenship. Then in I will turn to the analysis of nation-based and postnational conceptions of political identity and address some of their critiques, particularly those which apply to European context. I will show how conceptual difficulties that both constitutional patriotism and liberal nationalism grapple with, reflect the uncertainties and controversies present in the debate over the nature and interpretation of future European polity. Then I will reflect on the meanings of the concept of solidarity and explore if postnational constitutional patriotism could provide ground for transnational solidarity in complex and multi-level European community. At last I will provide some concluding remarks on the necessity of thinking about European community in terms of shared political identity.

Citizenship as political identity

Before turning to identity-dimension of democratic citizenship it is necessary to sketch the modern paradigm of citizenship dominant in political and social theory. One that contemporary theoretical discussions continue to draw upon is the conception of citizenship developed by British sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall in the late 1940s. In a series of lectures collected in a book entitled Citizenship and Social Class he had advanced a conception of citizenship which set the frame of the debate on fighting poverty and encouraging public participation in postwar Europe.
The primary question underlying his considerations was how to ensure every person is treated as full and equal member of society without undermining healthy functioning of market economy. Marshall was especially hoping to find a solution for enhancing social standing of workers and ultimately bringing them to full inclusion and engagement in common life. Linking the concept of citizenship with the problem socio-economic inequalities he came to conclusion that egalitarian society requires full and equal rights of citizenship assigned to each member of society irrespective of individual attributes and achievements. Citizenship empowers people as citizens with political agency and expresses their political belonging by shared distinct identity.

By inferring from British experience he presented an understanding of citizenship that reflected the class conflicts of modernity characteristic for advanced capitalist European countries and progressive extension of rights and subjects recognized as citizens. This reconstruction of historical development of citizenship started with the recognition of civil rights of the individuals in the 18th century, then political rights in the 19th century, and finally included social rights in the 20th century (Marshall, 1950). The last element in evolutionary model submitted by Marshall, namely social citizenship, is an institution aimed at the strengthening of bonds of mutuality among citizens of the state through leveling the differences of their socio-economic statuses. By assigning distributive obligations and institutionalizing access to cultural resources of the society social citizenship reinforces bonds of political membership which takes pride in its sense of solidarity and mutual responsibility. This is the reason why the welfare state has become an important element of national identity in many European countries (Bellamy, 2008).

Marshall’s discussion on citizenship had little to say about nationality and territoriality probably because he assumed the territorially bounded nation-state as primary locus of citizenship rights, specifically his native United Kingdom. This is the reason why contemporarily his model fails to address the phenomenon of large-scale immigration and various trends associated with globalization. He was concerned only with the rights of citizens against their own state neglecting the question how citizenship also operates as a mechanism of social closure that demarcates the boundaries of exclusion (Brubaker, 1992). Many followers of Marshallian concept heavily rely on the moral force associated with national identity making it normatively predicat-
ed upon the territorially bounded sovereign national community. In result, they often look at the formation of collective identities and the evolution of cultural solidarities not as having been attained through long, social and political conflicts, but simply take them for granted (Benhabib, 2005).

However, it is important to underline that normative ideals cannot be mechanistically deduced from a pre-existent sociological realities. Analytical separation of empirical and the normative aspects of democracy is necessary because people is often misread as both “natural” givens that paradigm for demos (Closa, 1998). Influential organicist and historicist conceptions of the demos based on a supposedly homogeneous characteristics such as race or language replicate this error by assuming identification of empirical models with normative ideals as usually happens with nation-states. Creating a community out of some aggregation of individuals who reside within the boundaries of a given territory is of course a well-known problem of democratic theory. Membership in the political community requires a deeper, more specific and emotional identification and bonds of commonality to secure solidarity and willingness to assume duties towards compatriots than mere commonness of subjection under a centralized sovereign power (Preuss, 1996). Of course demos which is one of the premises of democratic theory, is constructed on some pre-political aggregation of people who occupy the same territory. However, in order to build an artificial political unity between these individuals procedures of political representation are required to transform existing political institutions into democratic institutions (Preuss, 1996). Conflating national representation with democracy is merely a historical development. Nevertheless, it bears the effect of confusing of what is normative and what is empirical and elevating to a normative status and universal validity categories that are pre-political and contingent.

In contemporary debates on theoretical account of citizenship it is often analyzed as a complex multi-layered concept that encompasses a status of individual’s belonging to a particular political community, rights associated with political membership and political identity contrasted with other more particular identities based on race, sex or religion. By recognizing legal personhood of agents present in state territory state can be considered as membership organization which has the competence of distributing status of belonging according to its own rules.

It is argued a certain degree of national homogeneity and common identity accepting collective decisions and adherence to the principles of so-
cial cooperation require because they create and foster the bonds of solidarity and mutual trust among fellow citizens. Commonalities based on shared history, language and cultural traditions are considered not only a functional and sociological but also normative components that bind strangers so they mechanically engage in common endeavors despite diversity of interests and opinions. Democratic welfare states can function properly because it is simply easier to give up a part of one’s income if the certain benefits go to someone who is one’s fellow citizen. First, people find it easier to engage with and trust those whom they regard as similar in certain ways. Solidarity and mutual identification that help support social expenditures give rise to trust, loyalty and social capital. The recent work of the great American political scientist Robert Putnam furnishes evidence that in ethnically diverse neighborhoods residents of all races tend to isolate themselves. The level of trust is lower, altruism and community cooperation are not common. (Putnam, 2007). Second, all cooperative activities require reciprocity that exists in intimate communities, for example expectation that assuming special obligations towards some strangers will be met with the same response on their side. Shared language and political traditions facilitate communication and decision-making, reducing the scope for misunderstanding or incompatibility.

It is argued that dominant view of modern citizenship has been empirically inaccurate since it cannot account for the relationship between state and individual under new conditions. Growing economic interdependence, transnational networks of communication, global migrations, supranational legal regimes and political bodies proved fundamental transformation of territorially-bounded sovereign nation-state which is no longer able to effectively control its citizens actions. While the demise of the nation-states has been exaggerated by many scholars it is also true that governments are more often constrained to delegate their competences to supranational and international bodies. Thus, even if nation-state is still capable of exercising authority and influencing the life prospects of citizens it cannot both cope with pressing transnational problems and uphold undivided sovereignty and traditional accountability (Bohman, 2007, p. 23). Moreover, many theorist diagnose the fading significance of national identity arguing as Yasmin Soysal does that human rights discourse rendered modern citizenship obsolete (Soysal, 1994). Although such claim is certainly premature, by all means has nationality lost its exclusive power to shape the conditions of political
belonging. National citizenship has undergone what Seyla Benhabib calls “disaggregation” into diverse elements (Benhabib, 2005). In her view legal status of membership, collective identity and privileges of political membership are no longer bundled together within a unitary institution defined by national boundaries of state. Transformations of demographic composition of the European states, transnational human rights regime, institutionalization of distinct identity claims, and the increasing dissolution of sovereignty, have the growing effect of decoupling of rights and identity. In postwar conditions rights traditionally prescribed to citizens of bounded political communities have been transformed into rights of abstract legal person legitimated at the transnational level. As Seyla Benhabib puts it, “reification of personhood and individual rights expands the boundaries of political community, by legitimating individuals’ participation and claims beyond their membership status in a particular nation-state. With the breakdown of the link between the national community and rights, we observe multiple forms of citizenship that are no longer anchored in national collectives, and that expand the sets of rightbearing members within and without the nation-state.” New modalities of political agency profoundly change the meaning of citizenship and European Union citizenship can serve as a good example of this process: across Europe right to territorial residency does not depend on being a national of a certain country but instead on being a European citizen. One can also fully enjoy rights and benefits traditionally associated with citizenship given that they are granted on supranational level no matter of a particular national identity or legal status of agents.

Even those who remain skeptical about plausibility of European political identity admit that the idea of physical closeness as a recondition of bodily security, individual freedom, cultural identity, and material welfare is fading, and new patterns of social connectedness and spheres of pursing individual interests emerged along the existence of nation-state (Preuss, 279, 1995). From pragmatic perspective these new social facts and political circumstances demand new normative and conceptual elaboration of the concept of citizenship and political identity.
The absence of many basic attributes of democracy such as fully elaborated European party system, European civil society, transnational media or finally, a shared political identity amounts to common argument advanced by the defenders of the primacy of nation-tates, that the European Union lacks a demos. With the exception of Eurofederalists advocates of nation-based conception of political identity such as the influential proponents of liberal nationalism, do not see the process of European integration as bringing any major challenge for political theory for the fundamental concepts of statehood, nationhood and sovereignty remain unquestionable on normative grounds and continue to be dominant in actual politics. The question posed by united Europe applies rather to the scope of politics and transmission of nation-state’s functions to supranational level followed by some new institutional arrangements. As liberal nationalist David Miller puts it “(...) EU is too big and its Member States (and peoples) are too diverse to make citizenship workable” (Miller, 1998, p. 48). In this perspective ambitions for creating a meaningful European citizenship seem dangerous or futile at best. For there exists an essential connection between citizenship and national identity which can only be replicated and accommodated on supranational level at the cost of the latter.

Nevertheless, they all admit that nation-state is losing its traditional powers which results in the devaluation of citizenship as institution and practice. Communitarians, civic republicans, liberal nationalists as well as social democrats then fall under the Seyla Benhabib’ term “decline-of-citizenship school”. Whether under the impact of economic globalization, the rise of international human rights regime, or the spread of cosmopolitical lifestyles, according to these thinkers, in recent decades the significance of citizenship as an important aspect of community’s self-understanding and self-determination has been undermined rendering democratic self-governance and social cohesion even weaker.

Notwithstanding their position on the future institutional design of Europe they emphasize that the focus of primary allegiance and loyalty lays in nation-state and national citizenship reflects the unique and meaningful civic attachment. Thus, while not opposing European integration itself even liberal nationalists remain deeply skeptical about possibility of European
demos. Liberal nationalists such as Miller do not ground democratic citizenship in shared ethnicity so at least potentially are more open to the idea of European political identity with its distinct symbols and practices. However, along with strong communitarians’ position most of them doubt whether it is feasible or desirable to transcend and overcome historically entrenched identities of EU member states. Of course they acknowledge European citizenship as legal institutional but without putting any high hopes that it might one day generate civic ties. Such a perspective represents Anthony Smith while indicating that Europe lacks a pre-modern past, which provides an emotional substance and historical rootedness for meaningful identity. In his opinion, European countries at best have partially shared traditions and heritages which in fact aggregates European identity dilemma which is presented as “a choice between unacceptable historical myths or memories on the one hand, and on the other a patchwork, memoryless scientific ‘culture’ held together solely by political will and economic interests that are often subject to change.” (Smith, 1992, p. 74).

Despite important differences between liberal and civic nationalism and communitarianism their advocates agree that a strong attachment to shared identity with certain a substantive content is a necessary precondition for a meaningful democratic citizenship. They all stress that nationality – articulated in either cultural or civic terms – has intrinsic ethical and practical significance in that it is indispensable for constituting bonds of democratic community. According to liberal nationalists, the primacy of nationality as a common political identity that supports and reinforce citizenship is justified on the ground of a long history of common life, distinctive social and cultural practices that give rise to political culture and special obligations towards compatriots (Miller, 1995). They maintain that abstract universal principles cannot provide foundation for a fixed political identity. Instead they see it created from below and sustained by relationships of intrinsic worth that are deeply rooted in common life and involved with emotional and contingent components. Only such a “thick” sense of belonging to a political community motivates citizens to exercise their democratic agency. This is the line of argument that Miller provides arguing that value of nationality can only be appreciated as a essentially “subjective phenomenon, constituted by the shared beliefs of a set of people: a belief that each belongs together with the rest; (…) that the community is marked off from other communities by its members’ distinctive characteristics; and that each member recogni
a loyalty to the community, expressed in a willingness to sacrifice personal
gain to advance its interests (...)” (Miller, 1988). It is not to say that political
identity of a self-governed people and cultural identity of nation are identi-
cal but at the same time they cannot be disintegrated without threatening
democratic process itself by depriving citizens of strong emotions associated
with historical and cultural elements. Miller stresses that “if national identities
begin to dissolve, ordinary people will have less reason to be active citizens,
and political elites will have a freer hand in dismantling those institutions
that currently counteract the global market to some degree” (Miller, 1995, p.
187). The content of identity communitarians and nationalists defend draws
clear moral boundaries of political community, thus is strongly directed at
excluding those who do not share certain features. Some critics point out this
understanding of citizenship actually shifts the focus on scrutinizing identi-
ties that allegedly have the wrong content in order to protect political culture
from dilution or even worse (Williams, 2007, Chapter 10, p. 234).

A certain degree of national homogeneity and common identity of
people particularly matters as far as redistributive policies are concerned.
As already mentioned agreement on principles of redistribution needs to
be legitimized by citizens who accept special obligations towards their fel-
low nationals because they simply care about their life chances. To support
this thesis Miller and other appeal to various psychological studies arguing
that democratic decision-making and social justice require trust and motiva-
tion for making sacrifices which are more likely to exist among people who
share a common national identity, speak common language and share certain
cultural values (Miller, 1998, p. 48). Proper functioning of welfare states
depends on also on feelings of solidarity: it is simply easier to give up a part
of one’s income if benefits go to someone who we recognize as a member of
“we” who we commit to protect and guarantee equal respect as a matter of
duty. As Miller puts it “it is because we have prior obligations of nationality that include obligations to provide for their needs that the practice of
citizenship properly includes redistributive elements (...)” (Miller, 1995, p.
72). If we tried to conceive of distributive obligations on European level
there would appear a gap between peoples’ sense of social justice and their
sense of responsibility that could not be bridged unless a common sense of
European identity emerges that transcends national borders (Miller, 1998).

In opposition to liberal nationalists, Eurofederalists believe in con-
structing European political identity in analogy to nation-states. If Europe
is to become sovereign federal state capable of providing European citizens with security and welfare and performing independent foreign policy it needs to fabricate a strong positive political identity. Following the nation-state model this position obscures the distinction between political identity of demos and cultural basis of mutual recognition, social cohesion and assumed duties. Therefore political allegiance and civic attachment turn out to be indistinguishable from By forging and reproducing categories characteristic for nation-states such as essential correspondence between people, culture and territory Eurofederalists wish to reinforce and accommodate Europe within international state system and politics. Ambiguities of their perspective were exposed in the debate preceding the drafting of the Preamble of the Constitutional Treaties where controversies over cultural and religious origins of Europe dominated. Nevertheless, political identity of European suprastate may require not only narrative about common roots and shared memory, but also a certain “other” against whom Europeans could unite. Opportunities for this kind of oppositional political identity were provided by anti-Americanism and anti-Islamism, yet it may also deepen division among “old” and “new” EU member state as well within their societies.

Postnational conceptions of European political identity

Advocates of postnational conceptions of citizenship share the opinion regarding the incapacity of territorially-bounded nation-states to control developments triggered off by globalization processes and accommodate new forms of political power and engagement. Thus, political identities need not be conceived exclusively in state-centric terms because the boundaries of the civic community and the boundaries of the state territory tend to lose their exact congruence. If we take Benhabib’s view on disaggregated citizenship, it becomes clear that individuals can coherently develop and sustain multiple and overlapping allegiances and meaningful attachments across nation-state boundaries and within transnational contexts. The institutionalization of EU citizenship seems to have exactly recognized this changes. Probably the most influential normative argument for postanational European identity and civic attachment has been developed by Jürgen Habermas. He claims that nationality-building cannot take place
on European level because the difference between the nation-state and the European Union is a difference in kind, not one of size or scale. Thus, European people cannot simply emerge as a result of internalization of narratives, traditions and symbols which they consent on without risking charges of chauvinism or cultural imperialism typical for 19th century nationalisms. And by no means should convergence of nation and democratic procedures be equipped with normative status, for their historical fusion does not establishes a fair basis for future political membership. Inclusive and heterogeneous European identity might only constitute itself as an artifact of public deliberation in democratic society. Habermas sees establishment of the constitution as a necessary symbolic moment that breaks the routine of normal politics and sets in motion citizen’s consciousness in the process of political integration (Castiglione, 2009, Chapter 2, p. 40) Given the pluralism of EU member states and their societies he argues for disentanglement of the contingent relationship between nation and demos in order to develop European constitutional patriotism. The ultimate ground for European political identity cannot found be in any particular national cultures or explicated common values. Instead, European citizens owe their primary allegiance to constitutional rights and principles understood as human rights and a “consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws and legitimate exercise of power (Habermas, 1992)” However, collective political identity is a mediated and reflexive form that is created and constantly recreated through critical engagement in collective deliberation about how to interpret and institutionalize universally valid principles inscribed in the system of laws of European Union. Articulations of constitutional norms are always particularistic since they absorb substantive content reflecting specific background knowledge, interpretative commitments and historical memory that determine ethical self-understanding of polity. This way Habermas catches the affective element of constitutional patriotism that motivates citizens to collective endeavors: Once embedded within a liberal political culture, the democratic process itself can then guarantee a sort of emergency backup system for maintaining the integrity of a functionally differentiated society, in cases where the multiplicity of interests, cultural forms of life, or worldviews overwhelms the supposedly natural substrate of a community of shared decent. In complex societies, it is the deliberative opinion- and will-formation of citizens, grounded in the principles of popular sovereignty, that forms the ultimate medium for a form of
abstract, legally constructed solidarity that reproduces itself through political participation. (Habermas, 2001, p. 76). While recognizing the plurality of ethical perspectives that inform interpretation of universal principles across European countries, constitutional patriotism attempts to take no favorable position on any of them but rather enhance their coexistence and mutual understanding. As Craig Calhoun explains, “constitutional patriotism underwrites no one of [conceptions of the good life] but rather a commitment to the justification of collective decisions and the exercise of power in terms of fairness. It is thus compatible with a wide range of specific constitutional arrangements and to a varying balance between direct reference to universal rights and procedural norms and more specific political culture” (Calhoun, 2002, Chapter 9, p. 278). Obviously Europe has no ambitions of replacing nation-states but instead, but in the future European Union universal principles “would have to be interpreted from the vantage point of different national traditions and histories. One’s own national tradition will, in each case, have to be appropriated in such a manner that it is related to and relativised by the vantage point of other national cultures” (Habermas, 1992, p. 7).

Yet at the end Habermas amends his argument for European political identity by attempting to construe distinctively European values, traditions and experiences that could provide a background against which universal principles could be collectively discussed. Departing from his “thin” proceduralist account of constitutional patriotism he founds European patriotism on a “thick” understanding of historical roots and achievements, above all: a secular politics, welfare policies, social solidarity, rejection of capital punishment, awareness of the paradoxes of progress and capacity for self-reflexivity in the face of global decline (Habermas, Derrida, 2003). He even admits that countries willing to endorse stronger Europe, namely Germany and France, should go ahead other EU member states and work together as vanguard of European consolidation (Habermas, Derrida, 2003).

Democratic identity-building and will-formation process on European level activated by “constitutional moment” gives prospects for the development of European party system which recognizes interests beyond national borders, European public sphere and a common European political culture and linguistic basis and finally transnational media. Critical deliberations need to be synchronized within national public spheres that are conducted at the same time and on the same topics across Europe, so that a European civil society with interest groups, NGOs, citizens initiatives could
emerge (Habermas, 2001, p. 98). Habermas has already taken a notice of the emergence of such a European public sphere on certain issues and at certain moments, for example during Europe-wide demonstrations against war in Iraq.

By trying to reconcile between “thin” adherence to liberal democratic principles which on its own are insufficient to generate vibrant patriotic allegiance on one side, and greatly exaggerated attachment to unique European values Habermas actually comes closer to position taken by supranationalists. Several authors indicate that constitutional patriotism and his position on European identity fall into the same modern paradigm of citizenship inscribed within nation-state. And once the European Union achieves full democratic legitimacy and common political culture, it would become supranational federation with all attributes of statehood and nationhood. As Jean C. Cohen puts it, “no other word would better capture the political identity that such a sovereign liberal democratic constitutional European federalist mega-state would foster, if successful, than nation. Constitutional patriotism even on this level would not avoid the paradoxical dialectic inherent in the modern paradigm of citizenship that drives republican or liberal democratic conceptions into the arms of thicker, more communitarian understandings of identity.” (Cohen, 1999, p. 256).

The same charge might also apply to recent elaboration of cosmopolitan communitarianism aspiring to provide a third way between nationalism and postnationalism on one hand, and communitarianism and cosmopolitanism on the other. This synthesis has been advanced by Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione who claim that neither pure cosmopolitanism on its own can secure the enforcement of basic rights of individuals, no communitarianism can acknowledge and accommodate the pluralism of contemporary societies (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2003). If Europe is to maintain and promote diversity it should be founded on communitarian sense of attachment and cosmopolitan respect for difference (Bellamy, 1999, p. 197). Such combination would finally lead towards a mixed commonwealth (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2003) which is neither an intergovernmental organization, nor a federation but a hybrid entity with several demois. Hence, it is inspired by different cultural, linguistic and legal traditions while still it acknowledges the universal validity of liberal principles and the need for supranational action in certain areas (Bellamy & Walreigh, 1998; Bellamy & Castiglione, 2003). European citizenship should exist alongside the national one and al-
low citizens to maintain and cultivate their primary source of political identity whose locus is still the nation-state. Clearly this position oversimplifies both postnational and communitarian conceptions including some conceptual gaps, misinterpretations and inaccuracies. Moreover, the shape of the alleged middle position between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism is hardly distinguishable from Bellamy’s own understanding of postnational patriotic constitutionalism. In his perspective, the latter emerges in open deliberation and confrontation of multiple national cultures in public sphere. However, as Justine Lacroix points out, cosmopolitan patriotism does not imply a unique political culture or overlapping consensus but a shared political culture built upon different cultural interpretations of the same universal rights and principles (Lacroix, 2002, p. 954).

**Post-national citizenship and solidarity**

In both nation-based and post-national views on European political identity, the term “solidarity” is frequently invoked in reference to abstract bonds that hold citizens together, ensure their sense of responsibility and secure the fulfillment of mutual duties, especially those associated with distributive justice. However, none of these accounts provides a more elaborated interpretation of solidarity for it is often treated as a purely motivational factor that drives citizens to affective identification with other people’s need and going beyond their individual self-interest.

Given that the concept of solidarity is employed by universalistic as well as particularistic ethical perspectives, one might conclude that there has been no coherent tradition of its use in any bidding manner. Quite the opposite, it has consequently been used in very different and sometimes contradictory ways (Bayertz, 1999, p. 3). Notwithstanding these conceptual difficulties it is worth noting that the term “solidarity” may be used both normatively and descriptively, where the former implies mutual obligations to aid each other (Bayertz, 1999, p. 3). Kurt Bayertz also distinguishes four uses of the term: a relation between humans as members of a moral community; “inner cement” that hold society together; community of interests; and finally, responsibility of compatriots as member of welfare state (Bayertz, 1999, p. 3). However, scholars suggest there are two main genealogies of the concept of solidarity. One traces it back to the notion of friendship
as an interpersonal bonding extended beyond the possible limits of direct interactions to encompass a collective self-determining entity of individuals. Bonds that overcome boundaries determined by shared attributes and relationships of likeness are translated into abstract modern political norm of fraternity that symmetrically binds subjects conferred with rights and obligations. The other strand comes from political sociology of Emile Durkheim who distinguished between mechanical solidarity of pre-modern communities, and organic solidarity of industrial societies to describe a certain unity within group (Brunkhorst, 2005).

In normative political theories solidarity is often articulated in terms of common attributes and subjective attitudes that are taken as a norm. For example liberal nationalist scholarship sees this concept as a useful devise to describe the role of trust, common linguistic basis and cultural values in instilling willingness to make sacrifices and admitting responsibilities vis-à-vis other people. In the works of David Miller one finds assumption that the relations of likeness among persons non familiar with each other are precondition for common values and allegiances (Pensky, 2007, p. 171). Thus, liberal theorists may often try to dismiss the concept of solidarity as bearing a deep communitarian relativism but at the same time they tacitly mix communitarian and voluntaristic premises to account for why a certain group of people belongs to nation of a particular state. At the end, solidarity appears as a pre-political integrative bond that can be explained on the ground of individual and group psychology. However, for the most part liberal theory has not focused on the sources of solidarity, but rather on relationship between individuals and state mediated by citizenship.

In communitarian view, the concept of solidarity is often used to express a consensus on how people understand themselves as a community and how they interpret shared values and common way of life. This kind of communitarian-oriented reading of European solidarity provides Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde holding that citizens have to share a sense of belonging as the basis for the recognition of responsibility, mutual support and cooperation (Böckenförde, 2006). Whereas to reach an agreement on how to understand principles underwriting common living-together on both rational and emotional ground they need to appeal to substantive sources such as religion or cultural heritage. However, a crucial factor for building political solidarity is the determined political will of all involved which in the case of European Union is obviously lacking. Böckenförde does not give
the priority to community of values for it does not provide a primary drive towards political solidarity. Instead, he sees it in national histories perceived as a part of European history, in the development and promotion of a European national awareness assuming they do not absorb national identities and finally, “voluntary and emotional commitment to the political goal of presenting a political union as a shared community and acting toward this end” (Böckenförde, 2006)

Recently several authors have also taken efforts to revise the concept of solidarity and disentangle it from its historical meanings as a relationship binding members of a single homogenous society toward a conception that takes account of transnational forms of membership and attachments on one side or moral duties to all human beings as citizens of cosmopolitan community (e.g. Gould, 2007; Abizadeh, 2005; Flynn, 2009; Pensky, 2007; Nussbaum, 1996). The attempts to conceive of cosmopolitan solidarity that corresponds with universal scope of human rights are also responses for the practical need to accommodate developments grown out of globalization processes, as well as to address the question of global poverty. These calls for extending solidarity to the whole humanity or in fact any community larger than nation, may seem naïve, unfeasible and impotent, though they are often quite elaborated theoretically. On the other side, they easily fall under the criticism as an alleged attempt to impose eurocentrism, paternalism and regime of exclusion perpetuated by global institutionalization of cherishing humanity.

Ambiguities concerning the concept of solidarity applied to postnational conditions of European Union are also reflected in Habermas’s account of European constitutional patriotism. Indeed, throughout his work he makes several points of reference to the concept of solidarity but being cautious about misleading association of solidarity with appeals to some pre-political loyalty, at the end, his position remains unclear. For sure, he endorses expanding basis for solidarity for there could be no Europe-wide democratic opinion and will-formation capable of legitimating redistributive policies and foreign policy: “Civic solidarity, long-limited for the nation-state will have to be appropriated by citizens of Union in a way they are prepared to stand up for each other” (Habermas, 2003, p. 96). He also recognizes that to achieve solidarity as a resource for social integration and political motivation one has to expect a considerable change of political self-understanding of citizens (Pensky, 2000, p. 64). Given European experiences, there are
many paths to peoplehood, may that be from nation to nation-state or from state to nation-state. In particular, Habermas acknowledges that “since the beginnings of 19th century nation-state has manufactured an abstract form of solidarity among strangers from the combination of cultural symbolism of “the people” and the republican status of citizens (Habermas, 2003). In this view nation is a universe that rests on abstracted solidarity of strangers that reinforces their mutual cooperation. Democracy requires that citizens are motivated to look beyond what is understood to be family and self-interest for the good of their compatriots, who still remain strangers to them, and to do so if they feel some sense of identification with them, some sense of solidarity and some sort of shared collective purpose or project (Hayward, 2007, p. 182). In any case conditions of developing civic solidarity are not “natural” and inherent givens but artifacts of political practice. If national identities have developed in “learning process” in which people transferred and reconfigured traditional pre-modern affiliations and loyalties to family, church or clan, to a larger and more abstract democratic community under the rule of law, Habermas asks rhetorically why this “learning process” cannot continue beyond national borders to form bonds of solidarity among Europeans (Habermas, 2003, p. 96). As already mentioned, he sees good prospects for transnational solidarity in further elaboration of European public sphere, transnational media, and providing common linguistic basis.

In this respect he agrees with Craig Calhoun who provided an interesting discussion on transnational solidarity through public sphere and discourse. According to Calhoun, plausible cosmopolitan or constitutional patriotic project for Europe requires more attention to social solidarity than has yet been theoretically offered. He argues that public sphere linked with conception of active citizenship is only one way of building solidarity but a distinctive one since it is produced and reproduced through inclusive discourse of free and equal participants (Calhoun, 2004). While he agrees with Habermas that there will be no European democratic polity unless European-wide integrated public sphere develops entrenched within common political culture (Habermas, 2001, p. 160), he does not endorse the view that it is mere arena of rational and critical deliberations on common institutions and identities with accordance to certain procedures. Habermas, while hoping that public sphere will produce a rational agreement that can replace culture as the basis for political identity, first of all, he neglects the fact that cultural creativity and modes of communication are no less valuable for the
process, second of all, ignores the extent to which agreement and common political culture alike are neither rationally chosen nor simply inherited but produced and reproduced in social action (Calhoun, 2009, p. 284). Given Habermasian account of public sphere (Habermas, 1989), transnational deliberations would be able to produce only “thin” identity whose integrative force is not sufficient. Calhoun on the other hand, imagines public sphere as a stage of cultural creativity and reproduction where multiple visions of society are conceived of and actualized by the ways they are understood (Calhoun, 2004, p. 5). In his view solidarity is not to be necessarily understood in terms of fixed preexisting interests and similarities that bind collective subject before political action is taken but as mutual commitments fostered through participation in public sphere in order shape institutional forms of social cooperation. Contrary to common assumption that solidarity is distinct and prior to public action and decision-making process, he sees the development of solidarity at the center of public deliberation which itself involves acts of citizens’ performances in terms of community. For to actually motivate citizens to engage in deliberations legal and political developments of postnational character need to be complemented with the idea of how they came together as individuals to constitute themselves as members of the polity. According to Calhoun the dominant discourses on membership in European polity rest on assumed identity and interests which are invoked in order to justify why people come together to accept common institutions. As a result these perspectives the community of Europeans turns out to be already formed in cultural or civic terms or having certain common interests but what is missing is the role of public life in constituting solidarity and culture (Calhoun, 2002, Chapter 9, p. 238).

However, given that peoples are not stable and isolated entities, the account of their constitution requires seeing them as much more theoretically and practically problematic and rejecting of any purely external or objective approach to resolving questions of political identity (Calhoun, 2002, Chapter 9). For the idea of forging social bonds and institutions in public action Calhoun turns to This Hannah Arendt’s concept of “world building” understood as faculty of creation and reproduction of institutions and networks in public discourse where plurality of perspectives come together no matter of territorial distance or inherent individual dispositions (Arendt, 2000, p. 64). Participation in such a public setting for open communication collective struggle for a better society that influence citizens’ understanding
of the community can be itself a better source of solidarity than the appeals to prefixed identity or constitution. Weaker version of constitutional patriotism gives very “thin” account of political belonging associating solidarity with legitimacy, whereas stronger version assigns solidarity to the domain of pre-democratic cultural ties. In each case social agents and culture are treated as fixed and stable entities formed in advance of the participation in public sphere (Calhoun, 2004, p. 14). In European context debates on immigration or welfare policies may not bring participants to agreement but they certainly give them common points of reference to relate to and ultimately helps their integration. He admits that so far European process has not benefited from such a public sphere well enough for European integration has so far relied on functional consolidation, exercise of power, development of common culture and diverse interpersonal relationships (Calhoun, 2004, p. 7).

Conclusions: is the concept of identity indispensable for Europe?

By all means has the question of European identity been at the very center of political and theoretical debates concerning the future of European project, especially the basis for its legitimacy. What they show is that the concept of nation as the ultimate horizon of democratic polity continues to deeply inform considerations about the ideals of European integration, particularly among defenders of “the Europe of nations” and supranationalists who argue for “European demos”. However, neither the attempts to provide an adequate postnational conception of political identity of Europe often seem not to avoid following the traps of modern nation-building that falls into more communitarian scheme.

It certainly is worth noting that Habermasian account of postnational constitutional patriotism has significantly influenced the official conception of European Union in that both European treaties and admission criteria make only general affirmation of universal principles with no reference to cultural or historical community. One might consider this as following Habermasian strategy of rendering affect safe for liberal democracies (Markell, 2002). Copenhagen Accords of 1993 reflect recognition of profound cultural and social pluralism by including broad and “thin” conditions for admission to EU membership and avoiding many controversial issues concerning distinct cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic identities. But despite appealing to liberal democratic principles which supposedly have proven capacity to sustain institutions within non-European cultures, a deep
conflict between institutional rules and identity has unfolded especially in the light of negotiations with Turkey (Benhabib, 2005).

The creation of European citizenship was supposed to address challenges posed by conflicting visions of European process and help to fill in “the solidarity gap” which continues to impede political action in response to challenges posed by globalization. Even if European citizenship might be easily criticizes as a symbolic institution that does not introduce much new to political practice, nonetheless it should be appreciated as a notion that helps to abolish the hierarchy between loyalties and allegiances where individual’s relationship with nation-state has been viewed as most predominant (Preuss, 1995, p. 180). As for future prospects one might see its potential in lack of any reference to centralized and homogenous sphere of political power that could eventually give rise to European civil society: “thus, European citizenship can be regarded as a step towards a new concept of politics inside and simultaneously beyond the framework of the traditional notion of politics defined by nation-state” (Preuss, 1996, p. 551).

However, as Craig Calhoun’s writings prove, thinking about European projects does not need to be constrained by demands of fixed identity and allegiance to the constitution for his own conception shifts focus on how solidarity is constantly shaped and recreated in open public discourse possible also on transnational level. While not opposing the project of cosmopolitan patriotism he might agree viewing it not as solution for political identity of democratic citizens but as “a practice of refusing or resisting particular identifications (…) for the sake of ongoing, always incomplete, and often unpredictable project of univeralization (Markell, 2000, p. 40).

References


Pentru mulți, necesitatea instituirii Uniunii Europene a fost explicată prin incapacitatea tot mai evidentă a statelor naționale de a aborda provocările prezentate de globalizare. În momentul de față, globalizarea înseamnă un sistem tot mai complicat și mai dens de relații interstatale. Statul național, care până nu de mult era forma primară (sau chiar singură) de organizare politică a umanității, pare a fi din ce în ce mai nepotrivit pentru a aborda unor sarcini cum ar fi reglementarea proliferării nucleare, diminuarea instabilității economice și financiare tot mai accentuată la nivel global, estomparea puterii companiilor și a capitalului multinaționale, stoparea migrației masive, pacificarea zonelor de conflict și evitarea unui dezastru ecologic global. Curente de opinie populare sugerează că aceste chestiuni ar putea fi reglementate doar de către părți regionale – în cel mai bun caz – un astfel de statut fiindu-i prevăzut UE de către fondatorii ei. Astfel, printre multe alte aspecte, UE ar putea fi percutată ca o alternativă modernă la un sistem de state naționale, o strădanie de a depăși inadecvarea statelor naționale printr-o nouă formă politică de organizare, un nou „corp” politic. Într-adevăr, transferul de suveranitate în Europa a devenit din ce în ce mai vizibil după al doilea Război Mondial, având drept „beneficiari” direcții instituțiile politice ale UE: Comisia, Consiliul și Parlamentul, și drept “păgubiți” statele naționale. Deși inițial UE nu a fost concepută a fi mai mult decât o comunitate oțelului și a cărbunelui care să cuprindă doar câteva state, adică o comunitate economică cu scopul primar de a preveni – prin intermediul interdependenței economice – redeșteptarea naționalismului care a umplut de sânge, de două ori, întreaga Europă în secolul 20, în prezent instituționalizarea UE a depășit cu mult obiectivul economic inițial.

De altfel, concepția funcționalistă a integrării politice, care a însoțit de la început instituționalizarea UE, s-a dovedit a fi adevărată în ceea ce privește prezumția de bază: nevoia de a crea - și, în mod logic, de a controla – o piață economică comună a condus, într-adevăr, la nașterea
înstituţiilor guvernamentale comune ale UE. Din această perspectivă, naşterea instituţiilor a urmat scenariul elaborat mai întâi în teorie: fiindcă aceste instituţii au dobândit puterea reală şi independentă, în Europa au fost create un nou centru şi o nouă formă de putere şi guvernare. Totuşi, această nouă formă de putere a devenit intangibilă şi, în plus, legitimitatea instituţiilor guvernamentale create între timp s-a arătat a fi extrem de discutabilă. Forma de guvernare a întregii Europe s-a dovedit a nu fi atât de transparentă, responsabilă şi accesibilă – nici măcar accesibilă cetăţenilor europeni – precum au fost precedentele forme de guvernare, adică organismele de conducere ale statelor naţionale europene. Mai mult, cu cât aceste instituţii acumulează mai multă putere, cu atât mai evident devine deficitul lor democratic.

În mod similar, natura sau caracterul UE ca formă de organizaţie politică nu au ajuns nici ele să fie fără echivoc. UE nu este o simplă organizaţie internaţională, cum sunt Naţiunile Unite sau NATO, dar nu este nici un stat naţional. Deşi motivele transferului de putere şi suveranitate în Europa au fost, în primul rând, de ordin geopolitic, UE nu a devenit nici o alianţă de naţiuni, fiindcă normativele UE sunt instituţionalizate prin reguli şi practici în toată Europa, pătrunzând adânc în viaţa socială: nici Liga de la Delos, nici Liga Hanseatică nu au avut o astfel de pretenţie de a transforma viaţa socială. Poate cea mai apropriată asemănare s-ar putea face cu o federaţie, totuşi, lipsesc instrumentele comune de control şi influenţă ale unei guvernări federale. Politologul american, Michael Mann, este îndreptăţit să remarce ironic că, prin crearea UE, moştenirea politică a limbii greceşti este în sfârşit depăşită şi, probabil, cel mai bun termen pentru a descrie caracterul instituţional al UE este chiar „euro”.

Indiferent care este descrierea şi clasificarea corectă a Uniunii Europene ca organizare stataлă, incontestabil este justificat să ne întrebăm, la fel ca în cazul oricărei forme de organizare politică şi guvernământ: pe cine reprezintă? Există persoane, şi dacă există, atunci cine sunt acele persoane care formează naţiunea europeană, demosul european? – Pentru că astăzi chestiunea constituţiei europene este principalul motiv de dispută în Europa, trebuie să ţinem seama de faptul că o constituţie nu prevede doar metodele şi limitele exercitării puterii (în viitor), ci abor-


Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle
dează și persoana legislatorului. Crearea unei constituții trebuie înțeleasă ca un act prin care legislatorul, adică „națiunea”, se modeleză și se supune puterii pe care a creat-o. Prin urmare, crearea unei constituții nu presupune doar existența unei puteri legitime și limitate, ci și a unui „corp politic”, adică existența cetățeanului însuși. O comunitate politică este creată prin supunerea „națiunii” față de puterea politică creată de ea însăși.


Cred că răspunsul la această întrebare – cel puțin la momentul actual – este negativ. În această privință, merită luate în calcul datele furnizate de Eurobarometru: în ce măsură locuitorii sau cetățenii statelor naționale europene au declarat că sunt europeni sau mai degrabă europeni decât cetățeni ai unei anumite națiuni (cam 12%, dintre care doar 4% au declarat că sunt europeni). De asemenea trebuie văzut ce a însemnat pentru ei acest lucru?2 Se pare că, deși elitele politice ale unor state naționale tind să considere (și, în consecință, să trateze) că UE este un

sistem politico-instituțional independent și specific, cu legea proprie, totuși cetățenii acelorași state naționale au o cu totul altă perspectivă. În prezent, în afară de un mic, aproape nesemnificativ, grup de adepți ai Europei, cei mai mulți cetățeni se identifică în primulând, cu propria comunitate națională. Ei consideră că guvernarea europeană face parte din relațiile internaționale ale propriilor guvernări naționale, care privesc unele dintre interesele lor naționale, dar nu este în sine un sistem politico-instituțional pe baza legii proprii. Din această perspectivă, atitudinea pozitivă a majorității europenilor față de UE, reflectată în datele oferite de Eurobarometru, este de o însemnătate redusă. Sondajele efectuate în rândul alegătorilor cu privire la atitudinea lor față de UE diferă în mod esențial de alegeri, când alegătorilor li se cere să-și rezolve prioritățile și să se identifice cu probleme în vederea de a-și exprima, într-un mod coerent, singurul vot pe care îl au la dispoziție. Dificultatea evidentă de identificare cu UE este cauzată de „caracterul abstract” al scopurilor politice europene: în prezent, cetățenii nu consideră problema impozitării, a asigurărilor sociale sau aspectele normative precum avortul sau reglementarea imigrației ca fiind de competența UE.

În mod similar, deși documentele și tratatele oficiale ale UE utilizează conceptul de „cetățean european” – și există chiar un pașaport UE - totuși nu se poate spune despre nici unul dintre aceste documente că dețin o valoare operațională reală. Într-adevăr, pentru obținerea pașaportului european este necesară deținerea cetățeniei unui stat național, iar pașaportul este emis de către autoritățile competente ale statelor naționale, la fel ca înainte. Adică, în timp ce instituțiile și organizațiile guverneamentale ale Uniunii au dobândit puteri independente și autonome, cetățenia europeană a rămas doar un derivat al reglementărilor naționale. Termenul de cetățean european creează falsa impresie că cetățenii care trăiesc în UE au dobândit un nou statut politic specific, ceea ce este departe de adevăr – este pur și simplu un statut simbolic. Singura substanță politică reală ce se poate asocia cu acest statut este că el conferă cetățenilor europeni dreptul de a alege sau de a fi aleși în anumite condiții, cel puțin la nivelurile local ale alegerilor europene. Totuși, partidele politice din anumite țări, dominând de obicei procesul de numire a candidaților, rareori propun drept candidat un cetățean străin. Astfel, căutarea unei forme de identitate europeană apropriată de cetățean – capabilă să servească drept bază pentru o comunitate politică -, are sanse slabe de
reuşită, precum reiese din concluziile sceptice ale analizei datelor furnizate de Eurobarometru sau examinarea valorii efective, operaţionale a tratelor şi documentelor Uniunii.

În privinţa sentimentului de comuniune putem afirma: europeismul şi sentimentul apartenenţei la Europa au într-adevăr anumite origini istorice şi culturale. Totuşi, acest sentiment al comuniunii nu va fi îndeajuns pentru stimularea unui sentiment mai puternic de solidaritate, care ar fi necesar pentru funcţionarea sistemului european de asigurări sociale (stat providenţial). (Eşecul referendumului francez asupra proiectului de constituţie a demonstrat exact acest lucru în anul 2005.) De fapt, discuţiile privind chestiunea identităţii culturale europene _per se_ - şi asupra implicaţiilor politice ale acestei moşteniri culturale – pot conduce spre rezultate tangibile doar dacă reuşim să depăşim generalităţile uzuale.

Teoretic, tradiţia culturală europeană „comună” are două puncte de origine: cel elenistic şi cel iudeo-creştin. Tradiţia greacă a produs cele mai importante elemente ale culturii noastre politico-democratice, dar această „cultură” a suferit destul de multe schimbări în timpul procesului de transmitere, iar gândirea şi practica noastră politică de astăzi sunt influenţate mult mai puternic de moştenirile teoretice evansi-instituţionalizate ale lui Hobbes şi Locke, sau Montesquieu şi Rousseau decât de universul ideilor aristotelice. Astăzi, democrațiile noastre se aseamănă cu democrațiile orașelor-state grecești doar prin intermediul numelui.

În principiu, tradiţia creştină nu are astfel de implicaţii politice. Referindu-ne la originile creştine ale Europei, ne gândim mai ales la faptul că valorile creştine au penetrat cultura europeană. Cel mult, noi considerăm în mod obișnuit - şi incoerent – că principiul democratic al egalităţii provine din doctrina creştină a egalităţii tuturor fiinţelor umane înaintea lui Dumnezeu. Totuşi, unii filosofi politici – cum ar fi Pierre Manent⁴, pentru a menţiona unul dintre ei –, pretind că forma europeană tipică de comunitate şi identitate politică, naţiunea, nu s-ar fi putut dezvolta fără creştinism şi că acest lucru îşi are originea în creştinism: creştinismul a spiritualizat comunitatea politică şi prin intermediul Reformei a naţionalizat-o. Astfel, ar putea fi utilă analiza semnificaţiei politice a creştinismului din acest punct de vedere, în alt context.

Rezumând, putem spune că identitatea europeană comună (de astăzi) nu este, în nici un caz, o realitate existentă; este, în cel mai bun caz, un deziderat; iar bazele creării ei cu greu pot fi așezate pe reminiscențe sau reamintiri ale tradiției culturale europene comune. Forma europeană tipică de comunitate și identitate politică a rămas până azi națiunea și se spune că lucrurile care separă națiunile europene sunt mult mai numeroase decât acelea care le unesc. Ținând cont de cele spuse anterior, sarcina UE – dacă dorește să se impună ca formă de guvenare specifică și independentă – este evident de a crea o astfel de identitate (un corp politic) - și într-adevăr există aspirații clare în cadrul Uniunii în această privință, care se bazează în primul rând pe uneltele educației și comunicării.

Totuși, dacă ne uităm dincolo de aceste – destul de ezitante și deseori aparent contigente – aspirații ale Uniunii și luăm în considerare dezbaterile teoretice importante care încă se poartă în acest domeniu, vom observa că înșiși teoreticienii politici marcanți insistă asupra creării unei identități politice europene comune – cu excepția celor care nu cred că este posibil așa ceva (printre aceștia se numără și sus-menționatul Pierre Manent, ale cărui opinii vor fi analizate mai târziu în lucrarea de față). Fără nicio îndoială, liderul de opinie este Habermas, care a susținut, în câteva dintre cărțile și studiile sale, necesitatea unei constituții și a unei loialități europene comune.

Habermas a subliniat că după al doilea Război Mondial întreaga Europă a fost martora apariției unei cerințe puternice pentru o societate pluralistă și tolerantă, asemănătoare Statelor Unite ale Americii – această speranță continuă să însufla仍然是欧罗巴 „post-națională”, dar și proiectul politic al Uniunii Europene, care se instituționalizează treptat. Totuși, așa cum el sugerează, comunitatea politică „transnațională” poate funcționa, pe viitor, ca un fel de „corp” pentru

Europa post-națională dacă diferențele culturale care dezbină grupurile – chiar națiunile – ar fi limitate la dimensiunea socială (sau, în anumite cazuri, la dimensiunea privată). O altă condiție ar fi dacă am recunoaște că identitatea particulară nu prezintă o semnificație publică sau politică. Identitatea (politică) comună trebuie construită pe valorile universale ale unei constituții civile bazate pe principiul garantării drepturilor individue, iar cerința validării politice a identității particulare (așa-numita politică de recunoaștere) nu poate compromite valorile de bază universale ale constituției. Așadar, reperete teoriei lui Habermas sunt comunitatea politică transnațională, națiunea civilă, valorile constituționale comune, loialitatea cetățenească, patriotismul constituțional (și uneltele sale: publicitatea socială și democrația consultativă). ⁶

Fiindcă obiectivul meu nu este analiza detaliată a teoriei lui Habermas (nici nu dispun de spațiu sufficient pentru aceasta), mă voi limita la a face două comentarii asupra problemelor ridicate de el. Una dintre acestea este faptul că transferul de suveranitate spre UE erodează fără îndoială puterea statelor naționale (nu și legitimitatea lor), iar pentru că statul național nu este doar beneficiarul unei identități de tip național, ci și un promotor al acesteia, putem vorbi, într-un sens foarte limitat, despre o eroziune treptată a identităților naționale existente. Astfel, merită luată în calcul posibilitatea unei identități politice transnaționale (sau cel puțin postnaționale). Totuși, eroziunea vizibilă a suveranității statelor naționale nu conduce în mod automat spre o eroziune similară a comunităților și a identității naționale. O astfel de concluzie ar fi legitimă doar dacă punem semnul egalității între statul național și națiune, ceea ce nu prea se justifică nici din punct de vedere istoric, nici din punct de vedere...
metodologic, afirmă John Hutchinson, binecunoscutul cercetător în domeniul naţionalismului.\textsuperscript{7}

Al doilea comentariu se referă la faptul că Habermas – după cum el însuși menționează – consideră Constituția americană ca fiind exemplară și prevede un rol esențial viitoarei constituții europene în dezvoltarea patriotismului constituțional european. De la Tocqueville încoace, i-am percepțat într-adevăr pe americani ca fiind caracterizați de o formă particulară de loialitate politică colectivă, pe care el a identificat-o ca fiind o formă de patriotism reflectat (adică, nu doar înrădăcinat în inimi) și a pus-o în contrast cu naționalismul francez (care, la acea vreme, a caracterizat deja întreaga Europă). Totuși, spre deosebire de teoria lui modă a patriotismului constituțional, Tocqueville nu a acordat o semnificație specială nici așa-numitei sfere civile (și dialogului social întreținut în interiorul acesteia), nici constituției în evoluția patriotismului sau spiritului public american. Este adevărat că el a susținut că organizațiile civile sunt bastioane ale culturii și produse ale inițiativei spiritului public, dar el a atribuit mult mai multă importanță descentralizării administrați-iei publice în cadrul evoluției spiritului public. El a sugerat că centralizarea administrativă a răpit puterea poporului care a acceptat-o. Aceasta s-a întâmplat pentru că omnipotența statului slabește spiritul public al cetățenilor; totuși, descentralizarea, făcându-i pe oameni interesați de exercitarea puterii la nivel local, stărneste îngrijorare și preocupare reală pentru viitorul statului (dar nu și a națiunii!). – Cred că o propunere mult fezabilă ar fi ca patriotismul și iubirea de patrie să fie generate mai degrabă de formele de putere descentralizate decât de deliberarea socială și acțiunea comunicativă. Acestea din urmă nu sunt un fapt real, poate nici măcar o posibilitate, dar chiar și așa ar putea avea șanse foarte reduse comparativ cu formele de putere puternic centralizate și birocratizate.

Cu toate acestea, teoria lui Habermas este prea complexă pentru a fi analizată într-o manieră atât de limitată. Totuși, obiectivul acestui studiu nu este cercetarea lucrării sale, nici analiza mai profundă a posibilității unei identități politice europene transnaționale. În schimb, aș dori să ne punem întrebarea: comunitatea cetățenilor europeni poate fi considerată

ca fiind o comunitate de tip național? Sau ca să mă exprim mai clar: poate fi creat, măcar teoretic, ceva de genul așa-numitei națiuni europene?

O astfel de întrebare presupune de la bun început că UE intenționează să devină un stat național, deși o astfel de aspirație nu este pe-ateât de clară pe cât pare. Cu toate acestea, există unele îndicii (cum ar fi drapelul comun european, îmnlul, precum și alte simboluri menite să consoleze identitatea europeană) care indică existența unei oarecare intenții – deși nu întotdeauna conștiente și coerente în practică – de a conferi demosului european aspectul unui tip de comunitate națională. Un alt argument pentru abordarea aleasă de mine este faptul că identitatea politică națională – indiferent de cât de dăunător s-a dovedit a fi naționalismul european și de daunele pe care le-a provocat pe parcursul ultimelor două secole – s-a dovedit a fi o formă de identitate a comunității atât de stabilă și populară, încât astăzi cu greu se poate găsi un exemplu de comunități politice non-naționale în Europa. Mulți consideră că acest lucru este mai mult decât un efect secundar al coincidențelor istorice. Mai degrabă, acest lucru arată – iar anumiți autori care studiază identitatea politică consideră la fel – că națiunea s-a dovedit a fi forma de comunitate politică cea mai capabilă de a susține realizările modernității, fiind și cel mai potrivit agent al modernității.8

Din această perspectivă, nu există o autoritate mai cunoscută și mai apreciată decât Habermas. Deși câteva titluri existente promit o cercetare a identității europene din perspectiva ideologiei naționale, în majoritatea cazurilor această corelație dintre identitatea europeană și cea națională ascunde doar o concluzie sceptică și anterior asumată. Adică, în majoritatea cazurilor, acei autori nu cred în posibilitatea unei identități europene și intenționează să scoată în evidență durabilitatea și caracterul stabil al identităților naționale, în dauna identității europene comune. Astfel, de exemplu, o lucrare mai veche care aborda acest subiect, editată de Brian Jenkins, atenționează în legătură cu prezența tot mai intensă a naționalismului în Europa.9 În același timp, o altă lucrare, editată de Mikaelaf Malmborg și Bo Stråth, arată că diferitele discursuri naționale

8 Vezi, de exemplu: Miklós Bakk: Politikai közösség és identitás (Comunitate și identitate politică), Komp-Press Kiadó, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, 144. (Mai ales subcapitolul A nemzet mint a modernitás egyetlen formája (Națiunea ca singura formă a modernității).)
atribuie Europei idei extrem de diferite. O stare de spirit similară stă la baza abordării lui Anthony Pagden care din perspectiva istoriei ideilor deduce, analizând diferitele forme ale ideii de Europa, că acel concept european propagat în diferitele perioade istorice a servit doar la disimularea aspirațiilor hegemoniste europene ale diferitelor state și imperii, și că nimic nu s-a schimbat nici în cazul UE, unde idealul Europei unite este doar un camuflaj al dorinței franco-germane de hegemonie. Aceasta chestiune este abordată într-o manieră concretă și pe un ton la fel de sceptic în studiul lui John Hutchinson, dar și într-un text mai vechi scris de Anthony D. Smith, o altă figură emblematică a studiilor despre naționalism.

Abordarea pe care o propun, deși ideile folosite pentru examinarea chestiunii identității europene sunt utilizate și de către ideologia națională, introduce în scenă o nouă metodologie și un nou obiectiv. Nu intenționez neapărat să evidențiez durabilitatea și caracterul stabil al identităților naționale existente în defavoarea identității europene comune, ci să răspund la următoarea întrebare: există posibilitatea - chiar dacă limitată - la un experiment intelectual – ca o identitate națională să fie extinsă asupra comunității cetățenilor europeni? (Consider că nu ar trebui să ne împotrivi cum ab ovo unei asemenea abordări teoretice: să ne amintim că nașterea constituției americane a fost însoțită de dezbateri asupra unor chestiuni teoretice precum posibilitatea – dacă exista vreuna – a unei republici care să adăpostească mulți oameni și care să acopere o zonă geografică întinsă.) Evident, abordarea mea ar trebui să ajungă la o oarecare concluzie privind posibilitatea existenței identității europene (sau cel puțin a anumitor modalități ale ei), dar această concluzie nu trebuie să fie neapărat una sceptică; sau, dacă este sceptică, argumentele care o susțin nu ar trebui fundamentate în mod necesar pe primatul identităților naționale existente.

Metoda selectată de mine este o analogie istorică prin care încerc să aflu în ce măsură cunoștințele noastre istorice asupra procesului de

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conturare a națiunilor și evoluția ideologiei naționale ne îndreptățesc să vorbim despre posibilitatea conturării unei comunități naționale paneuropene. Pe scurt, poziția mea este că ar trebui analizat procesul creării unei comunități naționale politice în anumite state europene (pe scară largă), insistându-se mai ales pe începuturile procesului, Franța și Revoluția franceză, de asemenea trebuie constatat dacă se poate face vreo analogie între evoluția procesului de conturare a identității naționale și identitatea europeană.

La o primă abordare, s-ar părea că procesul evoluției ideologiei naționale, al genezei națiunii, cuprinde momente care ar putea să ne alimenteze speranțele și, aparent, ne-ar putea îndreptăți să prevedem în mod optimist evoluția unui tip de identitate europeană comună și națională.

Mai întâi, este adevărat că națiunea este un ideal. Adică, este un „concept abstract” (precum a spus Benjâmîn Constant), deci nu un lucru concret. Spre deosebire de familie, rude sau triburi, națiunea nu este o formă de comunitate tangibilă, iar identitatea națională – spre deosebire de alte forme de identitate – este o formă foarte abstractă a identității comunității colective. De aceea, extrapolarea sa viitoare nu întâmpină obstacole teoretice. Identitatea națională a fost „creată” – mai întâi în Franța, apoi în alte părți urmând exemplului francez – prin „separarea” indivizilor de forma de identitate particulară căreia ei aparținuseră anterior – conace, parohii, bresle, provincii. Indivizii astfel „eliberăți” au fost reunificați în națiune ca fiind cea mai cuprinzătoare formă de comunitate politică. Așadar, nu există nicio dificultate teoretică de a separa indivizi din nou de formele de identitate națională existente și de a-i reuni într-o națiune supranatională care să cuprindă toți cetățenii Europei.

Totuși, fiindcă această formă de identitate nu se bazează pe relații directe de sânge și legături de rudenie, ci are un caracter predominant conștient, procesul de construire a unei națiuni ar putea înregistra succes doar dacă o conștiință limpede a acestei identități noi, cuprinzătoare, va fi implantată în mintea oamenilor: o națiune „există” doar dacă membrii unui grup uman dat se cunosc pe ei înșiși ca fiind parte a acelei națiuni.

Precum Ernest Renan a expus destul de clar în remarabilul și notoriul său eseu despre națiune, aceasta presupune că o condiție preliminară asupra existenței unei identități naționale nu este o limbă comună, fiindcă națiunea nu este predominant sau în primul rând o comunitate lingvistică, ci una „spirituală”: „O națiune este un suflet, un principiu spiritual”.14 (Concluzia lui Renan rămâne valabilă chiar dacă el pur și simplu a trebuit să spună acest lucru în dezbaterea despre națiunea franceză pe care a ținut-o împreună cu istoricii germani din cauza separării Alsaciei. El nu a putut spune că națiunea franceză a fost o comunitate lingvistică, ținând cont de faptul că majoritatea alsacienilor erau vorbitori de germană.)


Totuși, succesul procesului de „construire a națiunii” nu depinde doar de posibilitatea ca în mintea indivizilor să poată fi creată o conștiință clară a noii identități, ci și de abilitatea de a trezi în aceștia un sentiment de apartenență la o națiune. Adică, crearea unei comunități asemănătoare unei națiuni este condiționată nu doar de identitatea națională și conștiința acesteia, ci și de o puternică loialitate emoțională față de națiune. Faptul că națiunea este un ideal sau o abstracție, nu înseamnă că emoțiile față de națiune și identificarea emoțională a individului cu națiunea nu sunt (sau nu ar putea fi) reale.

Aceasta este motivul pentru care revoluționarii francezi, respectând cu fidelitate propunerile lui Rousseau despre religia națională, au încercat să spiritualizeze ideea națională prin intermediul religiei obligatorii a Ființei Supreme introduse prin decretul lui Robespierre. Adică, au încercat și astăzi știm că au reușit – să transforme conceptul de națiune în

obiect al venerationii religioase sau evansi-sacre. Deși obiectul adorației spirituale în religia de stat a lui Robespierre a fost conceptul de Fiiință Supremă, acest concept de Fiiință Supremă – după cum a evidențiat în câteva discursuri – exprima, de fapt, caracterul „poaporului francez” 15 Propunerea lui Rousseau – pe care Robespierre a citat-o literal în argumentarea primului festival al Fiiinței Supremi, consemnată în decret – dezvăluie evident intențiile finale ale religiei de stat: „Prin libertate, oriunde domnește belșugul, domnește și bunăstarea. Înfige un ţăruș încoronat cu flori în mijlocul unei piețe publice; adună acolo oamenii și vei avea un festival. Fă și mai bine; lasă spectatorii să devină un divertisment pentru ei înșiși; fă-i pe ei înșiși actori; fă-o în așa fel încât fiecare se vede și se iubește pe sine în ceilalți, astfel încât cu toții vor fi mai uniți.”16 Așadar, la festivalul religiei națiunii, fiecare se vede și se iubește pe sine în ceilalți, astfel încât for fi uniți in mod perfect. – Nu înseamnă că aceasta este singura cale de a stârni loialitate emoțională față de conceptul națiunii. Dar, într-adevăr, acest lucru atrage atenția asupra necesității loialității emoționale față de națiune și față de semnificația simbolurilor (îmhnuri, drapele), ritualurilor etc. în conturarea identității naționale. Identitatea națională este de neconceput fără simbolurile comune care trezesc loialitatea emoțională și umple inimile cu mândrie și sentiment. 

Prin urmare, din cele spuse mai sus putem concluziona că națiunea este pur și simplu o „comunitate imaginară”, o formă puternică și conștientă a identității comunității, ceea ce nu presupune nici amintirea istorică a unei origini comune, nici o limbă comună. Însă națiunea are


nevoie de o conștiință clară și un sentiment precis de comuniune. Din această perspectivă, crearea unei identități naționale paneuropene nu se confruntă cu niciun impediment teoretic.

Și totuși: gândindu-mă despre această posibilități, rămân sceptic. Din mai multe motive.

Primul, pentru că - și poate acesta este motivul cel mai evident dintre toate – UE a avut până acum foarte puțin succes în revigorarea loialității emoționale a cetățenilor ei. Acest fapt este atât de evident încât nu este necesar să-l demonstrăm prin mai multe detalii.


Dintre aspectele tratate anterior, esențial pentru scopurile noastre este că națiunea a însemnat un fel de „pod” între formele de existență politică foarte limitate și cele nelimitate. Totuși, astăzi suntem cam în exact aceeași situație ca în epoca romană, fiindcă după eșecul idealurilor naționaliste și imperialiste, trebuie să ne punem din nou întrebarea: ce înseamnă națiunea europeană pentru noi. Pe de o parte, suntem atrași de
familiaritatea cadrului restrâns în care se dezvoltă statul național, chiar dacă națiunile noastre și-au pierdut deja o parte importantă a suveranității lor politice; pe de altă parte, experimentăm impulsul imperial și ne întreținem dacă ar trebui să continuăm să umblăm pe calea care conduce spre un imperiu european fără limite fondat pe sentimentul universal de comuniune. Manent subliniază că „pierdem rapid dimensiunea de mijloc, cu aspectele sale fizice și spirituale inseparabile, pe care am întemeiat tot ce este încă vrednic de prețuire din istoriile noastre naționale, precum și din istoria comună europeană.” Departe de intenția noastră de a spune că noi, europenii iluminați, am depășit cadrele naționale. Mai degrabă am pierdut vizibil simțul pentru echilibrul fragil dintre lucrurile mărunte și lucrurile mari.

În sfârșit, sunt sceptic și pentru că – după cum ne arată experiența istorică – crearea națiunii a fost posibilă doar fiindcă indivizii puseau fi separați de formele de identitate anterioare. În anul 1789, acest proces – după cum am observat – nu a sedus doar cu speranța eliberării, dar a inclus și individualizarea, lichidarea legăturilor sociale anterioare: prin urmare, până în ziua de astăzi, națiunea a fost o comunitate de indivizii, iar naționalismul și individualismul sunt interdependente. Această pretenție, deși uluitoare, nu este paradoxală, nici de nesusținut.

O astfel de pretenție sună paradoxal astăzi în special pentru că după epoca naționalismului revoluționar, am cunoscut formele de naționalism puternic colectiviste, care contrastează cu aspirațiile de libertate și sunt ostile față de individ, și ni se pare astăzi că acest colectivism este ostil față de individualism. Totuși, după cum a demonstrat Hannah Arendt, de îndată ce – începând cu Revoluția franceză - individul a intrat pe scenă ca o ființă complet independentă cu drepturi și demnitate inerente, care nu necesită nicio altă ordine care să-l înconjoare, a dispărut instanțaneu și a fost transformat într-un membru al poporului. Iar, fiindcă după Revoluția franceză umanitatea a fost închisită ca o familie de popoare, rămâne valabilă până astăzi afirmația că adevărata formă de organizare a omului nu este individul, ci națiunea.18

17 Pierre Manent, op. cit., 102.

IX. évfolyam – 2010/2
Astfel, individualismul naţionalismului şi puternicul său colectivism s-au născut în acelaşi timp; nu doar că acestea nu se exclud, ci chiar se presupun reciproc. Dintre toate aceste aspecte, momentan singurul care are importanţă pentru noi este că naţiunea este o comunitate de indivizi, iar această naştere a naţiunii a necesitat un proces de individualizare treptată, „eliberarea” individului de legăturile sociale moştenite. Totuşi, astăzi acest lucru ar însemna că indivizii trebuie eliberaţi de legăturile moştenite ale existenţei lor naţionale şi reuniţi în naţiunea europeană ca o nouă, chiar mai cuprinzătoare, formă de identitate politică. – Iar personal, prevăd puţine şanse pentru realizarea acestui lucru.

Nu neapărat fiindcă a ş i fi limitat de propriul meu naţionalism, maghiar, şi nici măcar pentru că, împreună cu alţii, înţeleg prin stat naţional şi de fapt prin cadrul existenţei naţionale un fel de necesitate istorică: un cadr u necesar pentru modernitate sau ceva asemănător. Dimpotrivă: sunt complet de acord cu Elie Kedourie, care în dezbaterile sale cu colegul său mai tânăr, Ernest Gellner, a ţinut să sublinieze că el a considerat naţiunea ca fiind nemic mai mult decât un simplu accident istoric. (Un alt argument care demonstră că naţiunea nu este un cadr u necesar pentru modernitate este faptul că modernitatea s-a instalat şi în comunităţi politice care erau organizate după principii non-naţionale: probabil cel mai bun exemplu il reprezintă Statele Unite ale Americii. Statele Unite nu sunt un stat naţional, cetăţenii săi nu formează o naţiune, sau cel puţin nu în înţeles european al termenului de naţiune: naţionalismul, aşa cum îl cunoaştem aici în Europa, este practic necunoscut acolo.)

Deşi Gellner şi Kedourie au fost „modernişti”, adică au considerat naţiunea ca fiind un fenomen modern, totuşi cu greu se pot imagina două teorii care să propună concepte atât de diferite despre originile naţiunii. Gellner, mai ales în lucrările sale din ultimii ani de viaţă, susţinea tot mai puternic ideea că naţiunea a fost un element necesar al modernităţii: procesele care au avut loc în modernitate (precum industrializarea) au chemat la existenţa naţiunii, iar din acest motiv modernitatea nici măcar nu poate fi concepută fără naţiune. Totuşi, Kedourie a susţinut că deşi

națiunea a fost un fenomen modern, nu a însemnat mai mult decât un accident istoric. În esență, nu a fost cu nimeni mai mult decât o construcție „ideologică”, iar responsabili pentru crearea și propagarea ideii de națiune, mai precis a suveranității naționale, au fost filosofi precum Kant sau mai ales adeptul său, Fichte. Schema explicativă tipică sociologilor, care caracterizează întâi de pronunțat cărțile lui Gellner, tind să prezinte acest proces în lumina necesității istorice, înțeosebi pentru că el caută originile națiunii și ale statului național în mecanisme de efect impersonale (modernizarea, industrializarea, răspândirea culturii superioare standardizate etc.). Totuși, prin ochii unui istoric al ideilor, este evident că națiunea și statul național nu sunt atunci decât o ideologie concretizată – din nou: un simplu accident istoric. (Desigur, aceasta nu însemnă că – precum demonstrează cuvintele lui Manent mai sus citate – apariția națiunii nu are anumite condiții istorice date de la care iși începe evoluția și că acestea nu ar putea fi interpretate folosind metodele obișnuite ale explicației istorice. Revindicarea echității sociale, care probabil este elementul cel mai important al idealului național, a fost înființată de absoluțism, chiar și după Tocqueville. În același mod, idealul unei comunități politico-spirituale își poate avea originea întrucâtva în tradiția creștină.)

Totuși, repet, sunt convins că națiunea este alceva decât un accident istoric care a fost creat de anumite condiții date și de ideologia suveranității naționale. Acest lucru nu însemnă în niciun caz că astăzi pur și simplu din cadrele existenței naționale. Indiferent de cât de teoretică este națiunea și de faptul că este un produs istoric al unei construcții ideologice, ideea – odată întruchipată și prezentă sub formă instituțională și dominând gândurile umane – este foarte greu de înălțat. (Acesta este motivul pentru care Isaiah Berlin, celebrul savant al istoriei ideilor naționaliste, a spus că activitatea unui savant plicticos al ideilor nu este doar o înedelnicire inofensivă, asemănătoare profesoratului: este mai bine – sugerează el – ca gândurile periculoase să fie erădate din fragedă copilărie, înainte ca acestea să dobândească o armură ideologică.)

Reiterând, nu văd niciun semn particular cum că efectul de conturare conștientă a ideii naționale sau intensitatea sentimentului național a pierdut din consistentă în mod considerabil. Și nici nu consider că micoșorarea puterii și suveranității statului național ar putea duce la eroziunea națiunii însăși și a puterii legitimatoare a ideii naționale. Dimpotrivă: eu cred, ca și sus-menționatul Michael Mann, că declinul statului național în
epoca globalizării nu indică întemeierea unor construcții statale mai mari, multinaționale, ci mai degrabă dezmembrarea celor existente: a construcțiilor statale etno-politice a căror dezmembrare se intensifică în paralel cu declinul statelor naționale, ceea ce duce la crearea unor state naționale noi, mai mici, dar considerate a fi tot mai autentice.21 (În acest sens, cel mai recent exemplu este evident Kossovo.)

În baza celor de mai sus, s-ar putea părea că pun în contrast posibilitatea unei identități politice europene doar cu realitatea sumbră a naționalismului existent. Totuși, avem la îndemână o altă experiență politică, ceea ce mă determină să păstreze aceeași atitudine sceptică. Deși este adevărat că națiunea este o „comunitate imaginată”, o abstracție, totuși există o serie de *mecanismes de effet politique*, ceea ce nu doar presupune, ci și consolidează conștiința apartenenței și coeziunii naționale. Astfel, merită să amintim – István Bibó nu a uitat niciodată să facă acest lucru – că naționalismul și „democratismul” sunt „frați de sânge”, adică răspândirea idealului național în Franța a fost însoțită de introducerea guvernării republicane; și că asimilarea lingvistică în Franța a fost urgen tată în principal din cauza unor considerații republicane.22 Adică, dacă revoluționarii francezi au considerat - și unii chiar au considerat – că se impunea anihilarea dialectelor vorbite pe teritoriul Franței în acea vreme (breton și basc, dar și limba italiană și germană), motivația nu era irritarea lor față de diversitatea lingvistică, cum este cazul naționaliștilor din zilele noastre. Ci fiindcă ei au considerat că idealul libertății (idealul republican) pretinde acest sacrificiu minorităților lingvistice.

Cea mai bună argumentare a omogenizării lingvistice în timpul Revoluției a fost formulată de Barère care, de altfel, a fost convins că franceza este „cea mai frumoasă limbă a Europei”, chemată să „mijlocească expresia celor mai înalte gânduri de libertate ale lumii”. În ziua de 8 pluvios anul II (27 ianuarie 1794), înaintea Convenției Naționale, el a expus că „este imposibil de distrus federalismul bazat pe gânduri de libertate ale lumii”. În ziua de 8 pluvios anul II (27 ianuarie 1794), înaintea Convenției Naționale, el a expus că „este imposibil de distrus federalismul bazat pe gânduri care nu se comunică”.23 „Noi am revoluționat modul de guvernare, legile, obiceiurile, morala, îmbrăcămintea, comerțul și chiar gândirea, spunea; haideți

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21 Michael Mann, op. cit, 155.
22 Ar trebui luat în considerare faptul că mai puțin de jumătate din cetățenii Franței cunoștea doar limba franceză în timpul Revoluției franceze.
23 În retorica revoluționară, federalismul însemna separatism.
să revoluționăm limba care este canalul de propagare a gândirii. Ați ordonat ca legile să fie răspândite în toate satele Republicii; dar această faptă bună este în zadar pentru ținuturile la care mă refer. Claritatea transmisă până la marginile țării cu mari sacrificii dispare până când ajunge la destinație, fiindcă locuitorii acelor locuri nici măcar nu înțeleg aceste legi. Federalismul și superstiția vorbesc bretona; emigrația și ural față de Republică vorbesc germană; contrarevoluția vorbește italiana, iar fanatismul vorbește limba bascilor. Haideți să zdrobim aceste instrumente dăunătoare și păcătoase.”

Aceasta înseamnă că argumentul pentru asimilarea lingvistică este propagarea ideii de libertate, adică a constituționalității și idealuluiRepublicii. Uniformitatea este justificată prin universalism, asimilarea este îndreptățită prin nevoia de libertate: „omul”, în interesul propriu, poate fi constrânsc la libertate – chiar prin distrugerea identității sale naționale. Astfel, scopul omogenizării lingvistice nu este unul cultural, ci politic, și este legat de necesitatea consultării politice (și optimizarea administrației centrale). Omogenitatea lingvistică nu se impune pentru că identitățile lingvistice și culturale diferite sunt iritante sau distractive ca atare și în consecință ar trebui distruse, ci fiindcă o semnificație politică este atașată limbii și comunicării în Republică.

În timpul Revoluției, cele mai eficiente mijloace care au servit acestui scop au fost ziarele pariziene distribuite în provincii cu scopul de a promova idealurile revoluționare precum și limba revoluționară, franceza vorbită în Paris, după cum a remarcat Edmund Burke. Totuși, în cele din urmă, aceste mijloace s-au dovedit a fi inadecvate, iar timpul de care revoluționarii au dispus a fost mult prea scurt pentru atingerea scopului. Astfel, unitatea lingvistică a Franței a fost realizată doar mai târziu, prin intermediul politicîi educaționale a celei de-a treia Republici, folosindu-se metode extreme de drastice. Deși Revoluția franceză nu a eradicat diversitatea lingvistică a Franței, însă a pus capăt indiferenței poporului francez față de diversitatea lingvistică din țara lor.  

24 Barère exagerează: încă din decembrie 1792 ministerul justiției a creat un birou pentru traducerea legilor și decretelor în germană, italiană, catalană, bască și dialectul breton.  
26 Un mod similar de a aborda problema analizării genezei identității naționale se găsește
Desigur, toate acestea nu înseamnă, nici măcar astăzi, că guvernanrea republicană este de neconceput fără existența unei comunități naționale ci mai degrabă că Revoluția franceză a introdus un tip de sistem democratic în Europa care își asumă și în același timp reproduce comunitatea politică de tip național. Și-o asumă fiindcă, conform gândirii lui Rousseau, acest sistem se auto-legitimează în mod convențional ca stat național pe baza principiului „suveranității naționale”; este constrâns la reproducere continuă, fiind o structură statală puternic centralizată și birocratizată este funcțională doar atâta timp cât cetățenii ei, ca comunitate, vorbesc aceeași limbă oficială, aceasta asigurând funcționarea unitară, neperturbată a administrației, justiției și educației publice.

Totuși, anumiți autori contemporani au tras o concluzie generală din această experiență istorică – referitor la nașterea statelor naționale europene – și consideră ca fiind un adevăr general valabil faptul că structura statală republicană nu poate funcționa într-un mediu social multilingv. Astfel, Will Kymlicka (poate cel mai cunoscut reprezentant contemporan al teoriei multiculturalismului) a argumentat, în încercarea sa de a elimina neutralitatea etno-culturală a statului împărtășită chiar și de unii liberali contemporani (de exemplu, de Habermas), că identitatea lingvistică are o anumită importanță politică în sistemele politice republicane, fiindcă limba este un instrument al politicii democratice.27

Acesta spune că, indiferent de opinia liberalilor, instituțiile politice nu pot fi separate de cultură sau limbă precum s-a întâmplat mai demult cu religia și cu statul. Apoi, continuă Kymlicka, în general liberalii tind să facă o analogie între situația comunităților etnice sau a minorităților naționale și situația confesiunilor.28 Cum neutralitatea spirituală a statului a fost asigurată prin separarea statului de biserică, la fel, neutralitatea etnică a statului ar trebui asigurată de separarea puternică din-


28 Will Kymlicka: Multicultural Citizenship, 111.
tre stat şi etnie. Cum statul nu recunoaşte şi nu susţine nici o confesiune, în acelaşi mod nu ar trebui să recunoaşcă nici o etnie sau limbă. Totuşi, în timp ce separarea dintre stat şi biserică a fost posibilă prin intermediul laicizării statului (întrucât politica seculară nu are neapărat nevoie de legitimitate religioasă, creştinismul însuşi susţinând separarea problemelor de credinţă de autoritatea seculară), limba, elementul central al identităţii naţionale, este un instrument necesar politicii democratice. Statul nu este obligat să susţină anumite confesiuni (deşi face acest lucru în câteva state europene, cum ar fi Germania, Anglia, România, dar şi în alte țări ale lumii); totuşi, când statul decide folosirea unei limbii în cadrul administraţiei publice sau educaţie, atunci confirmă automat statutul public și legal al acelei limbii. Iar dacă statul conferă statut de limbă folosită în administraţie și educaţie limbii vorbite de majoritatea populaţiei, susţinând astfel cultura acesteia, acesta nu poate refuza, prin invocarea încălcării principiului separării dintre stat și etnie, recunoașterea oficială a limbilor vorbte de minorități.

Dintre toate aceste aspecte, ce ne preocupă în momentul de față nu este neapărat concluzia lui Kymlicka, ci premisa argumentației lui: gândul că elementul central al identității naționale, limba, este și un instrument important al politicii democratice. Acest lucru se datorează faptului că politica democratică este o politică a limbii autohtone, afirmă Kymlicka. Pentru cetățeanului obișnuit, cel mai bine este ca problemele politice să fie expuse în limba sa maternă, iar procesul democratic de luare a deciziilor este legitim doar dacă fiecare cetățean al statului participă (sau este apt de a participa) la dezbaterile publice care preced luarea deciziilor. Astfel, pretenția statului național pentru o limbă națională comună poate fi interpretată o necesitate pentru o democrație consultativă robustă.

Dacă ne gândim la afirmația sus-menționată a lui Barère, putem spune că acest gând nu este chiar atât de nou: revoluționarilor francezi le era deja clar că exigența participării în procesul republican decizional presupune omogenitate lingvistică. Diversitatea lingvistică a Franței nu a fost problematică atât timp cât categoria a treia nu a simțit nevoia de a participa la guvernare: a devenit un factor neliniștitor doar o dată cu introducerea sistemului republican. Totuși, în timp ce Kymlicka, recunoscând importanța politică a limbii, a dedus necesitatea statelor multiculturale și multinaționale care să instituționalizeze limbile populațiilor europa...
minoritare la fel ca limba populației majoritare, Barère, pe baza aceleiași logici, insistă asupra asimilării minorităților lingvistice pe motiv de uniformitate. Premisa, punctul de plecare permite, într-adevăr, ambele concluzii.

Acesta este motivul pentru care nu am reușit să decidem până acum ce poziție exprima poate cel mai cunoscut reprezentant al liberalismului național, John Stuart Mill în 1861, în celebrele sale idei din lucrarea Guvernarea reprezentativă: „Este aproape imposibil să-și închipuie cineva că va fi posibilă existența unor instituții libere într-o țară în care conviețuiesc mai multe naționalități. Între popoarele legate în mod artificial între ele, mai ales dacă acestea citesc și vorbesc limbi diferite, opinia publică unică, necesară funcționării guvernului reprezentativ, nu poate exista. […] Din motivele anterioare prezentate, o condiție necesară pentru funcționarea instituțiilor libere este ca granițele guvernării să coincidă, în mare parte, cu cele ale naționalităților.”

Evident, acest lucru poate duce la concluzia că trebuie configurată câte o guvernare independentă pentru a conduce fiecare naționalitate, dar și la concluzia că este „obligația civilă” a naționalităților mai mici să se contopească în cele mai mari: un sacrificiu care trebuie adus pentru binele libertății.

Într-un fel sau altul, premise rămâne validă, indiferent de concluzii. Deși Renan se poate să fi avut dreptate când a susținut că națiunea este în primul rând o comunitate lingvistică, nu una spirituală, totuși funcționarea cotidiană a unui stat național centralizat și a unei guvernări reprezentative necesită modelarea cetățenilor statului național într-o comunitate lingvistică. Națiunea ar putea exista fără o limbă comună, dar statul național nu ar putea. Politica de omogenizare lingvistică emisă de statul națiune se supune acestei logici în momentul în care limba oficială este impusă celor care nu o vorbesc ca limbă maternă.

Totuși, dacă nu interpretăm spusele lui Mill ca un apel al unui naționalist vehement la asimilare lingvistică și înălțare civilizațională (deși este dificil să nu le interpretăm în acest fel, având în vedere că Mill însuși, câteva rânduri mai jos, vorbește despre un scoțian munțean „stând îmbuflat pe propriile sale stânci, o relicvă din trecut pe jumătate sălbatică” care ar trebui să devină englez în loc să se „învârtă în jurul propriei și micuței sale orbite mentale”), atunci aceste cuvinte exprimă preocupa-
rea sinceră a guvernelui reprezentativ și a adepților republicii. Într-adevăr, spusele lui au atras atenția asupra faptului că republica presupune de la bun început o „simpatie reciprocă” între cetățeni, aceasta fiind doar una, însă probabil cea mai eficientă dintre formele de sentiment național.  Însă, observația rămâne valabilă: fiecare formă reprezentativă de guvernământ – indiferent dacă funcționează sau nu în cadrul unui stat național – presupune ceva comun, ceva care unește cetățenii între ei, ceva care creează coeziune politică între ei și care, probabil, poate fi desemnat cel mai bine prin sintagma „spațiul politic comun”.

Aici se pune întrebarea: în ce măsură putem vorbi despre un astfel de spațiu politic comun în cadrul UE, despre „simpatie reciprocă” între cetățeni? În ce măsură sistemul de guvernare al UE este reprezentativ? – Iar această întrebare privește nu doar posibilitatea unei identități naționale le europene strictu senso, ci în general posibilitatea unei comunități politice și guvernări reprezentative europene.

Dacă încercăm să privim sistemul politic UE nu doar ca un guvern cu instituțiile aferente, ci ca un spațiu politic comun - european -, un „corp politic”, trebuie să observăm de îndată că „corpul politic” al acestuia sistem sau al acestei guvernari cuprinde nu doar cetățenii, ci și membrii elitei politice și administrative. Cea din urmă poate fi împărtășită în două grupuri. Primul este format din reprezentanții guvernelor naționale care se întrunesc în diferite Consilii, în timp ce al doilea include „euro-crații”, adică politiceni și birocrații care deservesc propriile instituții ale UE (Comisia și Curtea Europeană în principal, și într-o măsură mai puțin pronunțată, membrii așa-numitului Parlament European).

Membrii primului grup se găsesc într-o situație ușor paradoxală. Deși activează și în instituțiile UE și ca atare, deși pot fi afla într-o situație în care trebuie să ignore interesele naționale mai mici de dragul aprofundării integrării, co-naționalii lor (și dacă sunt interesați, cetățenii altor state naționale) continuă să-i vadă drept reprezentanți naționali. Celălalt grup, în special membrii Comisiei, care exercită în practică putea rea executivă, se află într-o situație opusă: abia sunt cunoscuți cetățenilor statelor naționale. Lucrarea Curții Europene, abia cunoscută altora în afara categoriei ținute a experților juridici și academici, și activitatea Parlamentului European sunt practic necunoscute și invizibile maselor de cetățeni.

Pe de altă parte, cetățenii statelor naționale individuale nu sunt în mod primordial cetățeni ai Uniunii - dețin acest statut doar în măsura în
care sunt cetățenii unui stat național individual. Ei reprezintă doar subiecții regulamentelor și actelor normative europene, fără a avea cea mai modestă posibilitate de a participa efectiv la elaborarea legilor și normelor europene. Astfel, dacă UE este un corp politic, nu are de fapt un „corp” - nu are cetățeni efectivi.

Observăm aceeași situație și dacă cercetăm alte dimensiuni ale corpurilor și comunităților politice, cum ar fi spațiul politic comun bazat pe comunicare. Sistemul de comunicare al UE, în special comunicarea privind diferitele „politică”, este evident foarte complex - însă, în același timp, are o structură foarte fragmentată. Comunicarea europeană, în sensul cel mai real al cuvântului, are loc doar între membrii elitei politice și administrative care participă direct la guvernanța europeană sau care măcar îi sunt apropiiați. Un alt exemplu, destul de diferit, al comunicării la nivel european ar putea fi comunicarea din cadrul cercetărilor europene, căreia unii par să acorde importanță în privința formării așa-numitei „spiritualități” europene sau chiar a „crezului” european, precum și relațiile de comunicare ale diferitelor dimensiuni politice, culturale și economice. Într-adevăr, mulți consideră că acest sistem al rețelelor de comunicare, construit treptat în Europa - la care se conecțează un număr tot mai mare de organizații și societăți naționale, și recent, în vederea unei coordonări mai bune a activităților, și mișcările sociale și organizațiile civile - se dezvoltă treptat într-o „societate civilă” a UE.

Însă consider că această concluzie este nefondată și pripită. Într-adevăr, în comparație cu societățile civile obișnuite, foarte puțini cetățeni participă în mod efectiv la aceasta. Deoarece nu există un spațiu politic comun deasupra națiunilor, mișcările sociale și grupurile voluntare rareori își pot exercita potențialul de a mobiliza și de a acționa (cum ar fi demonstrațiile, mișcările de nesupunere civilă, etc.), bazându-se pe un fel de asistență profesională „internă” de la Bruxelles pentru a-și face o apariție eficientă. Astfel, cu toate că sindicatele au încercat de mult să coordoneze negocierile, discuțiile și grevele, încă nu au atins un nivel al coordonării și integrării europene a eforturilor lor, și nici nu se întârdește momentul în care acesta va fi atins. În general, grevele lor se pot bucura de succes dacă mediile naționale „amplifică” vocea lor, și dacă cetățenii rezonează corespunzător cu aceste voci în propriile lor țări. În alte privințe, susținerea maximă pe care se pot baza este un fel de reacție locală sau reacție de la Bruxelles sau Strasbourg.
Desigur, în baza exemplelor sus-menționate de acțiuni, interacțiuni și comunicare, am putea pretinde că până la urmă s-a creat un soi de spațiu politic comun în UE. Și, asemenea oricărui spațiu politic, este și el limitat și deseori exclusiv. Însă chiar dacă există așa ceva în UE, spre deosebire de comunicarea care are loc în spațiul politic al statelor democrațice, acest spațiu politic (și comunicarea din interiorul lui) este în cel mai bun caz semi-public.

Dacă luăm exemplul guvernării în sine, este frapant că principalul corp de guvernare al UE, Consiliul European, de regulă nu se întrunește, nu poartă dezbateri și nu ia decizii în mod public. (Situația este similară și în cazul altor Consilii formate din miniștrii de resort ai statelor naționale, activând în diferite domenii ale sferei politice.) Desigur, aceasta este concesița naturală a faptului că ele sunt de fapt organe interguvernamentale. De aceea, ne putem aștepta în mod just ca activitățile lor să fie similare cu modul de purtare a tratativelor internaționale. Cu toate acestea, spre deosebire de tratativele internaționale, rezultatele activității Consiliului sunt deseori determinante în privința legislației europene. Și în timp ce Consiliile, formate din membrii guvernelor naționale, intradecră ar avea autorizare de a depune activitatea guvernamentală și de a o practica în mod legitim, nu au niciun fel de autorizare de a acționa ca și corpuri legislative. În calitate de organe de guvernare europene, au o anumită legitimitate, însă nu au niciuna în calitate de organe legislative.

În mod similar, sistemul de comunicare și relaționare în Europa este doar semi-public. În practică, cele mai multe informații sunt disponibile doar experților și specialiștilor. Chiar dacă canalul de comunicare este pe deplin public, interpretarea și procesarea informațiilor necesită cunoștințe de expert și relații: posibilitatea de a accesa rețelele și de a întreține contact regulat cu agențiilor europene și ministerul local pentru relațiile europene. Nemaivorbind de faptul că sistemul de comunicare este structurat într-o manieră foarte fragmentată, anumite canale acoperă doar domenii parțiale ale sferei politice, și cel puțin pe moment nu există niciun semn prevestitor al unei rețele de comunicare integrate care acoperă toate domeniile parțiale și care ar putea organiza discursul public la nivel european în jurul unei agende politice definite.

Astfel, ar mai adecvat să vorbim mai degrabă despre o rețea de informare fragmentată, gestionabilă doar de către puțini, care vizează diferitele domenii ale sferei politice și care operează la nivel european și

Însă unul dintre motivele principale pentru care nu putem vorbi despre un spațiu politic european pe deplin public, are de-a face cu faptul că comunicarea socială este chiar și azi în primul rând de natură lingvistică. O comunitate politică și un corp politic sunt capabile să întrețină un spațiu politic public doar dacă „corpurul politic” din care constă îndeplineste anumite criterii lingvistice; iar cerința minimă pentru acest deziderat este ca limba comunicării să fie înțelesă de către toți. Astfel, din această perspectivă, se pune întrebarea cum ar putea UE aborda diversitatea lingvistică a cetățenilor ei.

Cu toate că UE dispune de o politică privind limbile oficiale, și aici, ca și în multe alte aspecte, merită să aruncăm o privire mai degrabă asupra practicilor politice efective decât asupra principiilor enunțate. Elita politică europeană pare să realizeze o punte peste această diversitate confuză a limbilor europene fie prin intermediul unor traducători (în special în cazul documentelor), fie prin utilizarea unei linguae francae, a unei limbi intermediare; de cele mai multe ori, combină aceste două soluții. Într-adevăr, conform politicii UE privind limbile oficiale, limba fiecărui stat membru este și o limbă oficială a UE. De aceea, practic, membrii elitei de obicei apelează la limba engleză ca limbă intermediară, însă traduc toate documentele în limbi oficiale. Procesul din urmă durează de regulă luni de zile, și deseori, până ce documentele sunt traduse în limbi mai mici, specialiștii își pierd interesul pentru subiectul respectiv. (Opinia publică rareori urmărește evenimentele europene.)

Deși utilizarea limbii engleze ca limbă intermediară facilitează comunicarea între membrii elitei europene, situația nu este aceeași în cazul cetățenilor: traducerea în permanentă a informațiilor și problemele

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aferente de transmitere a informațiilor pun obstacole serioase în calea participării democratice depline. Astfel, într-adevăr se pune întrebarea dacă o guvernare reprezentativă - care permite participarea efectivă a cetățenilor - ar putea funcționa eficient într-un mediu social multilingv.

Cei care consideră această anxietate nefondată aduc de obicei drept contraexemplu existența unor țări multiculturale și multilingve cum sunt Belgia, Canada și mai ales Elveția – având în vedere că ultima are și patru limbi oficiale. Numai că în cazul Elveției comunicarea politică dintre cetățeni se bazează pe acel fapt pe care îl putem numi în cazul celor de acolo „multilingvism pasiv”. (Chiar dacă acest multilingvism cuprinde numai cele trei limbi oficiale și de cele mai multe ori nu include limba retoromană, cu toate că și aceea are statut oficial.) Sistemul de învățământ elvețian este de așa natură încât garantează pentru fiecare, dincolo de limba maternă, cel puțin înțelegerea a celorlalte două limbi. Teoretic, și sistemul de învățământ canadian funcționează conform unor nevoi similare, deși de bună dreptate se pune întrebarea dacă în această problemă poziția oficială a guvernului canadian ar trece sau nu testul practic.

Dar indiferent căt de eficiente sunt aceste practici politice și modele de învățământ privind multilingvismul, nu pot deveni exemple pentru crearea unui spațiu politic european. Pentru cei mai mulți cetățeni europeni, chiar dacă sistemul de învățământ autohton i-ar sprijini pe deplin, le-ar fi accesibilă cunoașterea a cel mult una sau două limbi străine – bineînțeles fiind inclusă și engleză. Este evident că în această situație soluția ar fi recunoașterea limbii engleze ca limbă oficială de comunicare, numai că pe lângă realitățile culturale și politice predominante în prezent, ținând cont și de intenția continuă de extindere, o astfel de decizie în Uniune ar părea iremediabil utopică în momentul de față.

Iar aceasta, desigur, presupunând că această soluție în sine nu s-ar dovedi a fi insuficientă. Pentru că iluziile noastre liberale și progresiviste legate de puterea „comunicării” exercită un farmec captivant, irezistibil, care de cele mai multe ori ne împiedică să evaluăm în mod realist puterea acesteia. Punem cu plăcere semnul egalității între comunicarea și comunitatea politică și îl cităm continuu pe Aristotel, care – pornind de la experiențele politice ale grecilor – a numit omul o ființă comunicativă și socială în același timp. Deci dacă și una dintre cele mai vechi și convințătoare definiții despre om a prezentat omul ca o ființă cu rațiune și
în stare de a vorbi articulat și care din acest motiv este capabilă și de asociere politică, atunci este legitimă așteptarea ca numărul în creștere al canalelor de comunicare de toate soiurile și creșterea globală a dorinței de comunicare vor crea apoi legături mai strânsе între oameni și vor lărgi paleta formelor de asociații umane cunoscute până în prezent.

Cu toate acestea, există în această teză ceva ambiguitate ascunsă. Deși legătura dintre comunicarea umană și asocierea umană este foarte strânsă, ea nu este simetrică: cei doi termeni nu sunt sinonimi. Nu comunicarea creează comunitatea, ci comunitatea dă naștere comunicării și o întreține. Cred că de multe ori supraevaluăm importanța mijloacelor de comunicare, în special rolul limbajului de intermediere în crearea spațiului comun. Să presupunem că mâine cu toții începem să vorbim engleză; în opinia mea, acest lucru nu ne-ar duce nici măcar cu un pas mai aproape de unitatea politică. De obicei, delegațiile israeliene și palestiniene vorbesc o engleză destul de acceptabilă, ca să nu mai vorbim despre diplomații indieni sau pakistanezi, și cu toate acestea limbajul comun în comunicare în mod vizibil nu pare să-i ajute prea mult. Într-adevăr, înțelegera reciprocă presupune ca partenerii de discuție să facă parte din aceeași comunitate politică, sau cel puțin să facă parte din comunități ale căror sisteme și experiențe politice sunt asemănătoare. Și noi europeni știm că această condiție necesară cât de departe este de a fi și suficientă: în Europa câte națiuni au luptat deja împotriva celor care au avut sisteme și experiențe politice asemănătoare?

Deci limba comună este numai una dintre condițiile creării spațiului politic comun. Este cel puțin tot atât de importantă – exemplul cel mai relevant fiind cel al Elveției – cultura politică comună, acea dimensiune comună de semnificații culturale și politice, în care fiecare persoană asociază același fenomen același semnificații, în care practicele și simbolurile politice acceptate sunt identice și la baza ei stau instituții și tradiții comune (istoria comună). Cu toate că statele naționale europene însele sunt într-un anumit sens – foarte larg - moștenitoare unei tradiții culturale și istorice comune, în același timp gânduiesc niște culturi foarte diferite și, ceea ce este important, cultura lor politică este foarte diferită. Însă ca urmare a acestei diversități culturale au rezultat sisteme instituționale și de justiție foarte diferite, deosebiri flagrante în constituționalitate și pur și simplu în concepția formată despre democrație. Astfel, dacă aruncăm o privire prin Europa, vom vedea sisteme fiscale, de asigurări,
servicii medicale, sisteme de învățământ și sisteme de pensii foarte diferite.

Fără îndoială, dacă Uniunea dorește crearea spațiului politic comun atât de necesar, va trebui să adopte și să aplice acea formă a politică multiculturale care va reuși să integreze această diversitate vizibilă a culturilor politice și să asigure acel fundal instituțional comun, respectiv acea „simpatie reciprocă”, care sunt indispensabile în crearea spațiului politic comun. Numai că în acest timp, Uniunea Europeană se confruntă cu diversitatea confuză a culturilor politice și limbilor locale și naționale cum nu s-a mai confruntat până acum nici un alt sistem federal.

Deși experiențele noastre istorice arată că sistemele federale într-adevăr sunt capabile să gestioneze diferențele majore dintre sistemele lor instituționale și de justiție interne (și astfel, în momentul de față ideea federăției poate să aducă anumite speranțe adepților Europei), acest lucru e posibil doar dacă în tot acest timp deținem „ceva” în comun, ceva care le unește ca organisme politice și care creează în ele spațiul politic comun. Așadar, dacă „noi, europenii” dorim într-adevăr o republică, chiar și federală (iar un alt regim decât regimul politic republican nu este nici posibil, nici dezirabil dacă dorim libertate și nouă și altora), atunci trebuie să ne gândim la regimul care face posibilă coeziunea politică reală, care creează comunitate politică autentică, mai ales prin „interconectarea eficientă a sentimentului față de noi înșine și față de alții”\(^{31}\). Acest lucru e posibil doar acolo, susține Pierre Manent, „unde în regimul politic dat oamenii au ceva în comun, și anume regimul politic, corpul politic, republica, care este un *bun comun*\(^{31}\): *res publica*. Adică doar acolo, unde cetățenii consideră și simt că regimul politic al republicii este într-adevăr al lor.

Nu am susținut că acest fapt este de neconceput azi în Europa. În schimb, sunt convins că și regimul republicii federale europene, ca de altfel oricare alt regim republican, dacă va fi, va fi limitat din motive sentimentale și spirituale. Numai atunci vom putea considera și simți acest regim ca fiind al nostru, dacă îi vom vedea în mod clar limitele. Cu alte cuvinte: în sfârșit trebuie să decidem cine suntem „noi, europenii”. Nu este posibilă subordonarea unui număr oarecare de comunități de culturi politice diferite aceleiași guvernări. Pe lângă toate celelalte moti-

\(^{31}\) Pierre Manent: Politikai filozófia felnőtteknek (traducere în limba maghiară a *Cours familial de philosophie politique*, de Péter Kende), Osiris Kiadó, Budapesta, 2003, 330-331.
ve, nici pentru faptul că angajamentul față de un sistem comun (sau pe numele vechi: patriotism), acest sentiment omenesc, care după Rousseau este „sursa celor mai mari virtuți”, numai atunci poate avea o forță dura-
bilă dacă se concentrează asupra unei comunități omenești particulare. Dacă vom încerca extinderea acestui sentiment asupra unui număr tot mai mare de comunități, în principiu putem spera la un regim mult mai echitabil, pentru că astfel nu va fi nimeni exclus din regimul republicii și al libertății, dar intensitatea sentimentului va scădea treptat: în final va fi mult prea slab ca să creeze o comunitate umană rezonabil echitabilă și fericită.
Introducere


Abordarea identității din perspectiva interacționismului simbolic


Interacționismul își îndreaptă atenția asupra raporturilor dintre structura socio-culturală și persoane, care își internalizează prescripțiile sociale și le exprimă mai
apoia, prin modele identitare specifice. Determinările sunt slabe în acest caz, ele părăsesc condiționările „naturale” și mai susceptibile de a explica dinamica jocului social real. Temele centrale de interes ale interacționismului simbolic sunt dominante pentru microsociologie și pentru psihologia socială. Acestea se întâlnesc în jurul câtorva problematici distincte: sinele, interacțiunea socială, comportamentul social și miscările sociale. Între conceptele și ideile majore promovate de acest curent teoretic și care sunt prezente activ în limbajul de specialitate astăzi, se numără: comunitate de interpretare a semnelor, construirea sinelui printr-un paradigma celorlalți, primul acțiunii în cunoaștere, definirea situației, managementul impresiei, sinele oglindit, instituția totală. Interacționismul este promovat ca orientare sociologică prin Școala de la Chicago. Inițiatorii curentului sunt William Isaac Thomas, Robert Ezra Park și George Herbert Mead.

Discipol și continuator al lui Mead, Herbert Blumer este cel care a introdus noțiunea de interacțiune simbolică și a sumarizat teoria Școlii de la Chicago de până la momentul 1937 (în Vlăsceanu și Zamfir (coord.), 1998, p.304) formulând următoarele premise:

1. oamenii se raportează la lumea socială pe baza semnificațiilor pe care aceasta le are pentru ei;
2. semnificațiile se constituie și se dezvoltă în procesul interacțiunii sociale;
3. interpretările date semnificațiilor variază în funcție de situațiile concrete în care oamenii sunt implicați.

Autorul pune accent pe interacțiune și pe semnificațiile simbolurilor vehiculate în cadrul interacțiunii. Interacțiunea simbolică implică actorii sociai, semnificațiile pe care ei le vehiculează despre lucruri și ceilalți indivizi, interpretările pe care le dau acestor semnificații și negocierile în care sunt antrenați în situații sociale. Societatea, instituțiile, clasele sociale sau conștiința colectivă nu există independent de interacțiunile sociale (Dicționar Larousse, 1996, p. 140).

În ce privește analiza interacționismului simbolic asupra identității, aceasta susține că identitatea se elaborează pe calea unei relații dinamice cu alte identități, în miezul unui context determinat deapătre psihologic, social, cultural și istoric (Barth, 1969, p. 117). Teoria interacționistă își propune dezvăluirea mecanismelor interne de formare a identității prin depășirea opoziției dintre individual și colectiv.

Pentru interacționismul simbolic dobândirea identității a fost asociată cu stima de sine și acceptarea de sine. Stima de sine reprezintă evaluarea propriei persoane: orice acțiune sau rațiune care deține identitatea socială
a persoanei va îmbunătăți implicit și imaginea de sine a persoanei. Lucrările lui Blumer (1969), Cooley (1902), Mead (1934) și cele ale altor fondatori ai interacționismului aduc în lumină natura esențialmente socială a sinelui.


1. construirea imaginii despre sine considerând deopotrivă angoasele și trăsăturile caracteriale ale individului;
2. utilizarea reacțiilor celorlalți pentru a interpretaream imaginii acestora despre noi;
3. dezvoltarea concepției despre sine, pornind de la aceste interpretări. Concepția despre sine poate suferi modificări în funcție de concluziile pe care le adoptăm cu fiecare astfel de evaluare (Yeung și King-To, 2003, pp. 843–879).

Potrivit lui Cooley, oamenii evaluatează orice fenomen social ca simbol al propriilor reprezentări, de aceea societatea trebuie studiată considerând percepțiile, aprecierile și reprezentările individuale. Sinele oglindit se construieste prin imaginarea înțelesurilor pe care le au ceilalți despre noi (în literatura de specialitate acest proces a fost ulterior numit „întrospecție empatică”). „The looking glass” sau metafora sinelui oglindit se poate rezuma în sintagma: noi suntem ceea ce cred altii despre noi că suntem. Individul devine treptat conștient de faptul că cel ce este el reflectă ceea ce altii își reprezintă că este. Înainte de a deveni conștient de sine, individul devine conștient de „sinele celorlalți” (Bădescu, Dungaciu și Baltasiu, 1996, p. 321). „În cadrul grupului fiecare individ se deschi-de spre altul (înconștient și conștient) pentru ca să se cunoască pe sine. Conștiința de sine presupune așadar, comunicarea: punerea (mea în comun (cu ființa celorlalți). Sunt ceea ce sunt (eu însumi) numai spre deosebire de altul. Prin reflexie mă individualizez” (Mircea, 1995, p. 70).
Totodată, un rol semnificativ în cadrul clarificărilor teoretice ce vizau înțelegerea identității l-a jucat teoria „eului interacțional” formulată de George Herbert Mead unde interacțiunea socială stă la originea conștiinței individuale prin raportarea la „altul generalizat”. Opera lui Mead derivă din teoria pragmatismului (James, 1970). Având aceste premise, Mead definește sinele ca fiind în totalitate un produs social care totodată, este creator și orientat de scopuri. Autorul face distincția între „I” („eu”), momentul în desfășurare al constituirii unei individualități unice și „me” („mine”), atitudinile semnificative interiorizate ale altor. Astfel, Mead se centrează asupra construcției și dezvoltării sinelui individual în societate, arătându-ne că instituțiile sociale sunt posibile numai în măsura în care fiecare individ integrat în ele poate prelua atitudinile generale ale tuturor celorlalți indivizi. Acțiunea socială rezultă din schimbările de simboluri în cadrul interacțiunilor, luând forma obiceiurilor, ritualurilor, regulilor, în general a instituțiilor. Sinele nu este prezent la naștere și nici nu reprezintă o consecință necesară a dezvoltării biologice. Personalitatea este în întregime construită social prin procese continue de interacțiune socială în cadrul cărora indivizii se definesc și se re-definesc continuu pe ei înșiși și pe ceilalți de-a lungul vieții.

Asemeni lui Mead, al cărui contemporan este în cadrul Şcolii de la Chicago (în perioada 1894 - 1910), William Isaac Thomas arată că orice activitate umană este socială pentru că se realizează într-o situație determinată social. Analiza situației nu poate lipsi din analiza activității [sociale], a faptelor ori fenomenelor sociale. Individualul definește situația prin un proces de alegere a unei variante pe care o consideră optimă dintr-o gamă a posibilităților disponibile într-un context social dat. În acest sens Teorema lui Thomas: „o situație socială este reală prin consecințele definirii ei ca fiind reală”, rămâne unul dintre postulatele de bază în interacționism. (Thomas, 1928).

În teoria sa dramaturgică asupra vieții sociale, Erving Goffman susține că oamenii joacă diverse roluri, manipulează reguli, costume, simboluri pentru a stabili interacțiuni oportune care să ducă la valorizarea pozitivă a sinei. Acțiunile sociale sunt definite ca interacțiuni umane pe „scena vieții sociale”. Scena socială însușează un ansamblu de obiecte, simboluri și împrejurări care-i sunt date individului, dar cărora acesta din urmă le dă viață interpretând diferite roluri, de asemenea prescrise, ale „dramei sociale” (Goffman, 1959).

Pentru autorii interacționismului simbolic, izvorul metafizic și experiențial al identităților este interacțiunea simbolică. Întâietatea este dată de interacțiunile empirice disponibile și interpretabile și are la bază presupune-
Identitatea din perspectiva interacționismului simbolic


În perspectiva interacționist simbolică, sociologia are ca scop înțelegeerea interpretativă a acțiunii sociale. Prin naștere dobândim coordonatele de pornire de la care lumea fiecăruia se dezvoltă prin procese interpretative. Din perspectiva celuilalt, individul nu asigură doar punctul de origine al acțiunii, ci și punctul final incluziv, la care celălalt își raportează identitatea. Un nivel interpretativ de bază este evaluarea propriilor simțurilor care orientează acțiunea. Corpul fizic este transformat într-o „apariție”, care este din punct de vedere social, plină de semnificație (Goffman, 1959). O dată ce individul și-a făcut apariția, indiferent că este pentru prima oară sau nu, el va fi pre-definit de contextul social concret. Apariția este însoțită implicit de semnificații pentru ceilalți. O persoană este un anthropos phenomenos sau un „om prin apariții” (Weigert, 1986, p. 165-183). Societatea protejează identitatea prin mecanisme de control social. A pune la îndoială identitățile întrupate care decurg din prezența cuiva, înseamnă a pune la încercare întreg sistemul echilibrat al sinelui celui vizat. Identitatea personală se realizează astfel, la interfața dintre social și fizic și transformă „corpul” în „sine”.

Structura socială poate impune modele identitare membrilor săi în mare măsură independent de voința acestora. Ea operează în mod interacțional prin intențiile, așteptările și interesele celorlalți și prin conștiința de sine. Adesea, armonizarea și socializarea indivizilor în cadrul structurilor cognitive, comportamentale, individuale și instituționale reprezintă obiectivul central acțiunii interpretative. Nu poate fi vorba de o interpretare absolut neutră a structurii sociale sau a identității structurale. În acest fel, identitatea trebuie înțelesă ca proces născut din raportul interactiv prin care un individ își construiește o anumită reprezentare de sine în relație cu alții.

A. Mucchielli susține că a vorbi despre identitate înseamnă implicit situarea în cadrul științelor sociale și numai decât în cadrul paradigmii...
subiectivistă sau interpretativă. Abordarea acestei poziții epistemologice se contrapune celor ale paradigmii pozitiviste din științele naturale. Principiile paradigmii interpretative au fost sistematizate de E. Morin (Mucchielli, 1986, pp. 5-12) în teoria sa asupra complexității, în particular pentru științele umane, după cum urmează:

(1) nu există o realitate obiectivă dată: realitatea umană este o realitate de sens (de semnificații) și este construită de către actorii sociali;
(2) nu există „o realitate” ci mai multe realități construite de actori diferiți și care coexistă în același timp, nici una nefiind „mai adevărată” decât altele (nu se exclud și nu se neagă reciproc prin coexistență);
(3) o realitate de sens nu are o cauză sau mai multe cauze, ci mai multe ansambluri de cauzalități între care realitatea de referință are ea însăși un aport (negarea principiului pozitivist al cauzalității lineare).

Prin urmare, identitatea nu poate fi o sumă de carateristici – psihologice sau culturale – și nu se poate constitui numai datorită cauzelor sau influențelor directe, ci ale unui ansamblu de semnificații variabile după situațiile sociale în care se găsesc actorii.

Perspectiva psihosociologică:  
Teoria identității sociale și Teoria auto-categorizării

**Teoria identității sociale**

a teoriei identității sociale și pentru a trasa bazele teoriei auto-categorizării (Turner et al., 1987). Deși voit distinctă de teoria identității sociale în unele privințe, teoria auto-categorizării poate fi considerată ca parte constitutivă a aceleiași întreprinderi teoretice și meta-teoretice cu cea a identității sociale.


După anii 1980, studiul identității sociale implică și analiza raportărilor „subiective” față de categoriile de identificare. Încep să apară alte feluri de analize decât cele ale datelor statistice, alte demersuri interpretative și alte problematici care sunt centrate pe procesele de identificare în definirea identității sociale (Dubar, 2003, p. 17).

Idea centrală a teoriei identității sociale este clădită în jurul conceptului de categorie socială (naționalitatea, apartenența politică, echipă sportivă, stilul de viață, genul, grupul de covârstnici sau echipa de lucru etc.). Categoriile căreia individul îi aparține sau cea de referință, în interiorul căreia vrea să accede, îi conferă acestuia o delimitare a sinelui în termeni de trăsături definitorii ale categoriei în cauză – o auto-definire ce se va constitui ca parte integrantă a concepției despre sine. Oamenii vehiculează un set de astfel de categorii, iar importanța fiecărei pentru influența asupra concepției despre sine variază. Fiecare dintre aceste apartenențe este reprezentată în mintea individului sub forma unei imagini identitare care descrie și totodată, prescrede atributele pe care individul trebuie să le dețină în calitatea sa de membru al categoriei sociale. Astfel, atunci când o identitate socială salientă devine activă și totodată bază pentru auto-orientare într-un context particular, auto-percepția și orientarea devin stereotipii normative pentru in-group, percepția celorlalți relevanți din out-grupuri devine stereotyp pentru in-grup, iar comportamentele intergrupale dobândesc proprietăți competitive și discriminatorii în grade variate în funcție de natura relațiilor dintre grupuri. Identitățile sociale nu sunt numai descriptive și prescriptive, ele sunt prin aceasta și evaluative. Identitățile furnizează o apre-
ciere (în general, larg împărtășită sau consensuală) despre o categorie socială membrilor săi și altor grupuri sociale relevante. Deoarece identitățile sociale au aceste importante consecințe auto- și hetero- evaluative, grupuri și membrii lor sunt puternic motivați să adopte strategii comportamentale pentru a obține sau pentru a menține comparațiile îngrup/outgrup care favorizează îngrupul și bineînțeles, sinele.

Tajfel și Turner formulează în 1979 abordarea lor asupra identității sociale prin următoarele principii teoretice (Doise, Deschamps și Mugny, 1999, pp. 42-45):

(1) indivizii caută să mențină sau să acceadă la o identitate socială pozitivă;

(2) identitatea socială pozitivă este bazată, în mare măsură, pe comparații favorabile care pot fi făcute între grupul de apartenență și anumite alte grupuri pertinente. Grupul de apartenență trebuie percepț ca pozitiv și distinct de alte grupuri relevante;

(3) atunci când identitatea socială este nesatisfăcătoare, indivizii vor căuta să părăsească grupul căruia îi aparțin pentru a intra într-un grup pozitiv și/sau să acționeze astfel încât propriul lor grup să devină pozitiv.

Pentru a explica fenomenul social identitar, teoria identității sociale invocă acțiunea a două procese socio-cognitive:

(1) categorizarea accentuează granițele inter-grupale producând percepții și acțiuni normative stereotipale și repartizând oamenii, inclusiv sinele, unor categorii relevante contextual. Categorizarea este un proces cognitiv de bază care operează deopotrivă asupra stimulilor sociali și non-sociali pentru a sublinia și a aduce în centrul atenției acele aspecte ale experienței care au semnificație subiectivă într-un context particular.

(2) intensificarea sinelui orientează procesul categorizării sociale în direcția favorizări în-grupului prin intermediul stereotipurilor și al normativității intergrupale. Se pleacă de la premisa că oamenii prezintă nevoia de bază de a se percepe pozitiv în relație cu ceilalți semnificațivi (să aibă o evaluare a concepției despre sine pozitivă), iar intensificarea sinelui poate fi obținută prin favorizarea în-grupului ca rezultat al comparațiilor dintre în-grup și out-grupurile relevante. Spre exemplu, obiectul comparațiilor il vor constitui acele stereotipur care sunt favorabile în-grupului mai degrabă decât cele care nu-l ar avansa (Hogg, Terry și White, 1995).

Teoria identității sociale explică comportamentul social prin relația dintre procesele socio-cognitive ale categorizării și prin intensificarea sine-
lui cu structura credințelor subiective. Acest din urmă concept se referă la
credințele rezultate din relațiile în-grupului cu out-grupurile semnificative.
Credințele - care nu trebuie să fie în mod necesar imagini fidele ale realității
și care frecvent sunt doar construcții ideologice produse de percepția
subiectivă a realității - vizează stabilitatea și legitimitatea relațiilor de status
ale grupului și posibilitatea mobilității sociale (trecerea psihologică de la un
grup la altul) sau schimbarea socială (schimbând psihologic rezultatul evaluării
auto-percepției ca și consecință a apartenenței la in-grup). Structura
credințelor subiective determină adoptarea unor comportamente pentru
intensificarea sinelui prin evaluări pozitive ale identității sociale.

Teoria auto-categorizării

Teoria auto-categorizării (în Turner, 1985; Turner și colab., 1987;
Oakes și colab., 1994; Turner, 1991) este o dezvoltare a teoriei identității
sociale care analizează în profunzime procesul categorizării ca bază cogniti-
vă a comportamentului grupal. Procesul categorizării accentuează atât per-
cepțile asemănării dintre stimuli (obiecte fizice sau oameni) aparținând
aceleiași categorii cât și percepțiile diferențelor dintre stimuli aparținând
unor categorii distincte. Efectul accentuării apare în dimensiunile în care
cardințele categorizatoare se corelează cu categorizarea. Spre exemplu,
atunci când o un microbist crede că echipa de fotbal favorită este dezavan-
tajată de către arbitrii, acesta va avea tendința să exagereze inechitatea în
comportamentul tuturor arbitrilor de fotbal și prin aceasta va percepe uni-
form atât pe membri out-grupului, cât și pe membri in-grupului, incluzân-
du-se în această ultimă categorie și pe sine (toți arbitrli discrimină ază pe toți
jucătorii de fotbal din echipa favorită și toți jucătorii de fotbal din echipă
favorită împreună cu toți suporterii lor sunt victime ale discriminării). Pro-
cesul categorizării accentuate arată discontinuitățile intergrupale, interpre-
tează experiența socială prin semnificații subiective și identifică acele aspec-
te care devin relevante pentru acțiune în contexte particulare.

Categorizarea sinelui și a celorlalți membri ai in-grupului sau ai out-
grupurilor definește identitatea socială a oamenilor și accentuează percepția
similarităților (dintre trăsăturile definitorii ale grupurilor) ce folosec în
construcția reprezentărilor sociale. Astfel, oamenii sunt „depersonalizați”: vor
fi percepți ca întruchipare a prototipului de membru al in-grupului mai
degrabă decât ca persoane individuale și vor avea reacții în acest mod.
Depersonalizarea sinelui este procesul de bază activat de fenomenul grupal – spre exemplu: stereotipul social, etnocentrismul și coeziunea grupului, cooperarea și altruismul, contagiunea emoțională și empatia, comportamentul colectiv, normele împărtășite și procesele de interdependență. Conceptul de depersonalizare ne ferește de implicațiile negative ale altor concepte cum ar fi „dezumanizarea” sau „dezindividualizarea” și face referire la un proces de schimbare la nivel identitar (de la unicitatea individului la calitatea sa de membru al unui grup) care nu înseamnă automat pierderea identității. Prin depersonalizare, auto-categorizarea și comportamentul devin compatibile cu prototipul contextual relevant al in-grupului și astfel, transformă indivizii în membru ai grupului, iar individualitatea în comportament grupal.

Conform teoriei auto-categorizării oamenii comportă reprezentări ale grupurilor sociale în termeni de prototipuri. Un prototip este o reprezentare subiectivă despre atribuțiile definitorii (credițe, atitudini, manifestări comportamentale) ale unei categorii sociale, reprezentare construită activ din informații sociale relevante în contexte concrete imediate sau de durată.

În general membri unui grup social sunt plasați în cadrul mai cuprinzător al aceluiași câmp social (sunt expuși unui set de informații similare care sunt emite de o sursă comună) și astfel, prototipurile lor devin asemenea și prin aceasta, împărtășite social. De obicei prototipurile nu reprezintă liste de atribute concrete, ci sunt ansambluri impădurite de cadre orientative, formate din trăsături dependente contextual ale membrilor grupurilor.

tinde să maximizeze semnificațiile fiecărui context social particular, angajând categorizarea disponibilă cu cea mai mare relevantă în explicarea sau justificarea similarităților și diferențelor dintre oameni. De exemplu, categoria „femeie” sau „bărbat” nu se va active pentru a conferi baza fundamentală auto-categorizării și depersonalizării decât atunci când diferențele și similitudinile create pe baza acestei categorizări sunt importante pentru contextul de referință. O dată ce categoriile sunt pe deplin active pe baza stimului acționează diferențele și asemănările, ele se organizează în jurul prototipurilor relevante contextual și vor fi utilizate ca fundament pentru accentuarea similarităților intra-grupale și a diferențelor inter-grupale. Astfel, maximizând și clarificând segregarea inter-grupală, auto-categorizarea, în termenii categoriilor in-grupale, va depersonaliza în consecință comportamentul individului și-l va modela conform prototipurilor in-grupale.

Saliența subiectivă a categoriilor sociale este guvernată nu numai de potrivirea mecanică a cuplului categorie – stimul, ci și de disponibilitatea motivată a categoriei sociale. Oamenii încercă renegocierea cadrului de referință pentru a dobândi auto-categorizarea cea mai favorabilă concepției despre sine în contextul respectiv.

**Teoria identității sociale și teoria auto-categorizării. Intersecții**

Teoria identității sociale și modelul auto-categorizării au următoarele caracteristici fundamentale:

1. sunt teorii generale ale grupurilor sociale care nu se aplică în funcție de dimensiunea grupului, caracteristicile psiho-sociale și dispersia membrilor sau alte trăsături specifice de acest fel ale grupului investigat;

2. susțin apartenența lor la cadrul teoretic socio-cognitiv;

3. încorporează contextul imediat și încercă totodată considerarea structurilor sociale mai cuprinzătoare, cum sunt categoriile sociale în analiza și explicarea comportamentului grupal;

4. explică registrul de comportamente grupale (cum sunt conformitatea, stereotipul, discriminarea, etnocentrismul, xenofobia, marginalizarea, integrarea socială, fenomenele incluziunii/excluziunii sociale etc.) prin formularea unor principii teoretice integratoare;

5. abordează un demers explicativ al originii proceselor grupale fără să facă apel la procesele interpersonale, viziune care îndepărtează cele două teorii explicative de ancorarea originar susținută în psihologie.
Procesul auto-categorizării depersonalizează percepția, sentimentele și acțiunea în termenii prototipului relevant contextual din perspectiva auto-definirii sinelui prin in-grup (ca rezultat al apartenenței și activismului în in-grup). Astfel, comportamentul este influențat de structura categorială a societății prin intermediul acțiunii identității sociale și al procesului implicit de auto-categorizare. Saliența contextuală a unor identități sociale particulare rezidă în puterea de transmitere a semnificațiilor către contextul social concret care le reclamă, iar factorii contextuali influențează forma manifestărilor cognitiv-comportamentale pe care le îmbracă identitatea. Pentru că identitatea socială este atașată unei valori sau unui set de valori, se creează un puternic complex social dinamic în care grupurile se străduiesc să obțină o identitate socială pozitivă. Astfel, după cum arată Hogg și colaboratorii, relațiile inter-grupale și identitatea socială acționează interdependent.

Teoria identității sociale și teoria auto-categorizării au stimulat cercetarea în domeniul proceselor sociale grupale ocupând un loc important și astăzi în cadrul teoriilor euristiche ale domeniului. Rezultatele secundare ale acestor studii de teren au ajuns să probeze ipoteze provocătoare desprinse din teoria identității sociale. Astfel, cercetări de prestigiu cum sunt cele ale lui Worcel, Morales, Paez și Deschamps (1998, p. 228) arată că identitatea socială are o influență mai puternică asupra individilor în societăți colectiviste și în culturi socio-centriste în comparație cu societățile individualiste și egocentriste. Pe de altă parte, grupurile sociale dominante și culturile individualiste reflectă o atenție sporită și o valorizare mai puternică a resurselor individuale, punând în evidență importanța particularului și a individualității în defavoarea identității sociale. În grupurile cu status social dominant în șervația socială primează aspectele personale ale identității și percepția individualității grupului și a diferențierii acestuia în raport cu alte grupuri. Grupurile dominoane dezvoltă o imagine de sine centrată pe rolurile participante în dezvoltarea grupului accentuând omogenitatea grupală asemenea grupurilor ce fac parte din societăți colectiviste. Grupurile sociale în general au o imagine despre sine pozitivă și se percep superioare altor grupuri pentru aspectele care sunt considerate de membri drept definitorii și specifice grupului și au tendința de a percepe out-grupurile ca fiind mai omogene decât în realitate. Autorii explorează și relația dintre statusul social grupal și identitatea socială: indivizii percep in-grupul ca fiind superior out-grupului și ceea ce privește aspectele care conferă specificitate in-grupului, chiar dacă în general comportă o imagine negativă despre in-grup. Favoritismul general,
ce acoperă toate aspectele, este mai des întâlnit la grupurile cu status social înalt în rețeaua socială. De asemenea, indivizii tind să comporte o percepție eterogenă asupra îngrupului în raport cu out-grupurile. Grupurile cu statut sau prestigiu scăzut pot prezenta favoritism față de out-grupuri în timp ce se auto-percep superioare doar pentru dimensiunile specifice în grupului, în special pentru atribute ca sociabilitatea sau expresivitatea propriilor membri.

Alte cercetări s-au centrat pe studiul mecanismelor diferențierii intergrupale. Deschamps arată că atunci când condiția de categorizare dihotomică este îndeplinită, diferențiarea este mult mai puternică decât atunci când această condiție nu există. Modelul covariației pare să se aplique diferit: nu numai că diferențele între omogenitatea intra-grupală și omogenitatea inter-grupală nu trebuie să se găsească în tandem, însă și variațiile diferențierii în cadrul în grupului și între grupuri depind în mare măsură de statusul social al grupurilor în cauză. În loc să considerăm diferențierile inter-individuale și intra-grupale ca două extreme ale unui continuu, caz în care acestea sunt mutual exclusive, considerăm că în situații concrete cu cât identificarea cu grupul este mai puternică, cu atât diferențierile interindividuale în cadrul grupului devin mai importante. În 1975 Codol (1975, pp. 475-501) a accentuat această presupunere prin fenomenul numit „conformitate superioară a sinelui” (Primus inter pares): cu cât un individ se conținează mai puternic standardelor grupale și cu cât se identifică mai puternic cu grupul, cu atât va avea tendința de a se auto-percepe diferit de ceilalți membri ai grupului, considerând că acțiunile sale sunt mai conforme standardelor grupale decât comportamentul celorlalți membri.

Indivizii comportă deci un centrism cognitiv atunci când li se induce o reprezentare a unei lumi dihotomice, împărțite în două categorii, clase sau grupuri mutual exclusive. Când există această reprezentare dihotomică va crește corelativ favoritismul față de propriul grup, diferențierea grupală (sociocentrismul), cât și auto-favoritismul sau diferențierea interindividuală în interiorul în grupului între sine și ceilalți (egocentrism) (Worchel et al., 1998).
Perspectiva sociologică: teoria identității


Teoria identității își are rădăcinile în opera lui George Herbert Mead care prezintă numeroase analize sociologice și psihosociale. Într-o formă simplificată, lucrarea lui Mead propune următoarea formulă: „Societatea configurează sinele care configurează comportamentul social” („Society shapes self shapes social behavior”). Teoria identității pornește de la încercarea de a substitui reciproc termenii de societate și sine din formula lui Mead. Prin aceasta, teoria identității arată utilitatea teoriei lui Mead, totodată însă se îndepărtează de aceasta, adoptând o abordare compatibilă cu metafora sociologică contemporană care susține că societatea este un mozaic de modele de interacțiune și relații relativ stabil, distincte însă totuși organizate, inserate în ordinea grupală, organizațională, comunitară sau instituțională, intersectate de granițe transversale de clasă, naționalitate, vârstă, gen, religie și alte variabile. Oamenii trăiesc în rețele de relații sociale relativ reduse și specializate, prin roluri care le asigura participarea la aceste rețele. Modelele de interacțiuni și relații sociale aduc în scenă unul dintre argumentele interacționismului simbolic: probabilitatea de a pătrunde într-o rețea socială concretă este influențată de structuri sociale mai cuprinzătoare din care această rețea socială face parte. Astfel, structurile sociale conferă rețelelor rolul de granițe pentru potențiali noi participanți. Întorcându-ne la formularea lui Mead putem înlocui „comportamentul social” cu sintagma: „com-
portament social prescris de rol”. Prin aceasta, teoria identității insistă să găsească un răspuns la întrebarea: *De ce o persoană care poate alege între mai multe roluri sociale aferente pozițiilor pe care le ocupă într-o rețea dată, având la dispoziție mai multe opțiuni comportamentale face o anumită alegere și nu alta?* (Stryker și Burke, 2000, pp. 284-297; Stryker și Serpe, 1982, pp. 199-218).


Perspectiva generală a teoriei identității oferă un cadru teoretic valid pentru numeroase lucrări din literatura micro-sociologică orientate spre analiza comportamentului de rol. Astfel, teoria identității s-a centrat de cele mai multe ori asupra consecințelor individuale ale proceselor identitare.

După cum ne prezintă însăși fondatorii curentului, Sheldon Stryker și Peter J. Burke în anul 2000, teoria identității a evoluat în două direcții complementare. Ambele se subscriu direcției teoretice și investigative a interacționismului structural simbolic (Stryker, 1980), al cărui obiectiv este înțelegerea și explicarea modalităților prin care structura socială influențează sinele și a modalităților prin care sinele influențează comportamentul social. Cele două principale direcții de dezvoltare ale teoriei identității sunt:

(1) – structurală – cea care accentuează structura socială ca sursă a identității și raporturile dintre identități;

(2) – cognitivă – cea care se centrează asupra proceselor interne, cognitive ale identității.

Cele două componente se întâlnesc pe terenul de analiză al comportamentului care reprezintă forma de manifestare a identităților, deseori în interacțiune cu ceilalți. Prima abordare ajunge la cercetarea comportamentului deplasându-și atenția de la structurile sociale la relațiile dintre identitatea salientă și comportament. Cea de-a doua pornește de la identitatea socială internalizată și semnificațiile sinelui pentru individ. (aceasta urmărește evoluția „înversă” a construcției identitare: indivizii se centrează în primul rând asupra identității lor internalizate și asupra percepților proprii despre semnificațiile sinelui, mai apoi cele două componente vor fi supuse de către individ unei
analize comparative ce va avea ca rezultat fie confirmarea identității standard, fie va reliefa o discrepanță; pentru ca să ajunge finalmente la opțiunea pentru un comportament care va ajuta discrepanța prin modificarea situației, prin păstrarea contextului sau prin crearea de noi situații). Abordarea structurală explică identitatea în termeni cognitivi și arată că identitatea se confirma, se re-afirmă găsind situații sau creând situații prin care se poate manifesta. Abordarea cognitivă demonstrează că identitățile se construiesc și sunt determinate de contexte sociale structurale. Ambele abordări au înțeles că identitățile sunt legate de rolurile sociale sau de manifestările comportamentale prin intermediul semnificațiilor. Prima abordare argumentează că identitățile saliente sunt scheme cognitive ale individului, cu ajutorul cărora acesta poate defini situațiile sociale concrete și în funcție de care poate opta pentru comportamentul cel mai adecvat identității. Cea de-a doua abordare arată că legătura primă dintre identitate și comportament este dată de semnificațiile comune, pe care ambele le decodifică în mod similar (Stryker și Burke, 2000, pp. 284–297).

În timp ce majoritatea investigațiilor au încercat să demonstreze influența structurii sociale asupra identităților, unele studii încercă să arate că structura socială poate fi condiționată și de funcționalitatea identităților. Burke și Stets validează ipoteza conform căreia atunci când mai multe persoane interacționează într-o situație comună, reafirmându-și identitățile, gradul de angajare în activitatea pe care aceștia o desfășoară crește. Astfel raporturile grupale se solidifică, coeziunea interpersonală este accentuată, dând naștere la o nouă structură socială grupală. În sens invers, atunci când mai multe persoane sunt implicate într-o activitate comună, însă nu-și pot confirma identitățile, legăturile interpersonale se dizolvă, iar structura socială grupală este periclita uneori până la disoluție. Spre exemplu Cast și Burke arată că divorțul este deseori imanent când cei doi parteneri nu își pot afirma identitatea de soț, respectiv de soție (Stryker și Burke, 2000).

**Teoria identității. Concluzii și deschideri viitoare**

În rezumat, teoria identității postulează ideea că sinele reflectă structura socială largă în măsura în care considerăm sinele ca o colecție de identități derivată din pozițiile de rol (statusurile) ocupate de persoană. Societatea, văzută ca totalitate a status-rolurilor sociale conferă indivizilor conștiința auto-evaluării, auto-poziționării și influențează comportamentul social prin inculcare prescripțiilor de rol ca și componente constitutive ale sinelui.
Astfel, impactul societății asupra comportamentului uman este mediat de identitățile de rol saliente ale individului. În continuare, teoria identității distinge între diferite tipuri identitare după criteriul dispunerii ierarhice în structura identitară a sinelui – distincție utilizată pentru a explica diferențele comportamentale și trăirile afective rezultate. Saliența relativă a unor identități în comparație cu altele reiese din numărul și intensitatea relațiilor ce decurg din deținerea unor roluri sociale particulare. Sintetizat, caracteristicile centrale ale teoriei identității sunt (Hogg, Terry și White, 1995):

(1) teoria identității reprezintă un model explicativ al construcției sinelui în care factorii sociali joacă un rol definitoriu;

(2) susține că natura socială a sinelui derivă din rolurile deținute de indivizi în lumea socială;

(3) în sens larg, se poate face distincție între identitățile de rol în funcție de saliența lor;

(4) cu toate că autorii teoriei identității supun cercetării legăturile de interdependență dintre sine și societate, sunt mai degrabă preocupați de rezultatele individuale ale proceselor identitare.

Principala provocare a cercetărilor teoriei identității a fost înțelegerea și explicarea modalităților prin care identitățile ajung să se manifeste prin comportamente. Autorii au găsit răspunsul în teoria clasică a interacționismului simbolic care consideră că identitățile sunt semnificații ale sinelui ce se dezvoltă din semnificațiile prescripțiilor atașate rolurilor și contra-rolurilor sociale (Stryker, 1980). Din perspectiva simbolic-interacționistă comportamentele sunt purtătoare de semnificații, iar legătura dintre identități și manifestările comportamentale constă în semnificațiile pe care acestea le împărtășesc.

Implementarea acestor idei necesită găsirea unor proceduri de măsurare, aplicabile deopotrivă comportamentelor și identităților sociale. Astfel, s-au dezvoltat metodologii de măsurare a diferențialului semantic reflectând perspectiva semnificației ca răspuns intern și bipolar la stimuli. Utilizând diferențialul semantic Burke și Reitzes arată că semnificațiile împărtășite reprezintă legătura dintre identitate și comportament: identitățile anticipiază comportamentul numai atunci când semnificația identității corespunde semnificației comportamentului. Întrebarea „Cum relaționează definițiile și semnificațiile internalizate cu semnificațiile sociale ale manifestărilor comportamentale?” a condus la dezvoltarea unui model cibernetic al controlului perceptual. În teoria identității acest model urmărește patru componente centrale pe care le-am sintetizat într-o formă grafică în Fig. nr. 1.
Comportamentul descris prin acest model, se organizează astfel încât să modifice situația socială și semnificațiile perceptive despre sine pentru a le pune în acord cu cele ale identității standard. Dacă comportamentul este o funcție a relației dintre percepțiile persoanei în interiorul unei situații sociale concrete și semnificațiile despre sine, atunci comportamentul poate fi considerat ca manifestare orientată spre scop: comportamentul schimbă situația socială pentru a o pune în acord semnificațiile ce decurg din auto-percepția individului în situația socială concretă cu semnificațiile pe care individul le are înculcate în identitatea standard. Prin comportament, oamenii ajustează realitatea situatională în care se găsesc conform grilei perceptive de care dispun și în concordanță cu semnificațiile definitorii ale identității standard pe care și le-au înșushi anterior. Acest model explicativ relevă faptul că într-un context social nou, vom activa identitatea de rol corespunzătoare situației în care ne găsim (identitatea standard), însă această punere în scenă a prescripțiilor de rol însușite nu este suficientă.
Identitatea din perspectiva interacționismului simbolic

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IX. évfolyam – 2010/2


Parallelism, Contradiction and Complementarity in the Genesis of the National Identities and Ideologies in Transylvania

Introduction

Transylvania, a historical region, whose evolution was characterized by the permanent interaction of more cultural identities on its territory, is traditionally important in its multiculturality and regional self-government. “In the Middle Ages it belonged to the Hungarian State, however due to its remote geographic position, it enjoyed an increased administrative and political autonomy.” After the decay of the independent Hungary in 1541, the region became an autonomous principality under the Ottoman suzerainty, preserving this status for more than 150 years, until the beginning of the 18th century, when it was included in the Habsburgic Empire as a self-governed administrative unit. Starting with 1867, the region belonged to Hungary in the context of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, becoming a part of Romania after the dissolution of the dualist state at the end of the First World War.

Regarding the religious freedom, we must mention that the Edict settled in Turda in 1571 was the first legal document in Europe, which guaranteed the perfect equality and autonomy in the case of a wide range of religions, including the Catholic, Protestant, Lutheran and Unitarian ones. The Orthodox religion represented a major exception; in the judicial language it was familiar only with the status of “tolerated,” instead of “intercepted,” which means that its autonomy was acknowledged yet it was deprived of the privileged political status provided to the other four religious communities.2

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2 Regarding this topic, see: Paul Chiș (2009), Bisericile Protestante în spațiul românesc. Scurt istoric.
Given the fact that in Transylvania the ethnic diversity was strictly connected to the religious differentiation, the acknowledgement of the clerical communities’ rights was also important from the perspective of the acknowledgement of the ethno-community rights. The settlement of the status of different ethnic communities can be also found even in the medieval political institutions of the region. Just like in other feudal political structures in the west and centre of Europe, the Pincipality’s right to participate in the public life was limited to the members of the noble members.

However, what defines the Transylvanian political system is, on the one hand, the existence of three noble orders (“natio”), instead of one, and on the other hand, the structuring of the three “nations” along a separating line also emphasizing an ethno-regional signification. The important political decisions had to be taken through the consensus of the three natio, which enjoyed an equal and co-participatory status, both at the central level, by means of their representatives, and in the context of sub-regions considered in the case of self-administration and government. The Saxons living in Transylvania received the southern part of the region where they formed the so-called Universitas Saxorum, which was offered to them by means of a royal edict, Andreanum. The Seklers had their autonomous area in the eastern parts. The rest of the principality was managed by the nobility from the counties. The other communities, which had settled to the region – the Armenian and Jewish were the most important ones – got their settlement rights, however they had no rights regarding territoriality, that was exclusively saved for the Seklers and Saxon people living in Transylvania. The royal edict in 1224 provided the latter with the territorial rights, which became the main guarantee of the social structure regarding the regions they inhabited.

The early sources of the strong autonomist tendencies, which influenced the modern political evolutions and the mentalities in the region, can be found in certain characteristics of the historical development. From this viewpoint, a part of the “Transylvanian heritage” is also represented by a certain political moderation, towards a balanced and

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flexible attitude, meant to assure the perpetuation of the state – and implicitly its identity – existence in difficult historical circumstances expressed, perhaps in the most eloquent way, by count Teleki Mihály, the chancellor of prince Apafi: “We never do what it is necessary, we always do only what it is possible.”

Although it had such traditions focused on self-management and the institutionalization of the ethnic and religious pluralism, which provided it with a distinct regional identity, as if meant to perpetuate the splendour of its diversity, the “Country Beyond the Woods” could not become a “Switzerland of the East”. There is no “Transylvanian nation”, and there is no nation, which reduces its “home” notion to Transylvania. The idea of “Transylvanian home/country” was (...) removed from the stage of history (...) by the ideologies of the Hungarian and Romanian national states, which were rival and exclusivist when referring to Transylvania.”

The sacralization of the “national territory” and the intense politicization of the territorial identity, as an expression of the competition of the two national, mutually exclusive and opposed identities, made the debate on this topic gradually get a symbolical and ideological value. As A. D. Smith notices – “whether the nations in touch have a different collective mental representation of the mutual geographic and historical territory, of the political situation, they also symbolize the events of the past, the national and/or ethnic conscience in a more different way, implying different social attitudes or actions.”

Starting from these premises, the present study suggests a concise analysis of the fundamental conceptual significations – related especially to the historical, territorial and ethno-demographic identification – in the process regarding the formation and development of the national ideologies in Transylvania:

– In what context and with which results were the arguments of the historical, territorial and demographic rights used by the different national ideologies?

– What kind of solutions and political strategies were used in the region’s integration in the territorial and political context of the national state?

– Which was the role of the historical, territorial and ethno-demographic factors in this process?

The study of significations – related to the past, but especially to the present – regarding such essential aspects, which marked the parallel and often opposed development of the two national ideologies – the Romanian and Hungarian one – in a profound way, can also represent, beyond the scientific relevance, a step towards the inter-ethnic reconciliation, through an effort to overcome the partisan preconceptions and attitude in the research accomplished in the domain. From this perspective, our work aims to be based on a reconstruction and analysis of facts and ideas, which is meant to be as objective as possible. We consider that a long-term transformation in the scientific approach of the inter-ethnic relationships in the region will occur only in the conditions related to the transformation of the traditional conceptions of the national legitimacy, which express the competition between the two national rival ideologies, emphasizing an approach focused on the acceptance of the identity pluralism as a natural characteristic of life in the Transylvanian multicultural space.

Peculiarities of the transition towards modernity

In Transylvania, the causes of the development of some national conflictual and even opposite ideologies – which were opposed to the multicultural past and the institutionalization of the ethnic, cultural and religious pluralism in the region’s context – must be searched for in the peculiarities of the formation of national identities in the countries belonging to the east-European space, besides the factors, which derive from the specificity of the Transylvanian historical evolution.
1. Characteristics of the State life

Due to the fact that most of the modern political units in the west of Europe formed, from a territorial and historical point of view, as successors of the medieval centralized states, with a prolonged continuity, on a well-defined state territory, the citizens of these countries were powerfully pre-conditioned to identify with the state, which used to provide them with a full status as equal members of the political community. Given the concomitance of the assertion of individual civil rights and the process focused on the formation of modern national states, the national identity in the western countries could acquire a strong civic signification. The ethnic and cultural differences played a secondary role in the formation of new leading structures and were politicized less. In exchange, in the east-European zone, the different historical circumstances imposed another model. The existence of the multicultural empires and the delay of the socio-economic modernization determined the fragility of the civil society and, as a result, it strengthened the importance of the ethnic affiliation, language and religion in this part of Europe.

On the territory of the Austrian Empire, which Transylvania belonged to at the beginning of the 18th century, the alternatives to constitute the national states were limited by certain restrictive peculiarities: the multi-ethnic character both of the former medieval states embedded in the Empire, and of their historical regions; the civil society’s weak level of development and the predominance of the ethnic factor in the nations’ formation process; the absence of continuity with the medieval political and territorial entities; the preservation of autonomies and regional and ethno-territorial self-management. The process underwent a troublesome evolution especially because the nations included in the Empire’s structure had lost the historical continuity of their own independent statehood (e.g. the Hungarians and the Czech) or because they had never had their own state (the Ruthenians and the Slovaks, for instance).

Thus, in time, the creation of the national identity coincided, in the case of the people in the region, with the process focused on the constitution (or reconstitution) of their “own” state, provided now with the attributions of a national state. Transylvania, a “border country”8 par

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8 The expression was used by George Cushing in a lecture entitled Hungarian Cultural
excellence, was especially marked by this lack of political and state continuity. Given the fact that the region was defined by an ethnically mixed character, one could foresee that the aspirations to construct the national state of the different ethnic communities might conduct to rival revindications; furthermore, we consider that, through the nature of things, the logic of the nationalistic way of thinking makes its promoters militate for the settlement of some state borders, which should involve as many locals as possible.

A hypothetic possibility – which must have been abandoned almost from the very beginning – referred to the creation of a German (Austrian) national state based on the political, cultural and linguistic domination of the German element on the whole territory. Although such an idea might have been probably supported by the German people from Transylvania, Bohemia, Moravia, Silezia etc., neither the demographic share nor the political position of these communities proved powerful enough in order to offer the necessary basis to implement such a plan.

The traditional political institutions of the province, which the imperial leading force had to support in order to assure the stable domination, were mostly constructed according to ethnic and territorial privileges. Therefore, the government from Vienna had to respect the cultural identity of its Transylvanian subjects within certain limits. In spite of all these, the Habsburgs did everything they could in order to undermine the possible danger, which the ascent of some alternative national political forces might have represented. The satisfaction of some identity revindications of the Romanian people during the reign of Ferdinand I, Carol III and Maria Theresa was probably accomplished to attenuate the share of the Hungarian ethnic element, considered the strongest national alternative competitor in the Empire’s eastern regions.

2. De-synchronized modernization

Regardless of the reasons beyond the limited support provided by Vienna to carry out the Romanian cultural needs, this factor had undoubtedly contributed to the creation of the modern national identity in


Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle
the region. In exchange, the institutionalization of the “second serfhood” represented a step backwards, both for the social-economic and national development. The consolidation of the feudal relationships during a period of time when certain countries in the Western Europe had just opened the way towards modernization, by eliminating the system of servility, can be interpreted only as a regress, a movement towards the past, which mostly stopped the creation of some powerful civil institutions and a strong civic identity.

In the individual and collective mentalities there was the idea that the status of a person depended not only on the individual’s performances and value, but also on the affiliation to a certain community, defined especially through the ethno-national criteria. In such circumstances, in the empire’s disintegration the ethnic affiliation became the only link capable of creating organic solidarities and inspiring loyalty among the members of the community, and the future political territorial units had to gain their legitimacy by assuming the representation of identities and interests in the case of a certain ethnic community. In order to be at least partially efficient, the civic culture, as much as it could develop in the unfavourable conditions of the region, had to be constructed of necessity – and it had been constructed – on this structure of the pre-existent solidarity of the ethno-community. By the very fact, the ethnic minorities found themselves excluded from the official identifying rhetorics, having to choose either their assimilation in the dominant nation, or their personal national conception regarding identity.

While in the West the modern nation developed as the expression of the resolute rejection of the feudal privileges, suggesting the power of the “people” and all the citizens’ equality in front of the law, in Transylvania – as a consequence of the weak urban and bourgeois development – the nobility was the one, which borrowed the national idea, by partially using it for the preservation of their traditional leading power. Instead of releasing the serfs from the feudal servitudes and proclaiming the citizens’ full equality, they noticed quite the opposite in a first stage: the free traditional communities, which were socially and ethnically homogeneous, began to lose their special rights as a result of a gradual process of internal differentiation, which finally drove to the creation of a unitary noble class, also joined by the privileged members of the other two natio. It was not only that the members of the noble elite were not excluded from the
nation, the past and present dominant position of the different political elites, which were defining themselves as national elites, became the most powerful argument to support the revendication of a privileged status for the nations, whose representation was assumed by these elites.

Thus, in the case of Transylvania, we can refer to a pre-national pre-modern stage of the elites’ political and ideological mobilization, which preceded and prepared the national mobilization as such. The transition from the premodern argumentation to the one provided with modern characteristics had been done gradually, and the process had not been completed so far. The de-synchronization of the socio-economic development with the one in the west of Europe had marked the whole evolution of the national ideologies and politics in the region in a profound way.

3. The ethno-cultural significations of the medieval political system

The institutionalization of the ethno-cultural plurality in the context of the medieval political system of Transylvania through the institution of the three natio and the four “received” religions expressed both the equality of the communities included in the leading structures and the subordinated position of those meant to remain out of these structures. Referring to the historiographic interpretation of this situation, Sorin Mitu emphasizes the existence of a clear line of differentiation – which is not incidental at all – between the positions adopted by the Romanian historians and the viewpoints expressed by the Hungarian historians: While the “Romanian historiography insists upon the discrimination the Romanian people had to undergo, meant to discredit exactly the idea of tolerance, […] the Hungarian historiography prefers to appreciate the positive aspect by opposing the confessional tolerance from Transylvania in the 16th century to the religious wars, which used to destroy other parts of Europe at that time.”

Obviously, the references to the existence of the three natio in the medieval documents do not mean that we had some nations in the modern sense of the term, more exactly, the one connected to the national identity. The affiliation to the medieval political nations was conditioned by the socio-political and/or territorial status of the individuals, being the

expression of certain privileges. The Hungarian serfs or Saxon people living in Transylvania shared a similar situation with the Romanian ethnic group, they were evidently excluded from the political nation, while the Romanian nobility belonged to the noble Hungarian class, being gradually assimilated by this from an ethno-cultural point of view too. However, there were some pre-conditions of the national inequality in the modern epoch, which can be identified in the ethnic significations of the unequal distribution of the access to power represented by the institution of the three acknowledged *natio*, due to the fact that the rights of the individuals, as well as those of the political communities, were mostly allocated according to ethno-territorial criteria. Although the “nation” term must be firstly understood as a community of rights and privileges, the organization of three Transylvanian “nations” was not deprived of any ethnic and cultural significations at all.

Firstly, the reason regarding the constitution of the three *natio* consisted in the necessity to assure the participation in the leading power’s exercise and implicitly the loyalty of different ethno-regional communities by including them in the government system. Secondly, two of the three “nations” (the Seklers and the Saxons of Transylvania) were ethnically homogeneous, while the third – the nobility in the counties – although it included persons of different ethnic origins, was Hungarian in its spirit, mentality and lifestyle. Thirdly, the fact that the Romanians, marginalized from a socio-economic perspective, were not allowed to form their own *natio*, just like the Orthodox Church, which did not share an equal status with the Catholic, Protestant, Lutheran and Unitarian religions, represented an obvious evidence of the ethno-confessional inequality, which influenced the development of the Romanian national identity a lot.

Reflecting on the causes, which generated the Romanians’ exclusion from the Transylvanian political nations, Gusztáv Molnár considers that the “status-regime structures of Transylvania, crystallized in the 14th century, still functioning during the following centuries, proved unable to cope with the problems of the Orthodox Romanians and the local Slav-Byzantine institutions. The incompatibility of the two systems of institutions, the occidental Central-European and the Byzantine South-East-European one, did not facilitate the Romanians’ integration as a social unit.”

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10 Molnár Gusztáv, ‘Regionalism civic (2)’ *Provincia, June 28, 2000.*
Of course, this problem deserves a more profound research. However, no matter what the reasons of the exclusion of the Romanian elite from the three noble nations might have been, it is certain that the non-recognition of the Romanians as a political nation and the fact that they could not benefit (they had only few chances) from the spiritual administration of their own noble elite (as this was included in the Hungarian nobility and mostly “Hungarized”), represented an important factor approached to influence their national ideology and also – in a way which might seem paradoxical – a catalytic factor in the process developing the assertion of the Romanian national identity.

The reference to the premodern community identities: continuity and discontinuity

As a consequence, although the comparative analysis of the factors, which had contributed to the formation of the national identities, imperiously implies a series of economic, social and cultural determinants, we can still state that the main element of differentiation in the constitution of the modern national conscience of the Hungarians, Romanians and Germans from Transylvania seems to be related to the unequal leading positions of their political elites.

Beyond the important similitudes, there were also significant differences between the two main national ideologies. While the Hungarian national movement from Transylvania appeared from the very beginning as integrated in the ensemble of the Hungarian national activism, the emergence of the Romanian national conception from Transylvania precedes the promotion of the Romanian national idea in the Danubian Principalities. Unlike the Hungarians from Transylvania, who defined themselves, from the very beginning, as the inseparable members of the Hungarian nation, the Romanians in the region considered themselves an independent political and territorial community, with their own identity and individuality. This was the quality assumed by the Transylvanian Romanian elites in the initial stage of the Romanian national ideology in general, which was subsequently promoted through their contribution in the territories situated at the south and east of the Carpathians.

Regarding the political status inherited from the pre-modern ep-
och, the Hungarians had obviously taken the most favourable position. Although its medieval status had collapsed, the Hungarian noble elite was in a comparatively good position in order to assume an early leading role in the national “renaissance,” opposing to the tendency of the German political and cultural domination. Two of the three natio from Transylvania – the counties’ nobility and the Seklers – were Hungarian through their culture, mentality and language. The former privileged status of the Hungarian elites, which in the modern national ideology was extrapolated upon the whole Hungarian population, was providing the Hungarian nation – from the perspective of its classical national ideologists – with the leading role in the state, which was supposed to be created.

Both the political and spiritual pre-conditions of such an evolution were present: “Given the fact that most of the Hungarians, which had received a good education, belonged to the noble class,” – considered C. A. Macartney – “almost all their writers and intellectuals were originally noble, and they imagined the nation according to the viewpoints of the class they were related to in an instinctive way... The new spirit (of modernity NA) did not decrease the social and political exclusivism of the Hungarian nationalism”.11 From a certain perspective, the Hungarian national movement must be probably considered, in the first stage, as also representing an attempt of nobility to construct a new legitimacy, by combining a modern and essentially equalitarian ideology with a strongly conservative vision about the “foredoomed” and “eternal” role of the traditional dominant class in the service of nation.

Furthermore, in the case of Romanians, the most important determinants were the absence of the political participation in the past, their exclusion from the three “nation”, the unfavourable socio-economic status and the gradual absorption of the Romanian privileged level by the Hungarian nobility. Consequently, the leading role in the national movement had to be assumed by the relatively recently developed intellectuals and especially by the Church United with Rome. All these contributed to the crucial role of the ethnic factor in the formation of the Romanian national conscience. “The nation term is used - in the Lexicon from Buda, in the case of Gheor-ghe Şincai, Samuil Micu, Dimitrie Țichindeal or Ion Budai-Deleanu – as a synonym for <people, nationality>, and it

is meant to describe the language community, the Romanians’ habits, customs and beliefs. This acception, actual in the case of the writers of Şcoala Ardeleană (Transylvanian School), is going to impose the semantic pattern for the 19th and 20th centuries”.12

From a certain perspective, the Germans (the Saxons from Transylvania) had taken an intermediary position in this painting. The Saxon community from Transylvania could aspire neither to the exclusively dominant role in Transylvania, nor to the creation of their own national state on this territory. In exchange, they benefitted from long and sustained traditions of the ethno-political and territorial self-government, and could take advantage of the natural pro Habsburgic orientation. Although both the ethnic and social homogeneousness of the Saxons from Transylvania became more and more altered, and the community’s management was overtaken by the rich bourgeoisie living in the towns, the inclusion of the Saxon serfs in the context of the same Lutheran religion represented a powerful homogenizing cultural factor and an important precondition of the formation of their national conscience.

The high comparative level of the economic and social development of the Saxon localities from Transylvania and their powerful political and cultural connections with the Germans from everywhere made the Saxon region become very important for the Habsburgic Empire. Cumulated, these conditions determined a different evolution of the identity of the German community compared to the Romanian and Hungarian ones. Although they obviously belonged to the “German world”, from a linguistic, cultural and religious viewpoint (as supporters of the Lutheran church), the Saxons from Transylvania did not aim at the integration in the German state, preserving a distinct ethno-territorial identity, in which the attachment to the land of Transylvania appeared as a fundamental element. Expressing this position, the Saxon leader Rudolf Schuller emphasized that “they did not want to be simple Germans, but the Germans from Siebenbürgen (Transylvania nn).”13

Therefore the evolution of the national ideologies and movements in Transylvania seems to confirm the hypothesis promoted by Ernest Gellner, according to which “under the impact of a certain socio-eco-

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nomic form (...) there are both classes (...) and nations, which become politically significant and often determine the transformations of frontiers when they converge (author’s italics). The economic pressure, in the case it is signaled and strengthened by cultural differences, becomes politically potent and determines a radical new outline of the map.”

It is true that the British thinker refers here to the formation of nations in the context of modern industrialism, which characterized the development in the west of the continent, yet his conclusion regarding the catalyzing effect of the coincidence between the socio-economic and the ethno-cultural inequality can be also applied in our zone of investigation, with an important amendment: the prominent role of the political positions owned by the main politico-cultural elites, which represented verifiable factors in the formation of the Hungarian, Romanian and German national conscience. Although in a first stage the nature and rhetorics of revendications were focused on some privileges for the pre-modern elites, there were also important elements, which denoted the evolution towards the formation of some completely constituted national ideologies.

The prevalence of the ethnic factor in the process developed to form the national ideologies mostly refute, in the case of Transylvania, the validity of the hypothesis formulated by John Breuilly, according to which the national ideology might have emerged as a reaction to the rising contradiction between the expectance of the civil society and the demands of the modern state, by providing the new institutions with a traditional historical legitimacy concerning the community. In the absence of some well-represented structures of the civil society and modern state, in the full meaning of the word, the national ideologies based on ethnic values had rather fulfilled – especially in the initial stages of the national mobilization – a compensatory role and integration at a prevailing symbolical level in the “world of modernity.”

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The territorial and demographic argument in the phase focused on the genesis of national ideologies

The argumentation of the Hungarian national elite emphasized the idea of the political state continuity. Given the fact that Transylvania belonged to the medieval state of Hungary, there was a traditional connection between the nobility from Transylvania and the one from Hungary, which was offering them a mutual basis of legitimacy. Moreover, the Hungarians – both those from Transylvania and the ones, which were not living here – could argue that the Transylvanian Principality was, in a certain way, the continuation of the historical Hungary, which provided the Hungarian culture in the 17th and 18th centuries (which followed the collapse of the medieval Hungarian kingdom) with a certain degree of protection. As a result, the main principle of the national Hungarian ideology (which was also approached by the Transylvanian Hungarians) had become the idea concerning the recreation of the national Hungarian state in the context of the historical borders of Hungary.

On the other hand, in the case of Romanians they noticed the assertion of a more different concept of continuity. Given the fact that there were no medieval State traditions which might have been invoked, they promoted demographic arguments and details defining the ethnic history to support the national demands. Initially, the Romanians’ demands were preserved in the context of the Transylvanian medieval constitution, aiming to assure the same privileged positions for the leading Romanian strata, enjoyed by the members of the three acknowledged political nations. That was the goal of a petition, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*, sent to emperor Leopold II in 1791, on behalf of the Romanian clergy, nobility and bourgeoisie.16

Although it respected the already existent order of rights, demanding some rights only for the elite members, the petition was referring to the whole Romanian population in the region through the invoked arguments (oldness, issue). Concentrating on this detail, Keith Hitchins considers that the *Supplex* might have represented the first document referring to the Romanian movement from Transylvania “which is be-

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lieved to have a national character.” 17 We cannot totally agree with this evaluation, as we consider both the contradiction between the nature of revendications and arguments, and the fact that the element of popular mobilization, which was essential for a national movement, was missing. However, the special significance of the petition – as a turning point in the process of transition from the pre-modern political thinking to the fully developed national ideology – cannot be denied.

The argument referring to the population firstly appears as a legitimizing principle in this document. They emphasized especially the fact that at the end of the 18th century the Romanian population represented the absolute majority in Transylvania, by also supporting the idea that the Romanians had always constituted the largest population in the region. We also emphasize that in this first phase the argument of the – past and present – demographic majority was used especially to counter-balance the idea of political and State continuity promoted by the Hungarian ideologists, without highlighting any exclusivist elements. The Romanian national demands in the second half of the 18th century – and mostly in the 19th century – were firstly based on the arguments of the equitable representation (proportional with the demographic percentage). The representatives of the Şcoala Ardeleană were also strongly interested in the idea of origins, invoking the Roman ascendence. 18 The historical right has an important place in the argumentation of the Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Aiming to support the advanced demands, the document proved not only that the Romanians were already living in Transylvania during the reign of emperor Traian, but also their continuous presence in all the three provinces.

The first ones, who had written about the Roman origin of the Romanians, were the Italian humanists in the 15th century: Poggio Bracciolini, Bonfini (the chronicler of king Mathias of Hungary). The idea was

resumed in the 16th century by the Archbishop of Esztergom, Nicolaus Olahus, being also popular in the Jesuit schools, as well as in the Protestant ones. Thus there were enough chances for the idea regarding the Roman origin to be implemented in the mind and soul of the Romanian young people who used to learn in such schools. However, the theory of continuity gets some political signification not only in the context focused on the formation of the Romanian national identity in the 18th century. The one, who was clearly referring to the arguments of the Roman origin in a politico-national way, was the united bishop Inocentiu Micu Klein. 19 The context was given by the circumstances outlining the bishop’s personal life. Becoming the owner of a terrain in Sibiu in 1734, the magistrate does not let him construct in the town, as this was one of the Saxons’ privileges, on the basis of their exclusive territorial rights on the Saxon Land. Trying to fight against this argument, Micu Klein appeals to the right of the firstly arrived. The idea concerning the historical primacy will represent an outstanding dimension of the national identity and ideology of the Romanians from Transylvania, then of those from the Danubian Principalities.

The importance of the historical primacy in the structure of the Romanian national ideology surely derives from the powerfully felt historical frustrations, the Romanians’ exclusion from the three natio acknowledged in the pre-modern period. They had probably considered not only that the Romanians could not appeal to the argument of political and State continuity, but also their characterization as “intruders” in the official documents of the time, a label used as a main reason to refuse to be accepted among the privileged political nations. 20 Paradoxically, the Romanians’ exclusion from the context of the political nations in the premodern epoch was being used as an argument against the idea referring to their co-optation to the power as a partner nation. In some works of the exponents of the Hungarian classic nationalism, the Romanians were

20 Point 3. from *Diploma Leopoldianum*, the Romanians were not allowed to get the status of political nation by emphasizing the necessity to have “the system of organization in the Principality protected from any troubles, for the Romanian nation, just like other foreign nations, not to count among nations” in: Apud Száraz György: Erdély múltjáról-jelen időben, *Népszabadság*, June 30, 1985
described as a nation missing the true history of Transylvania, mainly created from Hungarian voivodes, princes and nobles. At the same time, the Romanian national demands were also rejected by having accused the Romanians of a “lack of gratitude” because they had been sheltered by the Hungarians when migrating from the Danubian Principalities in Transylvania.

In such a context, the way, in which history was used by the Romanian Transylvanian ideologists to counteract the “foreign” status attributed to the Romanians, through the symbolical support and identification of some modern and stipulated thesis, was very important. It is about the way in which the representatives of the Şcoala Ardeleană – with references to the chronicle of Anonymus – invoked the would-be pact among the Hungarians run by Tuhutum with the native Romanian inhabitants\(^{21}\) – as a historical and legal basis of the need to settle (to re-settle, according to them) the political community of Transylvania based on the equality among its nations. Starting from the archaic structure of the form of argumentation, we can identify the germs of an early Romanian Transylvanianism which, because of the circumstances, didn’t survive for long. The main idea of such a desired reconciliation consisted in the necessary meeting of Romanians and Hungarians in the mutual area of legality and modern democratic transformations.

Of course, the Romanian national demands in 1848 were firstly based on the argument of the equitable representation (which was proportional with the demographic share) and the need to assure the usage of the national language, although they suggested pre-eminently lawful ideas. The period between 1848–49, which marks the advent of the phase of modern national collective politico-ideological mobilization, probably represented one of the last chances to stop a mutually exclusive and disputing development of the two national ideologies. Among the Romanian Transylvanian elites there was the hope that the new Hungarian constitution would surely provide the complete equality among citizens. Yet what they considered as necessary, beyond the legislation of civic lawfulness, was the provision of some constitutional guarantees, which should include the explicit acknowledgement of the Romanian nation sharing similar rights with the other two important nations of Transylvania.

\(^{21}\) Cf. Mitu, op. cit. 73.
In the demonstration of the necessity of this acknowledgement, the discourse of historical legitimacy is noticed in the case of some authors, however, it is evidently subordinated to the legal rhetorics and the actual political demands. Thus, Simion Bărnuţiu shows that the Romanians, the “Romans’ descendants”, had been refused their legitimate place among the nations of Transylvania for too long. The structure of his argumentation emphasizes the need to use the actual political moment, for the Romanians to be capable of establishing and accomplishing their national program.  

Respecting the same way of thinking, George Bariţiu is perhaps striking not only in the assertion of the primordial importance of the legal argument related to the historical one, but also in the formulation of some concrete solutions. By demanding the renunciation to the disputes regarding the “oldness,” “priority,” “origin of the names of geographic places” etc., he also formulates a vision anchored in the present by proposing the organization of Transylvania through the constitution of some Romanian, Hungarian and Saxon cantons, according to the Swiss model.

However, Transylvania’s union with Hungary in 1848, as well as the Austro-Hungarian compromise in 1867, occurred without the existence of a consensual agreement among the nations, which were populating the region, and without the Romanians’ acknowledgement as a distinct nation. Like in other regions, in Transylvania the formation of the modern national identities coincided with the debate of ethno-community and territorial rights and privileges. Instead of ethnic and religious criteria, they declared the primordiality of the citizens’ rights as the State’s organizing principle. The persons belonging to different national communities could benefit from ethnic, cultural and religious rights, within the limits established by law. On the other hand, the nations were not acknowledged as collective entities, and this fact represented, according to their own perception, their deprivation of the possibility to protect and promote their national community rights and interests.

The national collective rights were rejected, and implicitly replaced with the rights of the dominant nation. All these, on behalf of the citi-

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23 G. Barițiu, *Părți alese din istoria Transilvaniei de două sute de ani în urmă*. Sibiu, 1890.
zens’ rights, yet these rights were interpreted by the Hungarian leaders in strictly individual terms. After this failure, the historical right remained the fundamental reason of the national conceptions – both Romanian and Hungarian –, and it gradually turned exclusivist.

**Divergent principles of national legitimacy**

While in the western model of the nation the State political units represented the starting point in the nation’s formation as a cultural unit, in the Central and Eastern Europe the process developed in the opposite way: from the cultural unit towards the political one. The inherent contradictions of this process in the countries which, due to the characteristics of the historical development, had adopted an ethnic definition of the nations, manifested in the most dramatic way exactly in the areas belonging to the Hungarian kingdom in the Dualist Monarchy, among which Transylvania too. Here we notice two mutually exclusive principles of legitimacy. While the Hungarian governments were aiming to realize a political Hungarian nation, which should reunite all the inhabitants regardless of their ethnic affiliation, the nations, which were not Hungarian, oriented towards the constitution of the political units corresponding to their own cultural identities.

This contradiction emphasizes a higher complexity than it appears at the first sight. The main representatives of the reforming Hungarian political elite were really some fervent supporters of the predominant liberal conception over then, in Europe, according to which the idea of citizenship, the civic identity, were the only possible efficient connections between the individual and community, and the awareness of the affiliation to an ethnic community could do nothing but weaken this connection. Yet beyond their modern liberal rhetorics, declaratively neutral from an ethnic point of view, providing the individual rights and the “mutual good” with the central role in the system of values applied by the political society, which was meant to be created, the vision of the Hungarian leaders was also containing traditionally conservative and

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legitimate elements, which actually drew them closer to ethno-centrist positions. Therefore, they considered that the Hungarian language had to naturally become an official language, focusing the legitimacy of the new state on the tradition of the Hungarian medieval kingdom. The citizens, who were not born as Hungarians, were not excluded from this discourse of legitimacy, but the condition regarding their acceptance consisted in the affiliation to the Hungarian “political patriotism”, more exactly to the national mythology and ideals of the Hungarians, as well as in the acceptance of the supremacy of the Hungarian language in the context of the State.

The matter of language was an extremely delicate problem, strongly connected to the “historical argument.” The importance of the linguistic matter in the case of national identities and ideologies derives – as emphasized by Will Kymlicka – from the very fact that “these matters are important both in the individual liberty and for the political community.”^{25} It is even stronger in the countries located in the eastern space, where the nations had formed around the idea of ethnic values, and the issue regarding the usage and acknowledgement of the national language reached, beyond the socio-technical aspects, a powerful symbolical signification.

From the very beginning, the national Hungarian movement developed as a struggle for linguistic rights and the acknowledgement of the Hungarian language as an official language in the Empire. This “birth certificate” encountered long-term consequences. While the national ideology was developing and manifesting on the political stage, the Hungarian nobility, which was leading the process, considered the development of the mass basis of the national demands more and more important. The approach of the language – and folk culture – as essential symbols connecting all the Hungarians regardless of their economico-social status, fulfilled an essential role in the context of this strategy concerning legitimacy. By proclaiming the Hungarian language the only official language, the speakers of this language – especially the native ones – were actually offered not only an instrumental advantage in the daily communication, but also the feeling of getting a privilege and supplementary source of pride and dignity. This fact had an effect of exclusion in the case of the

inhabitants, who did not know the Hungarian language, and determined their elites to obtain the general acceptance by using the same model: the emphasis of their own languages’ virtues “creating the nation”.

If the Romanian national movement considered the ethno-demographic share an argument, the national Hungarian State after 1868 was rather seen as a problem. The insufficiently powerful demographic positions owned by the Hungarians in the territory, especially in certain preponderantly rural zones inhabited by a compact non-Hungarian population (such as the northern part massively inhabited by Slovaks, the southern Transylvania, and the zone of the Apuseni mountains preponderantly inhabited by Romanians), made the implementation of the ethno-national aspirations more difficult providing an insufficient national identification, considered in demographic terms. This fact can probably be one of the explanatory factors concerning the emergence of a new direction pointing towards the development of the Hungarian national ideology based on the concept of political nation.26

The idea focused on the Hungarian political nation, which should include all the Hungarian citizens, of all nationalities, can be considered, from a certain perspective, as an attempt to reconcile the imperative need to assert the Hungarian character of the state according to the classical nationalistic principle of legitimacy (“a single state, a single nation”), practically aiming to assert the neutral and non-partisan character of the state related to the ethnic communities, through a political gesture offered to the numerous inhabitants, which were not Hungarians. Consequently, they adopted the Law of nationalities in 1868. While it was liberally providing the people, who were not Hungarians, with the possibility to use the mother tongue, also in the contacts with the state authorities, and it acknowledged their right to associate “for the development of the language, art, science, industry and trade”, the law was proclaiming that “from a political point of view, all the country’s citizens are the members of the same nation, of the unitary and indivisible Hungarian nation, which includes all the citizens of the country, regardless of their nationality, enjoying equal rights.”27

26 Regarding the two directions – the one focused on the cultural and political nation – of the Hungarian national conscience, see Szűcs Jenő Nemzet és történelem, Budapest: Gondolat, 1984
The concept of the all-embracing political nation was involving the legal supremacy of the citizens’ individual rights compared to the national collective rights, however it was clear that the leading elite aimed to limit and reduce the politization of the non-Hungarians’ ethnical problems, perceived as a potential source of danger in the state. Given the effort to create a politically unitary state, considered a guarantee of the internal stability and territorial integrity, in 1876-77 they planned a territorial administrative reorganization, which eliminated the autonomous areas of the Seklers and Saxons living in Transylvania and extended the homogeneous system of the counties in the whole territory.

The main reason behind the measures regarding the administrative territorial reorganization consisted in the concern that the acknowledgement of the collective rights of different ethno-cultural communities might encourage them to promote the national ideals of the states, where they form the dominant emotional entity. This fear was expressed by count Tisza István, a prominent liberal leader and prime-minister of Hungary for a long time, in the following way: “Within the borders of Hungary there is only one nation: this political nation is the Hungarian one. Hungary can’t become a Switzerland of the east. It might stop being.”

One must mention that, although there was an agreement among the Hungarian politicians regarding the necessity of the state’s unitary character, there were also some disputes and debates focused on the way, in which the state management must exert regionally and locally. Some deputies, who were approving the concept of the Hungarian unitary political nation, still considered that a certain degree of autonomy might be offered to the nationalities from the counties and localities. However, all these proposals were finally rejected.

The assertion of the principle regarding the unitary state and the rhetorics appeals to the historical tradition of the medieval kingdom, even if very popular among the Hungarian ethnic groups, could not provide the people, who were living on the territory of the “revived” statality, with a very powerful legitimacy; among these, the most important ones were the Romanians from Transylvania, the Slovaks from the “north-
ern Hungary,” the Croatians, Slovenians, Serbs from Vojvodina and the Ruthenians. Starting with 1868 these nations reasserted their previous demands to acquire their autonomy and collective rights, proposing the constitution of Hungary as a multinational State with six official languages; proportional representation in the central institutions; cultural autonomy; self-management rights at the regional level; as well as the settlement of the administrative territorial units according to the ethnic distribution.

These demands were settled according to the traditional constitutional principles of Transylvania, based on the plurality of the national community rights. Yet the Transylvanian institutions were mostly more different than the judicial tradition of Hungary, where there was only one political nation, natio hungarica. The difficulty encountered in the conciliation of this contradiction can explain – at least partially – why the outstanding thinkers and political leaders of Hungary in the 19th century, who within certain limits preferred the ethno-cultural pluralism, could not accept a multinational model in the political viewpoint, without having the final possibility to integrate Transylvania in the Hungarian national State.

Among the national communities from Transylvania, the Romanians were inclined to develop a national ideology, which was not compatible with the conception regarding the Hungarian state nation based on the territorially historical legitimacy. Given the demographic share (they represented 56.85% of the population of Transylvania in 1890 and 55.08% in 1910)\(^{29}\), of their comparatively disadvantaged economic and political status, as well as of their proximity with the new Kingdom of Romania, the Romanians from Transylvania developed a strong conscience of their separate identity. For the Romanians, the idea reflecting the Hungarian unitary state from a political point of view could not be accepted, no matter how much liberty the national minorities within this state would have enjoyed. Their minimal objective was the preservation of the Transylvanian autonomy with the assurance of some collective rights for the national communities in the context.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\) Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények, Új sorozat, vol. 27, 133; vol. 64, 137.

However, the replacement of the ethnical principle concerning the political representation with a modern “civic” concept was seen by the Romanians as an attempt of the Hungarian leading elite to hide and identify the real predominance of the Hungarian element and the non-Hungarians plans of assimilation. The introduction of the Hungarian language as a compulsory subject in the Romanian religious schools and kindergardens, as well as the fact that the state educational units were mostly conceived in the Hungarian language, had certainly strengthened such suspicions. The fact that the recommended unitary national political communion was named “the Hungarian political nation” instead of “Hungary’s political nation” by its promoters was interpreted by the Romanians as a proof of the real homogenising intentions of the government. The representatives of the medium leveled administrative mechanism, who were mostly Hungarians or became Hungarians, had really contested the desirability of the nationalities’ rights and tried to limit their application in the sphere of economy and culture, considered less delicate from a political viewpoint.

The insistence, which the Romanians protected the idea regarding the collective rights with, was probably related to the fact that, because of their exclusion from the medieval political units, in the past the Romanian elites had never had the privileges of the community representation, unlike the Hungarians, Seklers and Saxons living in Transylvania. As Alexandru Bohățiel was analyzing in the Diet from Sibiu in 1863-64 in a very suggestive way, “as a Romanian noble enjoyed the same rights with a Hungarian noble, a citizen on the royal land had the same rights with another citizen on that land, a citizen in the towns and counties of Transylvania had the same rights with the other citizens. Yet they could not use them as nation (the emphasis belongs to us), without being mixed up with other nationalities. Because of all these, today I cannot be satisfied with the equal individual justification, there’s only the national justification which I am satisfied with.”31 Thus the national Romanian Transylvanian demands were aiming at the realization of a co-social model of government in which every nation was participating as a separate political subject, with equal rights in the exercise of the power. The “nation’s right” was seen by the Romanian

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leaders as some essential premises to overcome a historical painful frustration as a pre-condition to regain the feeling of equal justifications, and equal dignity in the relationship with other nations.

Concomitantly with the efforts to politically assimilate the non-Hungarian ethnic groups, they intensified the assimilatory processes, among the Hungarians, of the non-Hungarian population, which had recently immigrated to towns. For many newcomers, who had arrived to the urban localities, the adoption of the Hungarian identity had represented an important corollary and stimulating factor of the ascendent mobility. This process was encouraged by the authorities, who were mostly interested in obtaining an increased share of the inhabitants, who were assuming their affiliation to the Hungarian nation, taking into account that the Hungarian ethnic groups formed, even in 1910, less than half of the population of Hungary, and more than 40% of the population didn’t even know the Hungarian language.

The effects of the Hungarian assimilation in the context of the Romanian population immigrated to the urban Transylvanean centres, together with the historical, socio-economic and cultural factors, which were discouraging the movement of the Romanian ethnic group towards cities, reflected in the very limited share of the Romanians in the urban context. Even in the centres, where the Romanian bourgeoisie was more concentrated, and where they enjoyed much better conditions to preserve their identity, the Romanian ethnic group represented only a minority of the population.32

The rural population was hardly mobile to be really interested in modifying its identity in order to gain some advantages, and too powerful and massively present to be politically compelled to make this step.33 For the Hungarian national ideology and policy the advent of the socio-economic stage focused on the national mobilization of the elites and urban working class as a consequence of the industrializing process starting with the second half of the 19th century represented a chance of strategic importance for the facilitation of the non-Hungarians’ assimilation to reach a higher degree of national homogeneousness.

32 According to the census in 1910 (Magyar Statisztikai Közlönyek, vol. 64, 130-133), the percentage of the Romanian population was 26.3% in Sibiu, 28.7% in Brașov, 16.3% in Arad, 12.4% in Cluj.

33 In 1910 the proportion of the rural population was 85.9% of the whole Romanian population from Transylvania (Magyar Statisztikai Közlönyek, vol. 64, 188).
Moreover, the acceleration of the process of industrialization and migration towards the urban centres also had an opposing effect: the strengthening of the Romanian socio-economic and political elites in the Transylvanian towns. The assimilation was not the only possible option for the members of this elite. Once they overcame a critical limit of the number of members belonging to the Romanian industrial and commercial level in a certain locality, the newcomers could be either integrated in the life of this elite by assuming the Romanian identity, or assimilate.

While the internal organization and the economic power of the Romanian bourgeoisie was consolidating, the national movement was gaining new impulses and new active members, who were capable of supporting them in an efficient way. In actual fact, because the right to the universal approval was not permitted, and due to the application of some well-thought political tactics, the Hungarian elite actually succeeded in perpetuating their domination in the state’s political and administrative context, even in many of the zones preponderantly inhabited by Romanians.

The fundamental reference term – the historical and actual native land – for the outstanding Romanian leaders in the region was still Transylvania. This is the way Andrei Şaguna expressed his thoughts in 1863: “Gentlemen, we are all the sons of one and the same mother, of one single country (…). I am asking you, once for ever, to judge me neither according to my nationality nor to the religion I am related to, judge me according to my land and patriotic values (…)” And he added: “Transylvania, our native land, is in an indissoluble and indivisible connection with the other provinces and countries of His/Her Highness.” “As a Transylvanian”, he considered he had a single native land: Transylvania.34

However, the refusal to provide the national entities of the state with political subjects and the increasing insatisfaction of the non-Hungarian political elites, especially of the Romanians, regarding the predominance of the Hungarian ethnic element in a state, which pretended to behave equally with all its citizens, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, had gradually driven to the development of an alternative national rhetorics, which ended in the dispute of the already existent politico-territorial arrangements.

34 Dieta Ardealului, Şedinţa 7 (27 iulie) In: Pacatian, op. cit. 67-69.
Strategies of the Transylvanian national legitimacy in the Romanian State during the inter-war period

The territorial transformation occurred at the end of the First World War, after which Transylvania became a constitutive part of the Romanian state, was perceived by the two main national communities in the region in a contradictory way: the Romanians celebrated it as if it emphasized the apotheosis of their national state, and the Hungarians sensed it as if it suggested a profound national tragedy. When the national aspirations of a community (of the Romanians) were solved, a new national problem emerged: the one regarding the minorities on the new territory of Romania.

The new politico-territorial configuration made the Romanian majority cope with a difficult problem: the ethnic composition of the extended state was much more complex than the one of the Old Kingdom. In the territories, which had belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before 1918 (Transylvania, Partium and a part of Banat) the population (5,570,000) included 1,651,000 Hungarians and 565,000 Germans. At the same time, the Great Romania was composed of Basarabia, Bucovina and the south of Dobrogea, with many Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians. The census accomplished in 1918 demonstrates that, reported to the whole territory of the country, the share of the Romanian population represented 71.9 %, while in Transylvania (including the region named Partium and the part from Banat returned to România) the Romanians formed only 57.8 % from the population. Thus one was wondering whether and to what extent was the state supposed to change its structures in order to provide a model of integration for its citizens, who did not belong to the Romanian population from an ethno-national point of view.

The new territorial status of Transylvania also drove to a profound transformation of the situation regarding the Hungarian community in the region, yet in a more different way than in the case of Romanians: from a dominant nation, the Hungarians became a minority group both

numerically and with regard to the political status. The sudden transition from the status of a dominant nation to the one as a minority group was also felt because of the traumatizing effects of the separation from the “native land,” while the Hungarian state was perceived as the protector of the Hungarians’ interests and culture. For the Hungarian inhabitants of Transylvania, the transition in the territorial status actually meant a compelled separation between the political community and the cultural one, by suddenly losing the state political dimension of its own identity.37

It seemed that in the first months after the extension of the Romanian sovereignty upon Transylvania there were chances for the Great Romania to be constructed on the basis of certain power divisions between the Romanians and the other important national communities. The Proclamation from Alba Iulia, which expressed the initial political position of the Romanian Transylvanian leaders, included the following principles, which were received positively by the minority groups:

“1. Absolute national liberty for all the co-inhabiting nations. Each nation will be trained, managed and judged in its own language by the individuals from its context, and each nation will get its representation rights in the legislative units and in the country’s management according to its number of individuals.

2. Equal justification and absolute religious liberty for all the state religions.”38

The Saxons from Transylvania voted for the unification of Transylvania with Romania on the basis of this program, and in the next decades the minority political organizations – both of the Hungarians and Germans – kept asking for solutions concerning the national problems on the basis of the principles settled in Alba Iulia. From the very beginning, there were numerous signals indicating that the leading circles from the Old Kingdom would choose a unitary centralist state for the identify-

37 The ideological field, which configurates the national identity of the national minorities from the Central and Eastern Europe, is defined by Rogers Brubaker (1996) as having three main sources: “the external mother country”, which assumes the cultural protection of the minority; the national majority ideologies of the national state in which that minority lives; the ideological elements formulated by the leading elite of the national minority community.

38 The ‘Resolution of the National Assembly from Alba Iulia, November 18/December 1, 1918’ In: România și minoritățile. Colecție de documente Tg. Mureș: Pro Europa 1997, 9.
ing ethno-nationalistic models too, rejecting the autonomist or federalist solutions.

Very soon, the Romanian Transylvanian leaders also adopted the same political direction. Such a long-term rupture was created in the society from Romania along the line, which was separating the Romanian majority from the minority communities. This reality turned obvious when the new constitution was approved in a form, which took the will of the national majority into account. The Constitution settled in 1923 had proclaimed Romania as a “unitary and indivisible national state”, and the idea of national unit became an ideological and political statement of the Romanian national identity. Analyzing the signification of this fundamental idea in the history of the Romanian state after 1918, Lucian Boia considers that the “myth of the unit … implanted so deeply in the Romanians’ conscience, that even the specialists, historians and sociologists tried to consider the regional structures of the studied phenomena in a plain way.”

In this context, the traditional arguments of the Romanians’ autochthonism, priorities and historical continuity on the territory of Transylvania were resumed with a special vigour getting a powerful anti-minority aspect suggesting the de-legitimacy of any alternative national aspiration. A very suggestive analysis of these arguments appears in the vision of a historian, C.C. Giurescu: “We belong to this place, yet all our neighbours arrived later to the country, which they belong to nowadays... we represent the oldest Christian nation in the South-East of Europe.... We represent … the only nation in this part of Europe, which was able to create its continuous political life from the foundation of the state to the present day”.

An important component of this reconstruction represented a new narrative of history by projecting the ideal of the national state onto the past. Consequently, Romania had become a kind of Hegelian existential category, which kept accomplishing and fulfilling as a unitary national state. All the actions and events were seen and re-interpreted according

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to this ideal.42 As Sorin Mitu notices, “the whole Romanian history is invested with this meaning, it is profoundly teleological, advancing in a scientific way towards the union of all the Romanian territories into a unique state.”43 Unlike during the previous periods of time, when the Romanian Transylvanian ideologists tried to prove the equality in rights of the Romanians with the other Transylvanian nations, the lawful argumentation gets on the second place, being replaced by the teleological and exclusivist concept of the Romanian national state’s ideals.

The disadvantages of the application of such a model were certainly many, and the effects on the internal political situation expressed a contradictory nature. While, on the one hand, it successfully contributed to the mobilization of the ethnic majority, the exclusive discourse of identification had driven, on the other hand, to the creation and permanent recreation of the image reflecting the “internal enemy” embodied in the existence of a minority, determining the perpetuation of the political instability and a constant crisis of identification.

In the new circumstances, of the minority status, the traditional ideologies and rhetorics of the Hungarians became mostly irrelevant. The new ethno-political situation demanded new spiritual reference points for the Hungarians from Romania, which were supposed to reply to some vitally essential requirements:

– to re-define the identity of the Hungarian community from Romania in the new circumstances
– to elaborate a program of self-organization to protect and perpetuate the national identity
– to settle the nature of the relationships between the community and the Romanian and Hungarian state, with the Hungarians generally speaking, with the Romanians, as well as with other national and ethnic communities from Romania.

This role was assumed at the beginning of the 20s by a group of Hungarian intellectuals from Transylvania, especially writers (the most outstanding ones were Kós Károly, Kuncz Aladár, Makkai Sándor, Reményik Sándor etc.), whose conceptions and ideas regarding the eth-

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43 Mitu, op. cit. 70.
nic co-existence in Transylvania became well-known as Transylvanism. Far from being constituted in a coherent and unitary ideative system, presenting great variations from an author to another and undergoing some transformations from an epoch to another, the Transylvanism had stated certain principles, which influenced the life of the Hungarian community from Transylvania very profoundly, whose more or less direct effects can be still noticed. In the elaboration of the proposed ideological alternative the Transylvanists approached a radical revaluation of the way in which the national identity was the most frequently topic so far. Instead of the vision, which regarded the awareness of the affiliation to a national community as a homogeneous, uniform and unidimensional block, the founders of Transylvanism proposed a nuanced approach, which was supposed to take both the complex internal structure and the gradual transformations of identity into account.

One of the merits of the Transylvanism was related to the fact they they had formulated an alternative of national co-existence besides another conception focused on “a single State, a single Nation.” The Transylvanism was providing the coinhabiting nations with a vision, which aimed to replace the classical nationalistic paradigm of cohabitation with a model based on the absolute assertion of the pluralism of identities. However, the fundamental difference between this and the Hungarian classical national vision consists in the fact that in the Transylvanist conception the answer to the Hungarians’ situation in Romania did not assume the return of Transylvania to the structure of the Hungarian states. The territorial demands could be abandoned, yet the state had to transform and adapt to the new requirements imposed by the existence of more national communities on its territory. This alternative ethno-political proposal formulated by the Transylvanian Hungarian ideologists was supposed to attenuate the polarization of society along the line, which was opposing the national majority to the national minorities, by providing guarantees to vanish the Romanians’ fear concerning the territorial integrity.

It is about an evident separation from the concept of Hungarian political nation in the second half of the 19th century and a revaluation of the concept of cultural nation, in fact a return to the initial matrix, which facilitated the formation of the Hungarian national ideology and identity. Yet the Transylvanist vision was emphasizing new elements compared to the traditional conception of the “Hungarian cultural nation”. Accord-
ing to the interpretation of the Transylvanist thinkers, the nation was no longer conceived as a perfectly homogeneous cultural entity, not even one which aspired – or tended – towards such homogeneousness. On the contrary, it was considered a common and natural situation in which a national culture – in our case the Hungarian one – was composed of regional cultures, bringing their contribution to enrich the national cultural patrimony.

Of course, the renunciation to the concept of political nation did not mean that the Transylvanists might have minimized the role and importance of the corresponding political frame for the development of the national culture. On the contrary, they considered that all the efforts had to be focused on the creation of some political structures which were meant to assure the same justifications for each national culture in a state. Without considering the limitation of the expression of national characteristics (ethnic, cultural and religious) in each separate community, the Transylvanist theoreticians suggested a new association of these particular identities in a larger form of mutual identity: the Transylvanian identity. From this perspective, the Transylvanian conception can be considered an attempt to reformulate the traditional nationalistic ethno-centric paradigm by replacing it with a vision of the “unity in diversity.”

A very important contribution in this sense is the study of Kós Károly, *Transylvania*. Considered by its author “a sketch of cultural history”, the book presents the history of Transylvania from ancient times to the present, demonstrating that the “spiritual force” of the Transylvanian land can “unite the voices of some different ethnic groups, which were often antagonistic, into a consonant melody.”

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“The three nations of Transylvania lived their lives separately: each of them had developed its own cultural and social facilities, all in combinations, without provoking incidental mixtures, in general without representing an obstacle in the development of the rest, yet getting in touch with each other, learning from each other, influencing each other.”

Following the guidelines concentrated on the settlement of an alternative vision concerning identity, in the context highlighting the search for solutions to the national problem, accepted both by the minority and majority groups, the Transylvanism had permanently re-asserted the idea of community between the Romanians and Hungarians, and the other nations of Transylvania, providing this idea with a new political signification. The mutual dependence among the national communities was also proved by the thinkers from Transylvania through the fact that the aspirations of the minority group could be satisfied only with the cooperation and agreement of the national majority. Starting from such ideative premises, the founders of Transylvanism not only affirmed the existence of a “Transylvanian specific context,” of a distinct regional identity, they also experienced the construction and improvement of some connections among the people of Transylvania.

Emphasizing the relative independence of the cultural sphere when related to the dynamics of the political elements, the writers of the Erdélyi Helikon magazine considered that the cultural connections can fulfill a catalytic role in the process of national reconciliation.

According to the theoreticians of Transylvanism, the long-term regulations of the inter-ethnic connections in Transylvania assumed the clear settlement of the criteria regarding the mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of cohabitation in the region. From this viewpoint, the main idea promoted by the Transylvanian ideologists is the one of co-legitimacy, the equal legitimacy for all the three national communities enjoying a historical territorial tradition in Transylvania (the Hungarian, Romanian and German). According to this conception, these three communities represent the equal possessors of the inalienable right to consider Transylvania their historical and present native land. This vision was mainly opposing to any nationalistic exclusivism through the assertion of an
equal justification of more nations to be related to the same territory seen as their mutual native land. From this perspective, the ideas stated by the thinkers from Transylvania, represent an alternative both to the position pointing to Transylvania as an exclusively Romanian area, and to the vision according to which the pure Hungarian character of the region appeared almost axiomatically.

It is exactly the attempt to offer such an alternative, which explains the organic connection in the Transylvanist thinking between regionalism and Europeanism. During a period of time, which was favouring neither the regional divisions nor the trans-national structures, in which the preferred and protected model was suggested by the nation-state, the Transylvanists were determined enough to display the minorities’ role and mission as a connection among nations in the construction of a new world, based on the acknowledgement and promotion of alterity, in all its aspects (ethnic, national, religious, regional etc.) The Transylvanist program for a “Europe of the regions”\textsuperscript{46} formulated in the clearest terms by Kuncz Aladár, emphasized the recovery of the real European unity, the creation of a “united spiritual Europe” by settling the cooperation on the “regionalisms allowed to express themselves freely”\textsuperscript{47}, by creating a favourable context promoting the assertion of the regional individuality and specificity. In the demonstration of this requirement, the historical model of the ethnic and religious co-habitation in Transylvania was presented as a model of tolerance and cultural pluralism, which should be also borrowed and followed by the population, which does not belong to the region.

Unfortunately, during the following decades, the initial hopes of the Transylvanists regarding the realization of an authentic national reconciliation developed to a very limited degree. The echo of the Transylvanist ideas, promoted by the Romanian Transylvanian elites, was generally weak, rather suggesting a lack of receptivity and a certain indifference, if not even rejection. Although in the context of the political leading elite of the Transylvanian Romanians there was a regionalist tendency, firstly represented through the activity of Romulus Boilă, this orientation – even if rather more generous, from the perspective of the political offer, for the minorities compared to the Constitution in 1923 – did not agree with

\textsuperscript{46} The concept is used by Pomogáts Béla in his article, Régiók Európája Korunk 3/1994, 8-14.

\textsuperscript{47} Kuncz Aladár: ‘Erdély az én hazám’ In: Erdélyi Helikon 1929, 487-492.
the idea concerning the co-legitimacy of the three Transylvanian nations, considering the Romanian supremacy of the region a political axiom.

The inherent ambiguity of the situation is also well illustrated by the activity of the famous historian, Nicolae Iorga, a very influential personality of the scientific, cultural and political life in the inter-war Romania. In the debate on the topic of the “Transylvanian spirit” initiated by a Saxon magazine *Siebenburgisch Deutsches Tageblatt* and continued by a Hungarian magazine, *Pásztorfüz*, Iorga recognized the existence of a specific Transylvanian tradition; at a certain moment, he even spoke about a “conscience of the political solidarity for the nationalities which live next to us (to the Romanians NA).” Yet he also pleaded for the realization of Romania’s “absolute spiritual unity.” Although in his writings he declared his positive opinion about the peaceful co-existence between the Romanians and Hungarians, in other cases he expressed his vision anchored in an ethno-centrism, which provided few possibilities for a conciliation and dialogue. Considering Transylvania and its history as being exclusively Romanian, Iorga actually refused the other nations even the lowest degree of cultural and historical legitimacy on this territory.

Even if presented in a form, which did not finally help in the assertion of the cultural and national pluralism, the regional idea had never obtained a dominant position in the Romanian political class from Transylvania, being supported only temporarily and especially by certain members of the older generation, who were regretting the loss of positions for the benefit of the political and administrative elite in the Old Kingdom. In exchange, younger ideologists (Nae Ionescu, Nichifor Crainic Emil Cioran etc.), who were more and more influential in the 30s, intellectually and politically socialized during the first years, which followed the territorial transformations, had formulated the aspiration towards a “pure Romanianism” deprived of any nostalgias and regional connotations. Their aspiration was the perfect integration in the Romanian society, by eras-

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50 Iorga is the author of the linguistic and ideological inovation according to which Moldova, Valahia and Transylvania were called as “Romanian countries” for the whole period of their historical existence. About the term’s signification in the Romanian historiography see Sorin Mitu, op. cit.
ing all the differences between the Romanians in the Kingdom and the Transylvanian Romanians. Identifying the essence of Romanianism with the Orthodoxism, these ideologists implicitly contested even the fact that the Romanians belonging to some non-Orthodox religions (such as the Greek-Catholic one) should be considered the authentic members of the Romanian nation. The social model imagined by these intellectuals was conceived on an ethnocratic basis, providing the Romanian population with socio-economic, political and cultural elements.

However, we must mention that, in spite of this general, profoundly unfavourable climate, in the higher spheres of the Romanian culture (especially the literary one) there were ideas and intentions, which favoured reconciliation with the Hungarians and the other minorities. In 1935, a writer, Ion Chinezu – who had unfortunately chosen the right wing – had appreciated the Transylvanian appeal regarding the collaboration among nationalities, although he was rather cautious about the Transylvanian idea itself. The Transylvanian poet, Emil Isac, had supported the efforts of Romanian-Hungarian cultural cooperation starting with the beginning of the 20s, expressing his agreement with the existence of a cultural plurality in Transylvania in an article published in a magazine edited in Bucharest, Ideea europeană. The strategies approached in the cultural legitimacy of the Romanian majority sometimes included the appeal to the humanist values which, by their nature, were aiming towards the national peculiarity. In this context we also mention the attempts of some outstanding thinkers (Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, Nicolae Iorga etc.) to separate from the ideas of the right-wing. The intentions of these authors to eliminate the nationalistic demagogy and the xenophobia from the ideological mechanism of the historical discourse of the national legitimacy and make the difference between the “real” and “non-real” nationalism present certain similitudes with the similar efforts of the Transylvanian writers.

51 Regarding this subject see Z. Ornea, Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească. Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 1995
54 C. Rădulescu-Motru, Românismul, catehismul unei noi spiritualități. Fundația Carol II, București, 1936, 77.
55 N. Iorga, Adevărul și neadevărul naționalism in Neamul Românesc, XXVIII, 201 (20. IX.1933), 1.
Moreover, in the given circumstances, the Romanian culture could not detach and separate too much from the official political formulas of the national legitimacy. This situation was also reflected by the fact that the initiatives – which were otherwise praiseworthy – in the Romanian-Hungarian collaboration in the domain of literature and culture generally speaking (the publication of some mutual magazines, the foundation of some mutual literary society etc.) were relatively settled for a short period of time. The incapacity of the state to integrate the minority communities, the assimilating pressures exerted upon the minority groups and the limitation of their rights, subsequently produced a more and more accentuated estrangement of the persons provided with a national non-Romanian identity compared to the political power and their quality as a citizen, especially at the level of emotional connections.

Conclusions

The whole evolution of Transylvania was characterized by the interaction and the permanently transforming connection among the demographic, economic, political and spiritual forces of three important ethnic communities – Romanians, Hungarians, Germans –, who had considered this land as their own, being related to it by means of profound emotional ties. The multicultural character of the region was partially reflected and acknowledged by the medieval political system of the region. From this point of view, the Principality’s Epoch – the period of the autonomous Transylvanian state – offers the best perspective to evaluate the way in which the community’s rights and privileges were institutionalized in a tight connection with the ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity.

Given all the favourable premises for the development of a multicultural model of national coexistence, at the beginnings of modernity, due to the action of more complex economic, political and socio-cultural factors, the region became the confrontation area and the main stake of the national movements and identities, of some parallel rhetorics of identification, which entered a number of competitions and even conflicts. Thus it is not surprising that the “possession” of the region, and implicitly its inclusion in the context of its own national state, had become a fundamental aspiration of both nations, while the loss of the territory (or
of more segments of territory) by one of the parts to favour the other one was felt as a shock, an almost irremediable strike.

In such a circumstance, which did not favour the ethnic co-existence at all, the minorities were not only marginalized, they often became the target of some nationalistic attacks. The main cause of these evolutions must be probably examined by the governing factors in the promotion of some ideological conceptions and strategies based on the assertion of the exclusive historical and territorial rights of the ethnic majority, which drove to the construction of an ethnocentric discourse of identification and the more frequent usage of the anti-minority rhetorics.

From this point of view, a long-term change might assume the gradual transformation not only of the two nations’ self-images but also of the image of the “Other,” involving the transformation of the traditional relationship between the present and the past, when history seemed to dominate (certainly at the ideologically illusive level) the people’s way of thinking and action.
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Identity as a Phenomenological Issue

In modernity\(^1\), self-interpretation and questions such as “where do I come from” and “who am I” are inevitably intertwined. The modern human being uses these questions to understand himself and to get on the paths of self-interpretation. The mixture of these questions leads us to identity which remains identical regardless of the changes that surround the identity. Therefore, constancy, detachment, and separation from others, as well as a sort of self-centeredness are the characteristics of the identity that was acquired this way. Identity indeed must be a performance; to be more precise, it must grow firm, because affirmation that comes from the Latin \textit{affirmare} assumes this very firming act. Thus, it seems necessary to affirm identity in a constant manner so as identity should remain the same in its dynamic environment. Accordingly, identity always implies some sort of power, that is, if properly endowed with power, it shall resist to any attempts of contestation that come through various mechanisms. At the same time, this is where the strain of fragility of identity and its constant exposure to various impulses originate – suffice it to recall the old notion of mergence which attests similarity with the other and the others, accompanied by losing the old identity and acquiring the new identity.\(^2\) Assimilation means the identity’s exposure to external risks.

Yet, if we put an end to interpretation at this point, we risk what was impending over modern self-interpretation all the way: compensat-

\(^1\) I avoid approaching premodern identity, but I should at least indicate: C. Müller and F. Prost, eds., \textit{Identités et cultures dans le monde méditerranéen antique}, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002. Indeed, one could argue that identity is a modern phenomenon, see e.g. A. de Benoist, \textit{Le droit à la différence est imprescriptible et L’identité ne doit pas être un ghetto}, \textit{Elements}, 2004, 113.

ing self-identity with the identity of things unfurling in time. Indeed, the latter one can be interpreted solely in the light of the substantial identity of things, i.e. as a perspective enforced externally which inevitably objectifies identity. The various models of identity that emerged as guidelines in the 20th century (such as: Paul Ricoeur’s narrative identity or the Martin Heidegger’s selfhood) challenged this very moment, because they bore in mind a notion of identity which acquired meaning not from an external perspective, but brought to the fore the selfhood’s self-relating. Here, self-relating is a dimension of identity that cannot be disengaged. And this fact does not allow for the substantial identity of the thing to be compensated with the selfhood’s identity.

It transpires from this configuration that there is an existence of the selfhood that is not fixed as same-hood. We could indeed possess self-hood, albeit we do not remain the same, particularly because social life constantly changes us. And thus, we have already made the first step of our argument which essentially intends to trace the contour of identity desubstantialized. Here we naturally assume the results of modern thinking that deconstructed the explication of human behavior based on intrinsic substances (class, race, genus, nation, etc.). All identities and all identification make reference to something else, to the Other or to the Others. We could say that we are speaking of an immanent *exteriority*. In the past few decades, several essays were dedicated to identity politics, but we think there are certain analogies, at least *mutatis mutandis*, between the individual and collective forms of identity. In other words, the existential tensions that broke surface in individuality also concerned, to a certain extent, the forms of collective subjectivity.

* Based on Freud, we distinguish identity from *identification*. And thus we urge the *denaturalization* of every identity, that is, we suggest that identity is not given, but shaped through certain socially mediated processes. For instance, feminist epistemology, in claiming that male and female corporality are not given but acquire their shapes through various processes, points to this very fact. Evidently, identity is not a substance which drives our modes of action. When we consider that sexuality cannot be construed without certain performative acts that execute certain

Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle
events in all cases, we actually question the notion of naturalized identity. Identification as coming to existence always assumes the shaking of identity as a stable formation. Identity configuration concentrates the complex processes of identification, it is never fully stabilized, therefore it always requires reproduction all over again.

Placing our thinking in the above context disperses the organicistic approach to identity which intends to discover identity as some natural expression of a solid ground or as the manifestation of the substance, while assuming that the substance is always present in the world \textit{latently}. Organicistic ideologies which indeed intend to naturalize, identity is assimilated with the immovable substance which is an inherent part of our world. Moreover, organicistic ideologies suggest that there is a substance which is unconditionally accessible to representatives of the identity model, thanks to which identity could be postulated in a prescriptive manner, as an intergenerational substance. Additionally, the same ideological orientation, while making reference to the past, suggests that: a) the past which dominates the present is not fictitious, i.e. it can be grasped positively in a certain past moment of time, meaning that it possessed presence in the temporal sense,\footnote{“A past which has never been present”. This frequent expression (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, Lévinas) negates the organicistic ideology. Indeed, according to organicism, only that past exists which can become present. In other words: organicistic ideologies mean the terror of the presence.} b) the same past still exists in the sense of becoming present, requiring only some efforts to this end. The form of identity that possesses presence did not disappear; on the contrary, it nurtures identity as an inexhaustible supply.

Organicistic ideologies are \textit{stratagems of presence}, regardless of the place in time they assign to presence. At the same time, consistently sticking to the sketched denaturalization implies bearing in mind the socially dependent forms of identification. References to identification lead us to the framework of a \textit{process-like} ontology. Indeed, if we focus on identification, we keep in view the processes that generate identity. Identity is not interpreted by making reference to the basic issues of classical ontology (“what?”, “what is this?”), but we open the way also to the matter of “how”. Identifications should be represented in the light of certain modalities. This also implies that we shall not settle for “who I am”, we
are not defining “who we are”, but enter the spaces of coming into being, asking: “who is the one that is created through identification”?

However, I would like to make it clear that it should not be inferred from designations regarding the reproduction and establishment of identity that identities take shape in an arbitrary manner, thanks to the acts of voluntarism. When we speak of identification, we do not speak of the products of an unconditional productivity of will. Absolutization of discursive activities and linguicism seen in certain theoretical approaches indeed confirm the idea that subjects have the power to create phenomena such as the identity. As if the existing forms of identity were created by some governmental bureaucracy or active body, aided by divine normativity, while the acts of designation and production were fully congruent! This absolutization corresponds, to some extent, to the control models of Neoliberal capitalism, according to which identity could be subordinated to decisions made preferentially, where identities could be changed in parallel with the dynamics of consumption patterns. Accordingly, identity would be nothing more than a product of the demonstration of consumption!

In each case, hypostasized nominalism, this absolutization of “human production” would be unbearable. Indeed, while identifications shape identities through regulative norms, we should not disregard that identifications too are part of historically determined processes and rely on certain “materialities”, such as the “materiality” of the body in case of gender structures or ethnical cohesions in case of national identity.

To put it plainly, pointing to identification hasn’t resolved all of our issues. Indeed, there is a tension between identity and identification. It is entailed by the intersubjective dimensions referring to endeavors of identity that the given institutions determine the attributes of identity

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Identity as a phenomenological Issue

and define the characteristics of belonging. This includes the exercise of designation and the practice which analytical philosophy labels as standard descriptions. Only in this manner identities become part of a given order. Identification here is simplified to registering identity, as institutions identify what could be described and are able to excise certain identities. Processes of identification in the order are always surrounded by silence, because only the effect, i.e. the form of identity breaks surface. This configuration explicates the fact that in certain philosophical interpretations, recognition (in the sense attributed by Fichte and Hegel) is connected with certain measures of the government. Standard issues raised at this point, such as “how should the separated identity be communicated?”, “how identity should be manifested in the intersubjective space”, could be resolved using the forms of identity interpreted normatively.

Identities, as we see, are not created in some social vacuum, but form part of the regulative practices which generate normalization effects. Thus, identity shaping is never a neutral process, but this shaping is always part of a non-neutral policy. As we know from appropriate literature, identity creation, subjectivization of the selfhood are embedded in the normalization processes; this entails that even in the order which assumes liberty axiomatically, the individual must accept certain established hegemonic norms. One could hardly understand the processes of de-identification or counter-identification without these elements. Several mottos bore the notes of these processes in the past period: “being beyond identity” – this term reflects the critical-corrective position which was phrased against established forms of identity. Resistance to the bondages of identity (philosopheme seen in Adorno’s work too) is expressed by feminist writers as well, who are often and unjustly accused of praising identity.

Each identity bears the mark of individuality, regardless of whether it is a collective or individual identity. But this rejection of holistic identity cannot overlook that the fact that the anchoring of identities in intersubjective structures causes forms of identity never to be fully and completely “individual”. While we are using anthropological resources such as the language, even the individual presents some sort of excess compared to the personal perspective. Together with the French philosopher Simondon, we could say that these are the trans-individual dimen-
sions of identity which by no means implies the elimination of the individual level.\(^6\) And this means that identities, in spite of having signs of unrepeatability, do not vanish in the swirls of singularity. Indeed, it is this very excess – this trans-individual moment – that prevents this vanishing to take place.

Furthermore, it is necessary to relativize the self-centeredness of identity. I.e. indeed we could speak of the decentralization of identity. Pure identity as compensation related to ourselves is indeed an ideological product. Each identity is exposed to the action of non-identity, i.e. each separated form of identity bears the signs and marks of other identities. No culture is able to cleanse itself of the signs and meanings of other cultures. And this does not mean an undifferentiated community, but the existence of dissociation which is always only relative.

And again, it is desirable to discuss the psychoanalytical approach, because it is not worth thinking about identity under this level. Identity construed psychoanalytically is a sort of a minimum starting point for us which, of course, requires some refinement. Thus, identification could be described either as a movement from the internal sphere to the external sphere (the issue of narcissism in Freud’s work) or as a dynamics which unifies the contrary direction (Lacan and the mirror stage). If we stay with the latter one (transcending the sphere of subjective immanence), a perspective opens up for a tension between the intersubjective and intrasubjective moments. Indeed, we are thereby enouncing the impossibility of identification without others. And this process cannot be illustrated in a pacified manner whereby identity is acquired through dialog or the assimilation of tradition. Identity is attained through breakpoints: the Other is a source indispensable for the existence of the Self, and at the same time, a hindrance in fully acquiring self-identity.

The ambivalence of the Other encumbers the forms of identity with contradictions. One cannot soften the contradictions of identity by internalization, such as some dialectical action which could dissolve contradictions through a higher level of synthesis. In other words, identity shall always bear the marks of the Other, i.e. the external signs, but there is no possibility for us to tame the Other in order to compensate our selfhood with itself. There is no coincidence between “myself” and “our-

selves”, i.e. between “our identity”, regardless of the form identity appears in (such as the name). We shall always carry some sort of non-identity.

However, the self-born non-coincidence does not unbar the way for an easy goodbye to identity. The Other appears as an obstacle warning about the inaccessibility of self-transparency and the impossibility of complete self-identification. We could thank the psychoanalytical tradition for stating that nobody is the master of its own identity. And the path traced this way differs from modern self-interpretation which claims that the subject’s liberty is realized through the affirmation of the subject’s self-identity as a basis. Indeed, when we are expecting a solid ground, a stable core and pure proprium, we shall find a lack of possession.

*Therefore, a constitutive impossibility and the impossibility of transparency is what describes the constant vibration of identity.* Without others, “my” and “our” identity would exist without cleavages, i.e. if alterity weren’t intertwined, “we” would be unitary and could enjoy the fullness of “existence”. And this fact is very important in understanding individual and collective identity, because both must be placed in the context of lack of possession and dispossession. Representatives of the strong collective identity assume identity as a bond and link between similar people, but our description suggests a form of identity which binds and unbinds, concentrates and disconnects at the same time. Unity acclaimed by modernity is nothing else but cleavage. Identity always cracked, it is a synthesis sustained by the cleavage. Instead of having a notion of identity which outlines a consistent unit as the product of non-conflicting concentration, we find ourselves in the space of staccato identity which includes a constitutive deficiency.

However, we must provide some explanations in order to avoid misunderstanding. All this does not imply the negation of the importance of identity, nor is it my intention to rate identity as being insignificant. This easy discarding of identity would actually avoid the essence of the issue, namely the ontological *non-conformity* which appears as the heart of the matter. Thus, I am actually speaking of the infinite difficulties of liberation from identity. Indeed, we said that identity was not a possession, which resulted from our considering that serious obstacles could arise with regard to the complete, whole and stabilized identity; yet, this does not imply that identification does not create forms of attachment.
Therefore, we are speaking of identity as of something that belongs to us but cannot be acquired: something that shall always mean a break between “myself”, “ourselves”, “my” and “our” identity. Some sort of dissociation is inscribed in us/me. Dissociation shall always reside deep down in association, both in the intersubjective and the intrasubjective spheres. This is the visible metapsychological fact which characterizes human existence.

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The politics of identity was guided by the historical forms of identity. It considered these to be the basis of difference, therefore it urged the forms of identity as the locus of difference. This politics carries a rebellion against universalism and the explicit or implicit bonds of assimilation. And this politics criticized universalist philosophy for maintaining the element of particularity in urging universality, in spite of enticing with the fact that universality would represent and express undifferentiated human existence which we all share. Universalism was projected as a sort of an empty space which nobody could fill. But it is a proton pseudos of modern universalism that it imagines non-residual universality according to which universalism could be cleansed of the residues of particularity. Assimilation philosophies acclaimed the universal arche. Didn’t Hegel himself, the par excellence representative of universalism, say that the general only resulted from the dissolution of the particular… in spite of accepting that there was no generality without particularity? Didn’t he demonstrate the termination of the particular saying that it was nothing more than generality mediated? And the known forms of universalism concealed their own particularities, abiding in fact by the generalization of particular contexts, while claiming that they transcended particularity.

Accordingly, the politics of identity, in the name of differences oppressed, claimed that the great discourses of western universalism (Christianity, rationalism, the nation-state) proved to be the breeding ground of assimilation processes. This politics did not settle for just protecting the forms of identity unfurled in the private spheres, as classical liberalism did with multidimensional forms of identity, but plumped for the forms of identity emerging in the public spheres. Hence the interest
for transformative politics which modifies the dimensions and aspects of visibility. Indeed, the politics of identity intended to create a topology which allows every difference to expose itself to others, particularly for the purpose of recognition. All this invokes a rusty notion, namely the principle of equality in the sense that difference becomes a right, an intrinsic value. Same-hood is a right which assumes the right to difference. In other words: the existence of same-hood resides in that we recognize the right of others to remain identical, because they are different.\(^7\) This is the basis of pluralism which scrutinizes the neutralization of identity in law or market ideologization.

However, thus the politics of identity exposed itself to accusations of having become an advocate for particularity, and undermining universalistic standards. This politics, they say, measures everything based on its own absolutized standards, hence it was indicted for bringing the determination of origin to the fore. I.e. it got caught up in the vortex of particularity which used to sanction class identities too. This politics strives to save the differences, but exhausts itself in the excessive praises of the status quo. Thinking stops before the cultural determinations. The union of politics and culture, as claimed by these accusations, brings back essentialism and inherent essences, but this time in the perspective of rigid culture.

However, we believe we miss the point if we discuss “culture” as an identity-creating system of references in the abstract manner. Indeed, differentiation itself, the difference between politics and culture means a political question from start: a situation which assumes the functional power. This difference is never \textit{neutral}. “Culture” is a \textit{polemical} notion to begin with, and the joints of its definitions are always penetrated by power effects.\(^8\)

If culture assumes the structuring of everyday experiences, the pertaining polemics will always be related to the division of forms of


identity. Culture is not based on some anthropological constants. And indeed one should follow the modern genealogy of the notion culture, which, as demonstrated by Foucault, is related to the ripples of the meaning of Man. Culture as a framework of socialization and mechanism of internalization is related to the division of politics and culture. If we said that identity contained trans-individual dimensions, shouldn’t we say that culture, besides ensuring the circle of meanings and designation of things, also signifies a stage where new subjects and objects, new perceptions, new relations between words and bodies emerge?

The issue with culture as the vessel of identity is that it encompasses ontological dimensions which do not enable us to create any contrasts between politics and culture too quickly. We could say that the phenomenon of culture contains, besides the anthropological dimensions, also an ontological excess. And that culture is not just an epiphenomenon; it immediately shows: “if multiculturalism stands for more than a purely socio-economic problem, then this is due not to a lack of order or orientation, but to an excess. Every culture... has transcendent values: something that cannot be reduced to the immanence of the cultural context... These values, which do not precede the culture and even less arise from it, are somewhere accommodated in it... like a symphony is nowhere else than in its performance... or like the dignity of a person lies in his/her proper name... the words... are not the house in which the transcendent finds a temporary accommodation, nor the incarnating envelope that is simply wrapped around the incarnatum... They are neither sign nor expression nor supplement: they sign-ify, in-form, im-press themselves, or as Derrida would say, they produce that which one would be mistaken to think they only serve to supplement.”

Criticisms of culture as determining medium are justified if we assume that somebody/something is fully embedded in the given culture. But we have not been speaking of such a thing. The ontological tension related to culture originates in that the fragility of identity depends on the “insane” games of words, the signs seared in us, the black letters, and

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9 C. Helliwell, B. Hindess, ‘Culture’, ‘Society’ and the Figure of Man, History of the Human Sciences, 1999, No. 4,


Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle
the meaningless chains of signs which still identify us and make us recognizable in the given order. As we know, *persona* (person) used to mean a mask which could not be attached to the slave. In our culture, identities are masks which assigned our social roles, a status of identity in the division of labor, in the regime of recognition – and it is this very mask that makes us fragile and vulnerable. No socially mediated identity coincides with the person, i.e. there is always a difference between the identity and the person. But this difference does not imply the lack of convergence between our personality and our identity. Otherwise an unbearable break would occur between the *intersubjective* (identity) and *intrasubjective* (person) dimensions.
Notes on the Margin of the Idea of Romanian Philosophy

Findings on the relative lagging of Romanian culture as a whole behind the level of development reached by more advanced Western nations, but also on the lack of philosophy within our spirituality are common. We shall not hasten to list too many examples; let us just dwell on a few rather significant ones. One of them is that of Nicolaie Bagdasar, historian of Romanian philosophy. “The historical circumstances of the Romanian people’s development – he said – were not too favorable for cultural development generally, as well as they weren’t so for the progress of philosophy either.”

The other one is provided by Lucian Blaga. In an observation made in 1943, he confirmed again this negative impression on the state of Romanian philosophy: “Until the first great war, Romanian thinking, save for few thinkers, found itself in a phase of exploration, preparation, and training. Everything was rather like an educational prologue. Sensitivity had just sprouted. Tools needed to be tilted. Under such circumstances, Romanian thinkers declared themselves to be very content with the sheer possibility of being able to read or acquire for unpretentious publicistic purposes one or another great foreign author. One should not wonder that some intellectuals had genuine bursts of joy when they managed to make some personal comments on the margin of Western thinking.”

Indeed, we should note that one of the most important Romanian thinkers, Mircea Florian, a sharp and insightful mind shaped by Kantian criticism, instantly drew attention to the contradictions implied by the term Romanian philosophy. The term Romanian philosophy encompasses two elements that otherwise should exclude each other: the universal – the

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1 N. Bagdasar: Scrieri (Writings), Eminescu, Bucharest, 1988, p. 3.
philosophical one – and the particular – the national one –, which is the Romanian element in our case. This theme recurs several times in Mircea Florian’s work. Let us dwell, for now, on his essay of 1933, “Filosofie și naționalitate” (Philosophy and Nationality), comprised later also in the volume “Reconstrucție filosofică” (Philosophical Reconstruction) of 1943. Alas, what he wrote there: “At a first sight, a thinking with national or even racial marks appears: 1) either as a tautology, as a sort of a verbal axiom that could dispense with proof, for any philosophy is either national and therefore valuable, honorable, a cause of pride for a nation, or it thinks it transcends the nation and in that case it does not deserve the name philosophy, even if we assumed that every truth in the world accrued in it; 2) or as an absurdity, because philosophy is either supranational which only means its being cosmopolitan – or, if it seeks to be national, it does not serve neither philosophy, nor the nation, but compromises both of them, because, due to the universal truth it allegedly embraces or pursues, philosophy is everybody’s friend, appeals to any unadmonished and clear conscience, therefore it is valuable regardless of places, times and nations.” We believe this long quote to be sufficiently edifying for our purposes.

1. Lack of serious philosophical pursuits in the premodern and modern Romanian culture

As demonstrated by facts, we did not have philosophy in our medieval and premodern culture. The few scattered expressions we may find are far from being able to make up a Romanian national philosophy. The term philosophy had entered Romanian culture before philosophy appeared as an independent activity. This happened no earlier than the second half of the 19th century, with Titu Maiorescu, considered to be the true father of Romanian philosophy. The term philosophy in the Romanian language emerged as early as the 17th century. As the afore-mentioned Mircea Florian noted, in Romanian culture “[...] the word philosopher trickled in [...] at the middle of the 17th century [...] when a code of laws, the nomocanons were rendered


Partiumi Egyetemi Szemle
from Slavonic, during the time of the blessed voivodes Vasile Lupu and Matei Basarab.”

This age and origin of the word, essentially medieval, in Romanian culture is such as to clarify also the ambiguous meaning the words philosophy and philosopher circulate with. “The philosopher – Mircea Florian notes – was seen as an astrologist or a star-monger, alien from reality and slightly lunatic, a sort of a wizard sold to the devil, an alchemist seeking to discover the mysteries of nature with the purpose of transforming, with the use of the »philosophers’ stone«, base metals into the noble and precious gold.”

Apart from the erroneous usage of the word philosophy, it failed to actually play a major cultural role. Not only a Romanian cultural tradition was lacking in this regard, but we could not find the conditions that would have necessitated the existence of philosophy either. C. Râdulescu Motru stated with good reason that “[...] philosophy in the modern sense, as an accord of dogmatic belief and scientific truth, of contrary trends emerged from the intellectual activity of the modern man, was nowhere in Romanian tradition. Our past never faced acute conflicts of religious beliefs or social and political ideas that could have required the intervention of a philosopher.”

2. Compensating for the lack of Romanian philosophy by the optimistic conviction that Romanian people have a genuine philosophical vocation

We should take note of a fact that seems very interesting. Stating the absence of philosophy in Romanian cultural pursuits, far from acting as a reason for panic, is associated with an optimistic and encouraging feeling towards a bright future of Romanian philosophy. We do not have philosophy yet, but we could have one in the future, on the grounds that the broad spectrum of all sorts of vocations that comprise the native heritage of the Romanian people also includes the philosophical calling. Besides, the issue of the so blessedly endowed national vocation, associated with the notion of a lack of chance that burdened the history of Romanians, became com-

5 Ibid.
monplaces in Romanian cultural rhetoric. Garabet Ibrăileanu stated somewhat sadly in 1909 that “the Romanian people, so abundantly gifted, never had the luck and honor to contribute to the shaping of European civilization. Romanians who created nothing borrowed almost everything.” The establishment of the Romanian School of Sfânta Sava by Gheorghe Lazăr in 1818 opened also a whole new horizon of possibilities for movement and for Romanian philosophy. Results showed quickly afterwards. In 1944, after almost one century of philosophical development, in a text called *Rohul educativ al filosofiei (The Educational Role of Philosophy)*, C. Rădulescu Motru, alias the Nestor of Romanian philosophy, stated a heart-warming fact: “Our philosophical movement comprises almost every direction seen in contemporary philosophy: the scientific, the personalist, the nationalist, the empiricist, the positivist, the critical, the metaphysical, the phenomenological, the mystical, etc., according to the personal preferences of the young Romanians who studied in universities abroad.” The certainty acquired after the cultural developments taken place during the entire 19th century was verbalized by Vasile Gherasim in 1927, in a conference of the “Association of Romanian Secondary Professors”, when asking rather rhetorically as lecturer at this conference: “Are our people capable of their very own original philosophy that, together with the cogitation systems of other nations, should be able to form the entirety of the profound human thinking?” And he goes on: “My answer to this question is definite: yes. We too are capable of profound cogitation, we too are capable of creation; – but one thing we should not forget; nothing is valuable unless penetrated by the sap that pulsates in the body of our people.”

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8 Ibid., p. 67.
3. What is actually Romanian philosophy?

Nonetheless, the question arises instantly: what in this mixture of foreign influences presented by C. Rădulescu Motru in his report of 1944 could indeed constitute Romanian philosophy? The answer to this question requires consulting the pioneering thinkers about what they thought Romanian philosophy should be. Our approach is an indirect one, by first stating what Romanian philosophy is not and should not be. First of all, a philosophy does not acquire the attribute Romanian for simply being written in Romanian. This aspect itself is insufficient; it is a condition at best.

As a matter of fact, Titu Maiorescu endeavored at that time to temper the heaves of national enthusiasm that emerged during the 1848 revolution in Romanian culture. His motto was “impersonal rise”, and protested against the abusive utilization of the word national as a guarantee of value. An artwork, especially a literary one, but also any other similar spiritual creation, does not enhance its value in any way whatsoever by simply being Romanian. The principle endorsed by Maiorescu was the assertion of nationality within the limits of truth. “Even patriotism – T. Maiorescu wrote –, which is the most important sentiment for a citizen in his civil actions, has no place in art as ad-hoc patriotism, because any real remembrance of practical interest annihilates the aesthetic emotion.”

Secondly, Romanian philosophy is also not a fabric of abstract ideas that are presented in our universities by so-called university professors from their high chairs, enrapturing themselves and most of their students with nothing. Such ideas borrowed from everywhere cannot constitute, in lack of national grounds, the essence of a Romanian philosophy. No, neither could this constitute a genuinely Romanian philosophy. Titu Maiorescu was correct in understanding this fact when he rebuked Ion Petrovici, his disciple who brought him his recently published book Probleme de logică (Logic Exercises), that a work with such a topic was premature in Romanian culture. On this occasion, Titu Maiorescu told him: “This is all great, but there is one thing: isn’t such a work premature for us? Are you certain that our cultural evolution reached the stage of such writings?” Then, after a break, he went on: “See Rădulescu-Motru’s case. He is prolific and has good things. But it

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seems to me that, for the reason I mentioned, his writings are gliding along over the waters.”

If Romanian philosophy is none of the above, then what is she? But let us allow the answer to be provided by those who actually participated in this debate, at that time. The insightfulness and gravity of their response impress even today. A Romanian philosophy does not mean the promotion of borrowings from universal thinking, but an original Romanian philosophy that was essentially bred and nurtured on the soil of Romanian material and spiritual realities. Therefore, in order to be able to speak of a Romanian national philosophy, one should first secure its independence from foreign influences from outside. A major role in this battle was played by Titu Maiorescu, and for this very reason, he can be seen as the true father of Romanian thinking. C. Rădulescu Motru noted about his former professor: “and if this Romanian philosophy ever poured itself into the history of universal culture, then the name Titu Maiorescu would mark an era. He is the beginning of Romanian philosophical awakening from under the influences of German, French, or English cultures.” Titu Maiorescu opened the way to the originality of Romanian philosophy, which granted her the possibility of a future.

His disciple, C. Rădulescu Motru, who erected the first philosophical system in Romanian culture, endeavored to define what exactly could constitute Romanian philosophy: “[...] the systematic argumentation by which a conscience shaped in the Romanian national setting manages to genuinely reconcile the proven scientific truths with the mystical beliefs of its own experience, i.e. it is the reflection on the ascertained scientific facts, brought to the level of thinking organically united with the self-conscience of man formed by the Romanian environment.” Philosophy is meant to identify how conflicts of conscience could be eased; the graver these cultural or social-political conflicts, the more acute the need for having a philosophy. Mircea Vulcănescu, this genuine martyr of Romanian thinking, once set even clearer conditions for Romanian philosophy, establishing three elements: “a) the existence of an authentic and original philosophizing activity among

13 C. Rădulescu Motru: op. cit. p. 58.
Romanians, driven by Romanian motifs; b) the existence of a setting where philosophical ideas could be promoted in Romanian, verbally or in writing, in magazines, books, courses and conferences, and c) the existence of Romanian problematization and philosophical systems. The common trait that bridged several decades from Rădulescu Motru and Mircea Vulcănescu was the notion of Romanian philosophy as thinking nurtured by a particular Romanian problematization. Similarly to the more developed Western cultures, Romanian philosophy must act as the supreme spiritual authority, a true tribunal of the spirit which judges all the divergences present in society.

How it is possible to have a “particular Romanian problematization” and more importantly, “Romanian philosophical systems” that could be born out of it, is of course another matter, not at all uncomplicated, reason why it is beyond the pursuits of this essay. On a final note, we believe that the considerations elaborated herein should bear in mind Titu Maiorescu’s idea: “Philosophy does not drift somewhere with the horizon; she is intimately connected with any spiritual activity.” Or, even if it does drift over the air, it floats over a national problematization, in the very cultural and social-political atmosphere of a nation.

Our starting point was the historically established remark that philosophy was missing in Walachia in the 16th, 17th and 18th century; her existence became possible in the 19th century and materialized in the 20th. Now, in the 21st century, she is present as a necessity of Romanian life, at least in the sense envisaged long ago by those who had contributed to her birth. Indeed, there is a need for Romanian philosophy that would reflect on Romanian reality, detecting its conflicts and convulsions, in order to explain and understand them, and offer theorems, concepts, solutions and generalizations to its problems.

Translated by Annamária Ámik

The problem of identity in the art world is relevant in many aspects. This paper aims at discussing the identity of the work of art. Discussion is built on three steps: the issue of identifying an object as a work of art, the issue of the relevant properties of a work of art, and the issue of the author of the work of art as being decisive or not for the identification of artwork. These issues are raised by the evolution of art practice and art theory in the last century. The appearance of the “readymade” destabilized the strong identity of art work, and now we have to decide what the difference is between an artwork and its perceptually identical pair. Perceptual features that were traditionally relevant have lost their importance in conceptual art, therefore we have to decide what are relevant properties that belong to a work of art even today. Finally, the practice of acquirement in postmodern art poses a challenge to concepts created about the artist and about the meaning of genuine creation.

Art works are seen as special objects\(^1\) that instantly evoke the signs of genuineness and uniqueness. Thus, determining the identity of a work of art (“what is this?”) is a two-phase process: first, the object is identified as a work of art (generic thesis), then the object is identified as being unique (specific thesis).

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\(^1\) The subject was presented at the international symposium *Questions of Identity*, organized in Cres by the Horváth Society of Philosophy between 19–22 September 2010 (within the “19th Days of Franč Petrić”), under the title *Whose Shoes? Identity in Works of Art*.
1. Generic thesis: “This is a work of art”

In order to identify an object as a work of art, the most feasible endeavor is to start with a definition of art or a theory of art that traces the boundaries of art world, and to use it for deciding whether or not the concerned object is part of this area. The generic aspect of an art work’s identity can be defined if we know what the art – whose field the “work” is generated and created in – is.

The late appearance of the concept of “art” signals the difficulty of finding an answer to what art is. The concept used by the Greeks – techne (Latin: ars) – conveyed an element that had an impact on the subsequent history of the concept of art. Techné meant knowledge based on rules, professional knowledge, thus it covered every trade having its own rules that could be learned. Therefore, the Greek-Roman world, the Middle Ages and early modernity considered art to be an activity that could be regulated by rational principles.

As techné is a very broad term which covers a large part of knowledge, starting from mechanical trades to rhetoric, Greeks defined the field that was later known as (fine) arts as imitative, mimetic art. This thought determined ideas about art and artistic practice until the 19th century.

As Tatarkiewicz’s analysis convincingly demonstrates, classifying various arts under the same concept was not a facile task. In the medieval system of knowledge, painting, sculpture, architecture were classified as mechanical or vulgar arts, while music pertained to liberal arts. Poetry was not reported to be an art at all – due to the fact that Plato’s dialogue Ion was known in the Middle Ages, while Aristotle’s Poetics was not. It transpires from Plato’s dialogue that poetry was not a matter of professional knowledge, but a matter of inspiration, therefore poetry could by no means be considered to be art. Plato’s authority could only be compen-

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2 In this writing, my major preoccupation is visual arts; as there are quite big differences between fields of art, the differentiated handling of the issue by branches of art would have exceeded the scope of this writing.


4 The first humanist translation of Aristotle’s Poetics was made by Giorgo Valla in 1498. The indicative Latin translation for humanism is Alessandro de’ Pazzi’s work from 1536 and the Italian translation signed by Segni from 1549.
sated by Aristotle’s authority; therefore, based on the Poetics – which was interpreted normatively – it was possible to include poetry among arts. These theoretical limits had to be challenged in order to allow the formulation of a comprehensive concept of art which could place the utterly different activities (poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, dance, theater) in the same field.

This theoretical accomplishment is seen in Charles Batteux’s writing published in 1746 with the title Les Beaux-Arts réduits à un même principe. The very title of the text reflects these unification endeavors. It transpires from this writing that the unifying elements of arts are the shared purpose (pleasure), their essential feature (imitation) and their topic (the beautiful nature). One can see that mimicry continues to be a general feature in the definition of arts. However, there is a novelty element in recognizing that arts essentially contain the axiological category of beauty: we no longer speak of purely mimetic arts, but fine arts (and Batteux uses this term equally to indicate painting, sculpture, poetry, music and dance).

The art definition that was born with such great difficulties proved to be insufficient one and a half century later. Romantics returned to the very element that for centuries was considered to be incompatible with techne: muse, inspiration, ingenuity. The emphasis shifts towards the process of creation; fine arts – using Kant’s term – are the art of the genius. In this new perspective, the most faithful imitation of nature is no longer a goal for the genial artist whose creative process takes place under the aegis of originality. Considerations of art philosophy and art practice both considered the mimesis theory to be obsolete, and urged for alternative art theories. This is how the late 19th century and early 20th century witnessed the appearance of quite popular definitions according to which art was expression (Leo Tolstoy, Benedetto Croce), and a significant form (Clive Bell). Thus, by the 20th century, art theory ramified into proposals which were incompatible. Perhaps Clive Bell’s definition had the best chances to be applied universally. However, several researchers warned that his definition of art was circular: the significant form inspires emotion; however, aesthetical emotion is an affective reaction that arises

from meeting the significant form. Yet, even Clive Bell’s definition was insufficiently universal to be able to encompass things such as Marcel Duchamp’s *Fountain* or Roman Ondak’s *Loop*.

Until the 19th century, the main difficulty was in having a standard interpretation of the variety of artistic activities; however, it was not an issue whether or not an object was an art work or whether or not a painting or sculpture was a painting or a sculpture. Until the twentieth century, it was not common to have art works where the receiver could have feel an urge to confuse them with common objects. At the most, dispute concerned the quality of art work: whether the representation of a female nude was acceptable unless delivered with some mythological reference (Manet’s *Olympia*), or whether a technique was acceptable if it evoked a sense of incompleteness (in 1874, Louis Leroy stated the following about Monet’s painting *Impression, Rising Sun*: “A preliminary drawing for a wallpaper pattern is more finished than this seascape”), or whether it was acceptable to use flashy colors (Leo Stein, American art critic, who collected Matisse’s paintings, characterized the *Woman with a Hat* as follows: “the most repulsive pot of paint I’ve ever seen”).

However, the twentieth century abounds with phenomena where first we have to decide whether they are art works at all; and only after this decision can we pose the question of what artistic values they have. Breakthrough is hallmarked by Marcel Duchamp, who registered a piece with the title *Fountain* for the exhibition organized in 1917 in New York by the Association of Independent Artists. That work of art was practically a urinal bought in a shop and signed with a pseudonym. Obviously, this object does not represent and does not express anything, nor can the theory of significant form be applied to is, especially if we take into account that Duchamp himself declared that he chose the object because of it was aesthetically neutral. This object, one of the first readymades, was accepted

\[ ^6 \text{Roman Ondak: *The Loop*. At the Venice Biennale of 2009, Roman Ondak planted the Slovak pavilion with the same vegetation that grows in Giardiniban, thus the pavilion is a mere continuation of the outdoor garden.} \]

\[ ^7 \text{Dempsey, Amy: *A modern művészet története* [Art in the Modern Era]. Képzőművészi Kiadó, 2003, 14.} \]

\[ ^8 \text{idem 69.} \]

by the art world, although none of the traditional art definitions are ade-
quate for it. Later, visual arts made room for processes that were not objec-
tified in an object or in a work of art in the traditional sense: performance
is specifically a genre which focuses on the moment experienced, and it is
survived at best by its photo, film record or story related. The question of
identification is still very live: in the 2009 Venice Biennale, one could eas-
ily pass by the works of Roman Ondak or the winner Tobias Rehberger\(^{10}\)
without noticing that they were part of the exhibition.

Developments in the art world generated the art theories that
endeavored to integrate Jackson Pollock’s dripped canvases, readymade,
performance, Andy Warhol’s Brillo boxes and conceptual art. Of the art
theories elaborated in the second part of the twentieth century, the most
significant ones are Clement Greenberg’s version of formalism, George
Dickie’s institutional theory and Arthur Danto’s contextual theory built
on a metaphorical structure.

Clement Greenberg is known to many as the pope of abstract
expressionism. Similarly to England’s Clive Bell, who a few decades
before had attempted through his formalist theory to make room for
postimpressionism that scandalized traditional tastes, Clement Greenberg
endeavored to support avant-garde abstraction in American culture.
Thanks to his effect, \textit{abstract expressionism} was institutionalized as a spe-
cific American movement after World War II.

He published his study \textit{Modernist Painting}\(^{11}\) in 1960, sketching a
theoretical line that would connect Kant’s critical work with avant-garde
artistic endeavors. In this writing, Greenberg describes modernism as the
carrier of Kant’s form of self-criticism. He interprets Kant’s procedure as
a self-reflexive critique of philosophy, that is, the immanent critique of
discipline. The core of modernism is the reflexive use of the discipline’s
own methods in order to determine its own limits and thereby grow stron-
ger within those boundaries. For instance, painting must resist sculptural
forms, it must find its own rules. According to Greenberg, the essence of
painting is bi-dimensionality, the plain surface. This is why abstract paint-

\(^{10}\) Tobias Rehberger: \textit{Was du liebst, bringt dich auch zum Weinen (Cafetaria)}. The coffee shop
arranged by Tobias Rehberger was operated and used as a real coffee shop, selling and
consuming coffee, soft drinks, muffins, just as in any other coffee shop.

\(^{11}\) http://www.sharecom.ca/greenberg/modernism.html. Downloaded: 18 December
2010
ing is important: it makes it evident that everything can be ignored—theme, mimicking reality, perspective, shading, etc.—except for bi-dimensionality.

Clement Greenberg’s description is important in the identification as art works of creations such as Jackson Pollock’s paintings or Frank Stella’s black canvases (to which many react as “I can do this too!”, and rule them out from the dimension of art which is expected to be “the creation of the genius”). However, Greenberg does not tackle and cannot tackle Duchamp’s readymades or pop art.

Besides Duchamp’s Fountain, it is Andy Warhol’s pop art that poses another challenge to art theory. By the middle of the century, it seemed that abstract expressionism was the last phase in the evolution of art, that painting revealed its own essence, and there was no way back (for instance, back to the direction of figurativity), nor was there a possibility for renewal. However, in the sixties, pop art challenged the demand for clean lines and forms and abstraction. The demand for modernist clearness is condensed in Mies van der Rohe’s famous motto: “Less is more”. But the mood of the 60s is expressed by Robert Venturi’s reply: “Less is a bore”.

Clement Greenberg managed to phrase a theoretical framework which could serve as basis for the art world to accept non-representation-al art. However, legitimating the receipt of Andy Warhol (or Tom Wesselman, Jeff Koons, Jasper Johns) required Arthur C. Danto’s and George Dickie’s art theory.

George Dickie’s institutional definition was elaborated in 1969. According to this concept, the art world’s agents are those who attribute the term “artistic” to artifacts, and people (e.g. artists) do this, on assignment by the art world.

Art work in the descriptive sense is (1) an artifact (2) that was endowed – by society or a group of society – with the status of beneficiary of appreciation.12

This theory was seen by many as being circular: art works are defined by artists, while artists are those who create art works. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine who actually the art world’s “agent” is, who has the right to legitimately call an artifact “art work”.

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There may appear a concern that “assigning” art works involves a large amount of arbitrariness, and does not refer to axiological criteria. However, such type of an approach has advantages too. Its first merit is that it can be made universal: as it is completely independent from the substantial or formal features of the works, it can be applied to any type of artifact, including any future form of artistic practice. Moreover, Dickie’s interpretation of the term “artifact” means that even the objects found are considered to be artifacts starting the point where the artist picked them out from their environment. Dickie’s theory reminds one that art work is not created and does not function in an empty space, and it is insufficient to relate to it by simply starting with the work itself: one must take into account the art work’s historical-social context as well.

In this latter issue, Dickie follows Arthur C. Danto, who elaborated the concept of the “Artworld” in 1964 (“The Artworld”), for the very purpose of emphasizing the indispensability of contextual approach. Danto was greatly influenced by Andy Warhol’s work, and in his writings, he often uses the example of Brillo boxes or the Campbell soup can. In order to phrase the question of the art works’ identity in its full depth, Danto elaborates the argument of the visually indistinguishable pairs. Let’s assume that there is a warehouse where we can find the perceptually identical pairs of art works which are not themselves art works. Danto claims that the identification of the art work depends also on the identification of the author, if there are art works that are visually indistinguishable from their natural pairs. If a child, a forger or an artist creates similar objects, these objects will have their own identity, as they are embedded in differing traditions of art history.

Arthur C. Danto proposes an art concept that takes into account the social-historic context and approaches art works based on their metaphorical structure: art works have rhetoric structures, they do not have to be read literally, and we use them to change human attitude in some regards.

Construing art works as metaphors is a proposal which could indeed function in case of each object. The only problem is that the metaphorical structure could act as the genus proximum of art works, but the differencia specifica is still missing.

As we could see, we do not have a generally accepted “one size fits all” definition to rely on in the problem of the art works’ identity. How-
ever, all of the art theories presented here capture an essential element, and can be applied successfully to certain domains of art. Thus, the best thing to do is to consider Wittgenstein’s proposal, according to which we are not seeking an essential feature that can be found in each individual piece, but a batch of features which reveal familial similarities in art works. Based on these familial similarities, we can determine the identification of art works as art works on a generic basis. And we must prepare for a future extension of the list of these features in parallel with artistic practice.

2. Uniqueness of the work of art (specific thesis)

In case of art works, identity takes the form of uniqueness which is not the rule, but the exception in case of objects created by man. In case of devices, practical goods (bed, table, car, toothbrush, shoes, etc.), we do not speak of individual items, but of pieces, copies. However, art works are not newer pieces or copies, but claim an identity that resembles rather human identity than the nature of practical goods. I am going to approach the identity of art works in three steps. The first aspect is the organic thesis, where the question arises about the uniqueness of the art work in terms of materiality. In the second step, I am going to look at the effect on the art work’s identity of the hermeneutical thesis which suggests that the work is finished in the receiver. In the third step, I am going to examine whether the author is part of the work’s identity.

A. The organic thesis

Art works are traditionally seen as indissoluble units. Thus, albeit a painting or a sculpture is a physical and inorganic object, it functions rather as a live organism: it is a system which one cannot add to or subtract from anything without making it lose its identity. A five centimeter stripe cannot be cut off from a painting without changing the painting itself: even if the stripe cut off is empty, its absence changes the proportions of the painting, that is, it changes the painting itself. In this regard, perhaps the identity of a work of art is even more definite than the identity of live organisms. The speciality of a work does not consist solely of whether it represents a shoe or a ship, but also of formal features which
are not of representational nature: line, shape, drawing, proportions, lines of force, composition, color, etc. These parts of the art work are indeed unchangeable, as these determine the aesthetical features of the art work.

In the sixties, Frank Sibley, on analytical philosophical grounds, posed the question about aesthetic properties. If there are aesthetic properties distinguishable from other properties, then these would evidently be relevant for works of art.

Sibley assumes this very difference:

“Many judgments about the shape, color, sound, wording, subject matter, or composition of things, including works of art, are such that it would be ludicrous to suggest that aesthetic sensitivity, perceptiveness, or taste had been exhibited in making them. (...) By contrast, there are other judgments the making of which could be clearly be said to exhibit an exercise of aesthetic sensitivity or perceptiveness.”

Sibley calls the properties of the first category non-aesthetic properties (e.g. large, circular, green, slow), while the second group forms the category of aesthetic properties (e.g. graceful, glaring, balanced, touching, powerful). Non-aesthetic properties are noted by everyone, while noticing aesthetic properties requires a particular ability – taste. Disputes on aesthetics do not arise because people don’t see non-aesthetic properties, but because they cannot observe the aesthetic properties rising out of those.

One may notice that Sibley does not think of the traditional “big” aesthetic categories: beautiful or sublime. He calls the latter ones *verdictive aesthetic judgments*, as these determine whether or not work of art is good:

“I called “verdicts”. I regard them as very different from judgments of the second type – for example, that something is gaudy, or graceful, or balance – and as raising largely different, though occasionally overlapping, questions... Nowhere in my paper did I discuss judgments of the first type.”

Sibley assumes complex relations between the three types of properties and the judgments built on them. While one cannot infer aesthetic properties logically from non-aesthetic properties, the aesthetic judg-

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ments and the cumulative value judgments are related more closely. There are aesthetic properties that in any case can be evaluated as being positive in a work of art (e.g. balance, gracefulness, ingenuity).

Based on the organic thesis, we can consider the aesthetic properties of a work of art to be essential properties of the work of art. However, two questions arise: the first one asks whether the aesthetic properties of a work of art are sufficient for defining the work’s identity? The second question is: are the aesthetic properties of an art work in each case necessary elements of the work’s identity?

The first question arises in case of “perceptually indistinguishable pairs” which Arthur C. Danto so fondly discusses 15. Yet, let us begin with an example discussed by Garry Hagberg in one of his studies. Hagberg describes two cases which apparently support the mimetic theory, that is, they are representational works, and points out that, nevertheless, the essence of the works does not reside in resemblance with exterior objects. For our purposes, the analysis of one of Watteau’s works is particularly relevant; Hagberg describes the theme of this work as follows:

“The ladies are being escorted by the gentlemen onto the ship which will carry them back from the island. The gentlemen seem to hasten the departure from the island, while the ladies, reluctant to leave the lovers’ retreat, seem to hesitate” 16.

The issue becomes complex by the fact that the painting is known under two titles: The Departure from Cythera and The Departure to Cythera. Hagberg notes:

“If Watteau’s title included ‘to’ rather than ‘from’, the reluctance of the ladies takes on a different meaning, as do their expressions” 17.

The above example demonstrates quite convincingly that an art work becomes different (says something else, reads differently, has another impact) if the title is different 18.

17 Ibidem
18 This case is also mentioned by Danto (Danto, C. Arthur: The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art. Columbia University Press, New York, 2005, 49)
Arthur C. Danto’s scholarly experiment points to the same direction. His takes as his starting point a painting which is described by Kierkegaard: Either/Or presents an anecdote about an artist who had to create a fresco about the Israelites as they crossed the Red Sea – so he painted the wall in red, explaining that the Israelites all crossed, while the Egyptians all drowned in the sea. Danto lists several paintings that look the same way: the painting of a Danish painter called Kierkegaard’s mood, a realistic painting titled Red Square, a minimalist painting bearing the title Red Rectangle, and: Nirvana, Red Table Cloth in Matisse’s style, canvas primed by Giorgione.

He goes on noting:
“this completes my exhibition. The catalogue for it, which is in full color, would be monotonous, since everything looks the same as everything else, even though the reproductions are of paintings that belong to such diverse genres as historical painting, psychological portraiture, landscape, geometrical abstraction, religious art, and still-life. It also contains pictures of something from the workshop of Giorgone, as well as something that is a mere thing, with no pretense whatsoever to the exalted status of art”19.

Danto then discusses the case of Duchamp’s snow-shovel and the snow-shovel undistinguishable from it: we accept one of them as being a work of art, while the other one is “merely an object”. If there is a difference between them – Danto concludes – then it is not based on aesthetic properties, as Sibley described those:
“If aesthetic response is always and only to what meets the eye (or ear or whatever other sense), It is difficult to see where aesthetic difference can lie, given the indiscriminability of our snow shovels. So if there is to be a difference, it must lie logically hidden from the senses”20.

These cases point to the insufficiency of the organic thesis: in case of works of art, it is not only the aesthetic properties that count; in most cases, other circumstances are also relevant parts of the identity of artworks: the title, the author, circumstances in which the art work was cre-

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ated. These aspects are determined by interpretation, therefore Danto claims that interpretation itself transforms material objects into works of art:

“It will have been observed that indiscernible objects become, quite different and distinct works of art by dint of distinct and different interpretations, so I shall think of interpretations as functions which transform material objects into works of art. Interpretation is in effect the lever with which an object is lifted out of the real world and into the art-world, where it becomes vested in often unexpected raiment. Only in relationship to an interpretation is a material object an artwork.”

Danto’s analysis reveals not only that the aesthetic properties are not sufficient for determining the identity of a work of art, but also that interpretation is the one that decides which aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties pertain to the artwork.

The universality of the organic thesis can be questioned from other perspectives too, namely from the perspective of open works.

Umberto Eco was the one to drawn attention to the ontological particularity of open works, in his homonymous writing, published in 1962. Here Eco starts with musical works where the author does not define the works completely, that is, where he leaves it up to the performer which groups of musical notes to start with, or which order to use for playing the sections. His examples include two fine art works: Calder’s mobiles, which are light structures that react to air movement, changing their own space and shape, and an object created by Bruno Munari, which is a colored collage seen through a lanterna magica by the receiver who actually directs the image created, by moving the rotating lens.

Involving the receiver in perfecting the artwork – an exception in the mid-twentieth century – is a process more and more frequently applied starting from the second part of the twentieth century when creations often include “unfinished” works, interactive works which get their final shape through the receiver’s activity. An excellent agent for this purpose is provided by visual media, with its temporary image that does

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22 Eco, Umberto: Nyitott mű [The Open Work]. Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2006
not occupy space (is located nowhere). In 2003, the “Aura” exhibition was organized in Budapest, displaying artworks created by digital technology, where half of the works were “interactive works also in the physical sense”\(^23\). Extremely interesting among these was George Legrady’s work *Pockets Full of Memories*, which consisted of an installation and a related website. The work instructed the visitor to scan an object selected arbitrarily on site, then fill in a digital form answering questions related to the object. Afterwards, the objects were classified in the system based on their similar properties, and were placed on a bi-dimensional map which also displayed the visitor’s personal comments on the object. A constantly increasing database and an object-map based on it – organized along the relations – was created with the visitors’ contribution. The interesting aspect in this artwork is that albeit it integrated the accidental element, it still gave the semblance of rigorousness, thank to its table-likeness and the rhythm of accidentally repeating object types (hands, keys, certificates).

The receiver’s activity was required also by the AURA trick table co-authored by Zoltán Szegedy-Maszák – Márton Fernezelyi, where the image formed on the neat surface of a cup placed on the table changed as the cup was moved.

In case of similar works, the organic thesis is unusable: we cannot determine which of its physical states the artwork is identical with. More precisely: the artwork has a real, invariable frame (such as a technical infrastructure, program) and a batch of possibilities which contributes to the definition of the artwork’s identity in a more spectacular way than the stable elements do.

In summary, we can say that albeit the organic thesis and the related aesthetic properties built on the non-aesthetic properties connected to this thesis are valid for a major part of art history and useful in determining the identity of artworks, still there are several artworks that can be pointed out in the twentieth century art where perceptual properties are not essential and are not sufficient for identifying the actual artworks.

B. The hermeneutical thesis

The above conclusion is valid even if we accept the thesis which postulates that “the reader is the one who finishes the work of art”, that is “the text becomes a work of art only through the interaction between the text and the receiver”\(^24\). The dialogical reception model of hermeneutics considers the moment of interpretation to be essential, as being part of the work and not a consequence that can be separate from the work. If interpretation takes place through the mergence of the work’s horizon with the receiver’s horizon, then logically there are as many interpretations created as the number of receivers. And if interpretation is part of the work, then the apparent identity of the work becomes infinitely fragmented.

Let’s take, for example, one painting of Van Gogh, which presents boots (shoes). Apparently, the identity of the work is not problematic, the work’s identity and uniqueness is secured by fixed physical properties. We are speaking of the painting that Heidegger used as a starting point in his work *The Origin of the Work of Art* in his endeavor to illustrate how a work of art opens up a world. Heidegger’s famous analysis suggests that the painting represents the shoes of a peasant woman, and the philosopher provides a touching description of the painting:

“From out of the dark opening of the well-worn insides of the shoes, the toil of the worker’s tread stares forth. In the crudely solid heavi-

ness of the shoes accumulates the tenacity of the slow trudge through the far-stretching and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lies the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. The shows vibrate with the silent call of the earth, its silent gift of the ripening grain, its unexplained self-refusal in the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, wordless joy at hav-

ing once more withstood want, trembling before the impending birth, and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth and finds protection in the world of the peasant woman.”\(^25\) (Hei-


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\(^{24}\) Ricoeur, Paul: *Válogatott irodalmi tanulmányok* [Selected Literary Studies], Osiris, 1999, 294.

Issues begin where Meyer Schapiro – manifesting the typical methodology of the analytics, identified the painting which Heidegger described. Indeed, Van Gogh produced not one, but eight paintings with the theme of shoes or boots, and Heidegger’s description would fit most of these. Therefore, Schapiro asked Heidegger which one he thought of, and thus, he identified a painting brushed of a pair of boots in 1886 (Schapiro 1994). Using Van Gogh’s correspondence with Gauguin, Schapiro also traced down that the boots were Van Gogh’s own shoes of particular importance for the owner. Based on this, Schapiro presents the boots as a metaphor of the artist’s life, relying on biographical data and perceptual description alike.

It transpires from the above example that even in case of a traditional painting, where identification as a work of art is unquestionable and the work possesses fixed physical features, the identity of the work of art depends on whom the represented shoes belong to, which cannot be determined at all simply based on perceptual properties. And this almost makes us think of two different works.

Thus, the hermeneutical perspective confirms the assumption that non-perceptual properties essential contribute to defining the identity of a work of art.

C. The question of authorship

There is one non-perceptual property that contributes to the greatest extent to defining the identity of the work: the work’s author. This aspect has gained such importance that the names of well-known authors have grown into being genres (“this is a Rembrandt!”). The author impresses its personality on the value of a work to such an extent that an acclaimed author’s name provides sufficient guarantee for the quality of the work.

This perception seemed to be so natural for a few centuries, that Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* integrated “fine art is the art of the genius” as a universal thesis besides “aesthetic distance” and “disinterested liking”.

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From a historical point of view, the concept of authorship does not seem to possess such universality. The dominant vision in the Middle Ages considered that true thoughts originated directly from God, thus the one God used as instrument for expressing the truth seemed quite of no importance.

The author’s conscience is a modern product: it came into prominence during the Renaissance. In case of artworks, the author’s signature becomes a sort of a letter of guarantee. The signature warrants the “originality” of the work and the genuineness of its identity. The author is the most important component of a work’s identity – for this very reason, the original picture must be distinguished carefully from its copy (prepared for academic purposes, for example) and from a counterfeit, which attempts to appropriate the original work’s identity.

The simple perception of authorship is not as self-evident as it seems. On the one hand, it is not quite clear why a counterfeit seen as an original should lose its value simply because it is found that it was authored by someone else. And then, why should a signature automatically endow a work with value?

I’d like to evoke two cases. The first one is the case of Han van Meegeren who painted Vermeer pieces: that is, he brushed very credible canvases processing new themes in Vermeer’s style (e.g. religious themes which were not typical of Vermeer). The best contemporaneous art critics confirmed that the canvases were original Vermeer, and considered *The Supper at Emmaus* – a clever fake – to be more valuable than the other Vermeers known. Han van Meegeren went down when it was discovered that during World War II he sold a “Vermeer” to Göring, and after the war, the Dutch government sued him for high treason which incurred the death penalty. Han van Meegeren could hardly convince the judges that he brushed the paintings: he painted another Vermeer in prison, demonstrating his innocence in the high treason lawsuit. This case poses the question why *The Supper at Emmaus* so greatly admired by the critics when considered a Vermeer lost its value when it was discovered that van Meegeren painted it? Why would the Dutch government be ready to execute a man for selling a Vermeer to Göring, but was not interested in a van Meegeren being sold to the enemy? *The Supper at Emmaus* – albeit physically and perceptually remaining the same object, it seems its identity changed along with the author.
The second case concerns a doubtful gossip about Dalí who during his last years is thought to have signed empty canvases and papers on which counterfeits were brushed later, therefore museums and galleries are very cautious about Dalí’s works created during his last period. If this is true, then the question arises: does signature, as an essential element of the work’s identity, function or not in this case? If the signature does not function, then the style marks for determining whether or not a painting is “a Dalí” are much more uncertain and arguable. A similar case is reported about Giorgio de Chirico, who forged “early de Chiricos” as a famous artist, one the one hand, and denied authorship about creations which the museums and private collections thought to be de Chiricos, on the other hand.

In case of the canvases signed Van Meegeren and Dalí, it is fairly simple to start with a traditional theoretical frame and state that the concerned pieces were forgeries. However, the twentieth century witnessed events that strongly questioned the idea of authorship.

Roland Barthes’s expression, suspected to be a meme, – the author’s death – captures a complex phenomenon: authors have started to withdraw from behind the works. The aesthetics of the genius began to fade by the mid-twentieth century, and the author (and its intention) is surrounded by far less respect than in the 19t century. There are several signs pointing to this shift.

One of these signs is the idea of automatic writing (or drawing) promoted by the surrealists, through which the unconscious itself speaks, without the control of the ego. The genius theory always emphasized that remnant element through which the genius’s functioning differed from the normal, rational functioning of humans, an irrational element which was necessary for the genius to create masterpieces. However, surrealists did not see this irrational, unconscious element as a remnant, but as a first drive of creation, and the creative process was deemed to parenthesize the author’s personality. Albeit surrealist artists were characterized by a strong artistic consciousness and they consciously shaped their image of genius (for example, Dalí is said to have enounced the following: “Every morning when I wake up, I experience an exquisite joy — the joy of being Salvador Dalí”), the use of automatic writing and drawing signals the withdrawal of the author from behind the work.

The genre of the ready-made points to a similar direction: here the author does not create an object, but takes it out of its environment, and
perhaps this is a minimum gesture which can still be called creation – the minimum level of authorship. Traditionally, the author leaves “its hand mark” on the work of art: for example, Rembrandt’s style is hard to confuse with Gauguin’s style. In the ready-made, the author does no longer wish to see his “hand mark” on the work of art. The case is often similar in conceptual art works: Joseph Kossuth’s One and Three Chairs bears no perceptual marks, Robert Barry’s work ALL THE THINGS I KNOW BUT OF WHICH I AM NOT AT THE MOMENT THINKING – 1:36 PM JUNE 15. 1969 also lacks the author’s hand mark – that which Duchamp ironically called “la patte” (the paw).

We could interpret in a similar way the works that are structurally unfinished (using Umberto Eco’s term – “works in motion”27) or interactive: here the author waives his privilege of deciding what the final and unchangeable form of the artwork is; moreover, the final form of the artwork is a mystery to the author. The artwork is released out of the hands of the author as possibility, continuing its own life independently from the author.

In the afore-mentioned cases, the author withdrew from behind the work voluntarily. However, the operation of “appropriation” does not ask for the author’s permission, and the work’s identity is determined by a sort of a double authorship: that of the original author and that of the “appropriator”.

The works of Elaine Sturtevant who has achieved recognition as a “copy artist” consist entirely of the accurate copying of other artists’ works, especially the famous contemporary artists Elaine Sturtevant had started to copy before they gained fame: Andy Warhol, Joseph Beuys, Frank Stella. It is quite difficult to establish the identity of a painting Elaine Sturtevant brushed of Andy Warhol’s flower print for which Andy Warhol used a work by the photographer Patricia Caulfield (without asking for the photographer’s permission, which resulted in a copyright lawsuit). And it is quite difficult to distinguish Frank Stella’s strictly geometrical paintings presenting parallel black stripes, from his black period, from the copy made by Elaine Sturtevant. The perceptual differences between them are irrelevant, yet one copy is a Stella painting, while another one is Elaine Sturtevant.

27 Works that “characteristically consist of unplanned or physically incomplete structural units”, Eco, Umberto: The Open Work, Harvard University Press, 1989, 12
Equally distressing is the work of the appropriation artist Sherrie Levine, especially the “After Walker Evans” series. Walker Evans is a famous photographer who roamed America in the thirties, and took well-known social photos. And in the seventies, Sherrie Levine re-photographed them out of a catalogue, and then presented them under her own name, with the afore-mentioned title. Again, here we find two works displaying only slight perceptual differences that are nevertheless different, based on authorship. Sherrie Levine’s works are usually interpreted as a practical critique of the concepts of authorship and originality. While Sturtevant recreates the works in a real and physical way, and her work can be construed as tribute to the works copied and as contribution to their survival in their specific originality and individuality, works by Sherrie Levine and of appropriation artists can be construed as a critique of concepts driving art world. It is hard to outperform Sherrie Levine in questioning authorship, yet, there was someone who accomplished this: the American internet artist Michael Mandiberg born in 1977, who created an online shop where original Mandiberg copies of Sherrie Levine’s “After Walker Evans” series could be procured along with certificates of authenticity28.

Conclusion

Albeit it would be very useful to have a theory that states the properties which define works of arts, and make their identity unquestionable, regrettably we do not have one.

For the generic thesis – determining “what a work of art is” in a way that could be condensed in a definition or an art theory -, we cannot find a theory that is acceptable in all aspects. We can determine that the mimesis theory lost its monopoly of several centuries by the 19th century, and competing theories emerged (art as expression, art as form, artwork as artifact considered worthy of appreciation, etc.). Seemingly, art cannot be defined, but solely some familial similarities can be established among works of art. Perhaps we should accept that the various dictionaries could be applied more or less on various fields (branches of art, genres, artworks), in this field, we do not possess a universal dictionary.

28 http://www.aftersherrielevine.com/imagesA.html
In case of the specific thesis, the situation is equally colorful and disconcerting. In the first part of the twentieth century, we learned that the non-aesthetic properties of artworks set the ground for the aesthetic properties, and these form the essence of artworks. At the same time, critique parted with authorship-centeredness, and the concept of “intentional fallacy” has become widely accepted. This type of approach, which reduces the core of the work’s identity to the work’s structural properties and sees the author’s intention as being irrelevant, seems to have lost ground in the 60s against a larger contextualism. The case of perceptually indistinguishable pairs demonstrates that perceptual properties are insufficient for defining the identity of artworks, and non-perceptual properties, such as the author, the historical and cultural context must also be taken into consideration.

One of the most unchallengeable features of an artwork’s identity – the fact that it is a creator’s work – is questioned by artists themselves, by exercising the method of “appropriation” and by their approach to authorship in their works and their artistic attitude.

Reviewing the difficulties posed by the issue of identity of artworks, it may seem we reached an aporia. I believe we still have some aspects to rely on:

– We must abandon the thought that an artwork can be defined based on established criteria. I find Wittgenstein’s idea of “familial similarities” to be more useful in identifying the groups of artworks.

– The next challenge we must tackle is the movable nature of boundaries between art and non-art, which means that the identity of the artwork itself is in motion.

– Contemporary artistic attitudes challenge both the author’s identity and the identity of the work, and we must be acknowledge this fact.

– Nevertheless, old or new descriptive models (mimetic, expressionist, formalist, etc.) can by no means be discarded: albeit none of them can be raised to a universal level, all of them fit certain groups of artworks.

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29 Monroe Beardsley’s thesis according to which the author’s intention is not relevant for the interpretation of the work.
As we have seen, the issue of the identity of artworks is more complex in contemporary arts than ever. Artwork is not a stable object, the creator is not a subject that can be identified simply. The entire art history context, social context, and process of reception are all parts of the identity of a work.

The fragmentation of the identity of an artwork is parallel with the movements that take place in personal identity so well reflected by the statement of the Hungarian writer Péter Esterházy about the “self”: the “self” in postmodernism “is a fiction which we can at most co-author”. Similarly, an artwork as an object and its creator are actually not determinants of an artwork’s identity, but co-authors of it.

Translated by Annamária Ámik

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